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SHARING THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN- 
CANADIAN FISHERIES RELATIONS
CHAPTER I
PRESSURES FOR CHANGE: A FISHERIES
NEGOTIATIONS SCHEMA FOR 
OPEN POLITIES
The sea, breathing. The fish 
leaps into the air.
Far Tortuga^
Peter Matthiessen
The sea still breathes, the fish still leap. World 
fisheries, however, are experiencing dramatic changes as 
fishermen expand their efforts to use the living resources 
of the sea. Biological researchers " . . .  predict that by 
the year 2000 the potential, maximum, annual yield of tra­
ditional fisheries will have reached its upper limit. Com­
petition for fish will then increase, and the historical 
view of fish resources as the common property of the peoples 
of the earth and thus as available to whomever would
2exploit them will not survive.” Such modern day assertions 
are in great contrast to Hugo Grotius' classical argument 
that maritime fisheries should be free to all men, since the 
sea is free to all.^
There is a vast body of international law that per­
tains to the fisheries of the world. Kaldone Nweihed has 
estimated that since the seventeenth century ”. . . nearly 
223 international agreements relating to fisheries and ques­
tions affecting the use and conservation of the living
4resources of the sea . . . ” have been set forth. As noted 
ocean observer Elisabeth Mann Borgese has indicated,
" . . .  fishing is an ancient use, covered by a variety of 
rules, local, regional, and international. To scrap these 
whether or not they work, and to institute *ex novo' a uni­
versal set of rules for the global management of fisheries 
would be uneconomical, to put it mildly.”^ Thus, the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conferences and other international, 
regional, and national bodies' attempts to regulate the 
usage of the sea's living resources should be considered as 
another layer of international sea law supported by an already 
existent base.
In modern times, there have been two periods of ex­
pansive fishery development. The first occurred during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, primarily 
among the nations of Europe, North America, and Japan.® 
Fisheries researcher Hiroshi Kasahara has indicated that a
" . . .  second massive wave of development came after World 
War II, and we are still witnessing its world wide effect.”  ̂
The Soviet Union, Japan, the United States, Canada, many 
European countries, and developing nations such as South 
Korea, India, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Panama have greatly 
expanded their fishery operations. Since the waters adja­
cent to North America are very rich in living resources, a 
sizable part of the great expansion in fishing operations 
has occurred off the coasts of Canada and the United States.
R. M. Logan has clearly summarized current fisheries 
dilemmas facing Canada and the United States.
The introduction of advanced technology and an 
unprecedented intensification of foreign fishing 
effort during the past twenty years have altered 
[the fishery] situation dramatically. Alien fleets 
acquired the capacity to deplete fish stocks in the 
western hemisphere and have done so in a number of 
cases to the detriment of North Americans. These 
new circumstances have conspired to produce strains 
in Canada-U.S. relations because the Canadian 
government initiated unilateral steps to blunt the 
effects of the operations of distant fishingnations.8
In order to more clearly assess fishery relations 
between Canada and the United States, it is important to 
provide a working vocabulary of important fishery terms to 
be used throughout the dissertation. Moreover, specific 
types of fisheries as well as management/conservation con­
cepts will be detailed. Lastly, this chapter will provide 
a "fisheries negotiations schema for open polities," The 
central purpose of the schema will be to facilitate a clearer 
understanding of the efforts of Canada and the United States
to rekindle an environment of fisheries cooperation amid 
the complex pressuring of the national and international 
policy influencera existent today.
Fishery Terminology
The phrase "living resources of the sea” found in 
numerous contemporary marine conventions and bilateral agree-
gments refers to all vegetable and animal life contained in 
the oceans. To date, ". . man's development and manage­
ment of the living resources of the sea is largely confined 
to 'fishery resources,' a term which includes sea mammals 
as well as all fish and fishlike c r e a t u r e s . D o u g l a s  M. 
Johnston indicates that fish and fishlike creatures ". . . can 
be divided into three groups according to their mode of life; 
drifters (plankton), swimmers (nekton), and fixed organisms 
(benthos).
Plankton consists of zooplankton, tiny " . . .  animals 
that cannot swim against strong ocean currents . . .," 
and phytoplankton, vegetable matter and tiny plants that 
are a fundamental base for all marine life. The swimmers 
or nekton " . . .  include most fishes, squids, and whales,"H 
while the fixed organisms or benthos refer to primarily 
sedentary forms of animal life, such as mollusks (scallops, 
oysters, clams, and conchs) and crustaceans (crabs, lobsters, 
and shrimp). Since high commercial value is attached to the 
fishes, mollusks, and crustaceans found in North American 
waters, it is understandable that the primary policy-making
questions to be analyzed in this dissertation are centered 
on the usage and conservation of these living sea resources.
What is a fishery, and what scientific terms are 
used to delineate different types of fisheries? In a broad 
sense, a fishery is a place where fish and other living sea 
products are caught or obtained. Johnston notes that the 
term "fishery" . . is sometimes used to refer not only 
to the raw resource itself, but also to all the men, money, 
and machinery engaged in the primary and secondary phases 
of the fishing industry; the seagoing men, craft, and gear, 
in the initial extractive phase; and the shore installations, 
trade facilities, and people in the servicing phase.
Regarding the raw resources of the "fisheries," it
is important to point out that there are more than 20,000
species of bony fish which " . . .  are specialized for all
sorts of situations, and . . . have found countless ways
of exploiting the ocean's varied stores of food."^^ It is
possible to divide bony fish into two general categories:
pelagic and demersal. Pelagic fish are those which feed
near the surface of the water, such as salmon, mackerel,
herring, and tuna. Demersal fish are the 'bottom-feeders'
— those such as the halibut, haddock, cod, flounder, and
whiting which live " . . .  mainly in shallow waters where
there is enough light to permit photosynthesis; [such species]
can live on dense concentrations of seafood in the form of
16animal plankton."
Certain kinds of fish have been given special 
nomenclature because of their particular spawning practices. 
Anadromous fish, most notably salmon, white perch, and 
sturgeon, live the majority of their life cycle in the sea, 
but spawn in fresh water. Catadromous fish, including many 
eels, are those species that live in fresh water but spawn 
in the sea. The United States and Canada have special in­
terests in managing such fish stocks, especially the 
anadromous Salmon that flourish off the coasts of both 
countries and spawn in over 2,000 North American rivers 
and streams.
A question is often raised about the usage of the
word "stock" as it pertains to fish. There are a great many
definitions of a fish stock, but " . . .  the one favoured by
most biologists is 'a single interbreeding and intermingling
17unit of one species of fish.'" Often this general defini­
tion is modified to fit a given situation. The use of the 
word stock " . . .  was stretched to a considerable extent in 
the treaty with Japan and Canada, in which a stock of salmon 
was described as consisting of all of the species of salmon
that are caught in a major fishing area of Alaska through-
18out the season."
Lastly, a fisheries term that has created much debate 
and dispute among a number of countries needs to be clarified. 
What is the appropriate definition of sedentary species of 
living resources? Sedentary species are generally thought
to be those " . . .  organisms which, at the harvestable 
stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the
19sea-bed or the subsoil." The principal problem
". . . which has arisen concerning the treatment of seden­
tary species is the precise nature of such species included
within the definition contained in Art. 2(4) of the Contin-
20ental Shelf Convention." Disputes, for example, continue
to ensue over some species of lobsters which might be con­
sidered swimmers or nekton rather than sedentary forms of 
animal life. As the commercial value of such crustaceans 
continues to rise, it seems likely that "definitional" 
disputes between nations will remain an important part of 
the contemporary fisheries negotiating environment.
Types of Fisheries 
Today, it is generally held that oceanic fisheries 
" . . .  are characterized by a limited supply, many users with 
many different purposes and values, and the high costs of 
achieving and maintaining effective management of the resource. 
Conflict has thus been inevitable, and as nations expand their 
fishing capabilities as well as their jurisdictional claims,
fisheries management— which includes conflict resolution—
21becomes a necessity in and among the maritime nations."
Among the characteristics of fishery resources,
Francis T. Christy stipulates that fisheries " . . .  stocks 
are wild resources not readily subject to cultivation in the
8
marine environment. There is, thus, a limit to the yield
of each individual stock. . . .  In the past decade, the
rate at which stocks have become depleted has increased
rapidly and the increase in the world catch of fish has
22slackened off significantly." The "fugitive" nature of 
the living resources of the sea must also be kept in mind. 
"The fact that fish do not respect man's boundaries in the
sea creates particular difficulties for management and for
1..... 23the distribution of benefits." Moreover, it is important 
to realize that", . . there are frequently strong interre­
lationships among stocks of different species, so that the
24catching of one stock affects the yield of others."
Christy couples the " . . .  disparity in the migratory 
behavior of different marine organisms, ranging from seden­
tary species, such as oysters, to highly migratory species,
25such as tuna . . " with the different boundaries of
national jurisdiction. The resultant typology creates 
. i five separate kinds of situations, as noted below:
I. Unshared Stock. The stock is fully enclosed 
within the jurisdiction of a single state 
(e.g., oysters).
II. Shared Stock. The stock is enclosed within 
the jurisdiction of two or more adjacent or 
ôpposité states (e.g., Peruvian-Chilean 
anchoveta).
III. Highly Migratory Stoqk. The stock falls both 
within the jurisdiction of two or more states 
and outside national jurisdictions (e.g., 
skipjack tuna in the eastern Pacific).
IV. ^adromous Stock. The stock occurs in the 
fresh or estuarine waters of a single state
and also outside that state's jurisdiction 
on the high seas (e.g., salmon).
V. High Seas Stock. The stock occurs only 
outside of national jurisdiction (e.g., certain Antarctic w h a l e s ) . "26
If one accepts the definition of "fishery" as a 
place where fish and other living marine products are caught 
or obtained, then what Christy has clearly outlined are five 
specific types of fisheries. Since new national jurisdic­
tional patterns over fishing and exclusive economic zones
27are currently being set forth, Christy's typology seems
far more precise than earlier attempts to divide the living
28resources of the sea into "three separate regimes." While 
it is still useful to employ terms such as coastal fisheries 
(those existing within territorial waters), sedentary fish­
eries (those located on or under the seabed), and pelagic 
fisheries (those existent in open ocean or high seas), 
Christy's typology is a welcome addition to fisheries 
terminology.
Fisheries Management Concepts 
In order to clearly assess how Canada and the United 
States are unilaterally and jointly attempting to develop 
their fisheries resources, some important management concepts 
need to be clarified. At the heart of the situation, fish­
eries management ". . . includes whatever is necessary to 
maintain or improve fisheries resources and their utilization. 
Included in this definition are; exploratory fishing; gear.
10
harbor, and fleet development; stock selection; environmental
29maintenance; processing; and marketing."
Charles B. Heck believes that the major purposes of 
fisheries management are fourfold. Three purposes relate 
to ". . . reducing economic waste, food [production], and 
comprehensive marine m a n a g e m e n t . T h e  fourth prime objec­
tive, "avoiding biological depletion, or 'conservation,' has
31traditionally been the most prominent." It is with this
latter purpose that the concept of maximum sustainable yield
(MSY) has been developed.
Heck succinctly points out that any fish stock
" . . .  has a limited capacity to reproduce itself in the face
of human and natural interference. The sustainable yield
from a stock, at first increasing as fishing levels increase,
will eventually level off and decline as higher and higher
levels of fishing effort are applied. The exploitation of a
stock beyond its maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is what is
32generally meant by 'depletion' or 'overfishing.'" It seems 
likely that as commercial fishing efforts intensify, the use 
of an overall ceiling on fishing catches will be required to 
maintain a MSY. Significantly, Eugene Skolnikoff asserts 
that ". ; . it is almost certain that by the 1980's total 
catch-1imits will have to be imposed on essentially all 
species of commercially important fish."
There are also a number of practical problems inher­
ent in successfully achieving a maximum sustainable yield.
H. Gary Knight summarizes some of the dilemmas;
11
First, it is often difficult to define with 
accuracy the maximum sustainable yield of a given 
fish stock because of variations in environmental 
conditions and other factors. Second, two or more 
fishery stocks may be closely interrelated and it 
is sometimes difficult to predict the effect of a 
particular practice with respect to the catch of 
one stock on the sustainable yield of another.
Third, the objective of producing maximum sustain­
able yield does not take into consideration the net 
economic return from the enterprise and, according 
to some economic theorists, automatically diminishes economic r e t u r n . 34
A much newer management concept for fisheries is the
35maximization of net economic yield (MNEY). MNEY . . in­
volves the joint and interdependent use of labor, capital, 
and natural resources so as to attain the largest possible 
difference between the total present value of expected yields 
over an extended period and the present value of total ex­
pected c o s t s . H e c k  thinks that MSY " . . .  has been criti­
cized as a less sophisticated optimal goal for management 
than maximum net economic revenue, which would generally be 
reached at an effort level below that providing maximum sus­
tainable yields. It would be the point just beyond which 
the marginal cost of an additional unit of effort becomes 
greater than the marginal revenue from that effort."
A hybrid fisheries management concept is that of 
full or optimum utilization. The concept " . . .  implies 
that the fish not harvested in a nation's economic zone be 
made available to foreign fishermen."^® Implicit in the 
concept is the idea that the " . . .  harvesting of the sur­
plus should be accomplished by the lowest-cost, most efficient
12
foreigners and then sold in the highest-priced markets
(after allowing for transportation and other costs). In
this way, economic benefits would be maximized and so would
39the royalties paid to the coastal state." The full utili­
zation concept is especially valuable for Canada and the 
United States since it could encourage " . . .  the formation 
of profitable joint ventures among coastal nation processing 
and warehousing interests, efficient foreign fishing companies,
and marketing firms in countries with high demand for fish 
40products."
Whether specific nations desire MSY, MNEY, or full/ 
optimum utilization of their fish stocks, four basic func­
tions for fisheries management systems need to be conducted—  
allocation, information, regulation, and enforcement.
Allocation " . . .  concerns the issue of the distribution of 
the catch or revenue therefrom among participants or non­
participants in the f i s h e r y . C h r i s t y  notes that in 
" . . .  negotiations over allocation, many criteria are 
evoked— proximity to the stock; history of use; need for 
protein ; economic dependence; ability to manage the stock; 
[however], . . . even if agreement could be reached on the 
criterion to use, there is still no hard and fast guideline 
for determining distribution."*^
The management function of providing information to 
governments on fisheries concerns is vitally important in the 
sharing of fisheries resources. "Information should be
13
provided to make states (both developed and developing) 
more fully aware of the needs for management of shared stocks, 
There should be information on the alternative techniques for 
management and distribution and on the implementation of 
those techniques. States and regional bodies will need guid­
ance on how they can meet their research requirements most 
effectively.
The purpose of the regulations function carried out 
by fishery regulatory bodies " . . .  should be to formulate 
and implement controls that maximize the stream of net bene­
fits flowing from the use of the resources, without regard 
to how the benefits are distributed."^^ Lastly, the func­
tion of enforcing fisheries policies and agreements is con­
ducted in stages of surveillance, arrest, trial, and punish­
ment. Although numerous problems exist in enforcing 
fisheries management policies, " . . .  some system must be 
found to ensure credibly effective enforcement of the regu­
lations that are applied to the shared stocks . . . of 
fish.
Fisheries Negotiations Schema 
for Open Polities
In order to fathom the efforts of Canada and the 
United States to utilize and share their fishery resources, 
it is essential to establish a framework— a schema that can 
be used to assess the unilateral [state] fishery actions 
as well as the bilateral fisheries agreements between the
14
two nations. That framework is referred to as a fisheries 
negotiations schema for open polities (FiNS). The fisheries 
negotiations schema contains a "levels of analysis" per­
spective to be utilized throughout the dissertation to 
analyze fishery policy-making. It should be noted that 
a number of recent international relations texts have em­
ployed a "levels of analysis" f o r m a t . J o h n  Spanier, for 
example, discusses three levels of analysis. Spanier's 
first level of analysis is the state or international system, 
the second level is the national or internal/domestic per­
spective, and the third level is the individual (as 
decision-maker).^® Spanier*s third level of analysis 
stresses the interactions of policy-makers, their percep­
tions, and the decision-making process.
In this dissertation, the author will adhere to 
Spanier*s levels of analysis perspective. Once the record 
of previous Canadian-American fisheries negotiations has 
been examined (chapter 2), the external/systemic pressures 
impacting upon contemporary Canadian-United States fisheries 
negotiations will be analyzed (chapter 3). After viewing 
the changing fisheries situation from a systemic-first level 
of analysis perspective, the domestic pressures and processes 
involved in the shaping of new national fisheries legisla­
tion will be scrutinized at the second and third levels 
of analysis (chapters 4 and 5),
Chapter 6 will attempt to assess the current bilateral 
fisheries negotiations between Canada and the United States.
15
Interviews and correspondence conducted with fishery experts 
at the United Nations, members of United Nations missions' 
Third Law of the Sea Conference negotiating teams, diplo­
mats involved in the bilateral Canadian-American fisheries 
negotiations, and representatives of private marine life 
organizations and fishermen's associations should enable 
the author to set forth some observations on the decision­
makers, their perceptions, and the fisheries decision-making 
process. Utilizing the fisheries negotiations schema (FiNS), 
the final chapter (chapter 7) will summarize the findings 
of the previous chapters and determine the potential for 
fisheries cooperation between Canada and the United States.
The dissertation is thus detailing the activities of 
the international system, the nation-state, and man as 
decision-maker, as they relate to Canadian-American fish­
eries negotiations.. If the schema for analyzing fisheries 
negotiations is to be usefully employed in this dissertation, 
however, additional ingredients must be added to it.
Since chapters 3, 4, and 5 will examine the political 
pressures being applied to fisheries negotiations from a 
variety of sources, it would be helpful to utilize the con­
cepts of interest articulation and interest aggregation set 
forth by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman in assessing such 
pressuring activities. As a part of their analysis, Almond 
and Coleman ask, "How are interests articulated in different 
political systems?— or the interest articulation function.
16
Likewise, "how are articulated demands or interests 
aggregated?— or the aggregative f u n c t i o n . W i t h o u t  
really changing their understanding of these two concepts, 
it would be possible to use interest articulation and inter­
est aggregation to relate to a broader range of national, 
regional, and international pressuring efforts designed to 
impact upon fisheries negotiations.
Recently, Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. refined 
some statements on the process level of political systems. 
The two political scientists indicate that as inputs, in 
the form of demands and supports, "enter" the political sys­
tem they go through a conversion process to become authori­
tative outputs. "For analytic purposes, we may think of 
this conversion process as consisting of four functions.
The first function is interest articulation. At this stage 
interest groups and individuals express demands for policy 
change or continuation."^^
The second conversion function discussed is interest
aggregation. "At this stage the many demands expressed in
interest articulation are aggregated into a smaller number
of major policy alternatives. These alternatives become
'major* because substantial political resources— votes,
money, media attention, armed forces— are mobilized behind 
52them." Almond and Powell's third conversion function is 
policy making. "Each political system has a 'constitution,' 
a set of ongoing rules that define the sites of political
17
power and the nature of the resources necessary for a
coalition to make authoritative policies. . . .  At the
policy making stage the authoritative goals of the politi­
cocal system are enacted according to those rules." The 
last part of the conversion process i^ policy implementation. 
Almond and Powell note that " . . .  policies must be imple­
mented, typically through bureaucratic agencies, although
interest groups, parties, courts, and other structures may
54also be involved."
Canada and the United States can be considered "open" 
political systems. R. Barry Farrell suggests that the term 
" . . .  'open political system' will be used as synonymous 
with constitutional democracy. Among its characteristics 
are competitive regular electoral contests, legalised two- 
or multiparty organizations aimed at offering alternative 
governmental leadership, a high degree of toleration for 
autonomous groups in politics, and an acceptance of consti­
tutional restraints on governmental p o w e r . I t  will be 
interesting at a second level of analysis to determine 
important structural and functional differences that exist 
between these two neighboring open polities, before detail­
ing how the conversion process occurs at the third or 
decision-making level. While the second level of analysis* 
will concentrate on structural/functional aspects of the 
Canadian and American polities, it is essential that other 
attributes of the two nations also be considered. The vast
18
geographic territory of each country (including oceanic 
waters) will be viewed as an important element of each 
nation's political system. Moreover, the degree of eco­
nomic development related to the absolute size of the 
Canadian and American fishing industries will be examined 
in chapters 4 and 5.
In open political systems such as Canada and the 
United States, it is possible to distinguish at least four 
types of pressuring groups or policy influencers involved 
in interest articulation and aggregation activities.
I William D. Coplin suggests that the four types are 
^"(1) partisan, (2) bureaucratic, (3) interest, and (4) mass 
influencers."^® Partisan influencers are activists in 
political parties who " . . .  seek to influence policy both
by pressuring those in power and supplying personnel for
57decision-making roles." Bureaucratic influencers are 
those " . . .  individuals and organizations within the execu­
tive branch of government that aid the decision maker in
58making and executing policies." An interest influencer 
" . . .  consists of a group of individuals tied together by 
a common set of interests that are not broad enough to con­
stitute the basis for partisan activity but nonetheless 
necessitate mobilization of resources to gain support among 
other policy influencers and decision-makers."^* Lastly, 
the mass influencer Coplin refers to is public opinion—  
the " . . .  climate of opinion shared by a population that 
decision makers consider in making foreign policy."®^
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At the international/systemic level it is important
to observe the pressuring activities of transnational
organizations— those that have "membership from and capacity
to act in more than one c o u n t r y . T h r e e  prominent types
of transnational organizations are: intergovernmental
organizations " . . .  formed when two or more states sign
62a treaty or charter," nongovernmental organizations
" . . .  created among individuals or private organizations
in different countries, and multinational organizations
initially based in one country but [having] operations,
63interests, and/or employees in other countries."
Having identified a variety of national and trans­
national policy influencers, Coplin sets forth two policy­
making schemas— an international politics framework and 
a world policy process framework. Coplin indicates that
International Politics Framework64
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the more traditional international politics framework 
specifies " . . .  that there is a hierarchical flow from 
the subnational policy influencer to the national decision 
maker, with the interactions of the national decision maker 
creating international politics. . . .  The international 
politics framework . . . clearly assumes the national- 
state, represented by national leaders, to be the focal 
point of international politics.
Coplin suggests that in contrast to the international 
politics framework, the world policy process framework in 
•*. . . its most extreme form assumes that the nation-state 
is [only] one type of actor that may or may not be the 
critical factor in a given s i t u a t i o n . T h e  world policy 
process framework indicates " . . .  that there are no organ­
ized patterns of influence and authority among various
actors. Instead, lines link all actors— subnational, national,
68and transnational— to the formation of world policy."
World Policy Process Framework®^
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The conceptual schema for this dissertation will 
combine aspects of both Coplin frameworks in order to assess 
contemporary Canadian-American fisheries negotiations. It 
should be kept in mind that Canada and the United States 
are open, developed polities;therefore, the dissertation's 
schema is useful in analyzing a more pluralistic social- 
economic-political setting. The fisheries negotiations 
schema (FiNS) clearly is closer in form to Coplin*s tradi­
tional international politics framework and suggests that 
the nation-state is still a prime focal point for interna­
tional fisheries negotiations. Moreover, FiNS indicates 
that there are organized patterns of influence and authority 
among the various actors.
In his world policy process framework, Coplin defines 
an "issue area" (such as fisheries negotiations) and then 
asks: " . . .  what are the essential subnational, national
and transnational actors . . crucial to the formation
of fisheries policies? While one could argue that the world 
policy process best applies to fisheries negotiations, given 
the myriad of nongovernmental, intergovernmental and multi­
national organizations involved in fisheries/law of the sea 
negotiations, FiNS holds that the traditional international 
politics framework more closely reflects the nature of inter­
national fisheries negotiations today.
Finally, FiNS combines some of Coplin's ideas into 
a levels of analysis perspective. Note (on page 22) that 
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separation in the schema. The author of this dissertation 
concurs with John Spanier’s assertion that . . in analys­
ing the second and third levels, it is not always possible 
to keep the specific political system apart from the 
decision-making institutions and processes."^®
The uses of the fisheries negotiations schema for 
open politics will become more apparent in the chapters 
that follow. Still, the schema's central purpose is to act 
as an explanatory guide for the fisheries negotiations 
occurring between Canada and the United States, How these 
two nations work, individually and collectively, to develop 
sane fisheries policies for today and the future will remain 
the essential theme of this dissertation.
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CONFLICTS, CONVENTIONS, AND COOPERATION: AN
ANALYSIS OF FISHERIES RELATIONS BETWEEN 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Many people were quite perplexed by the fact that 
in June of 1978 Canada and the United States closed their 
coastal waters . . t o  each others' commercial fishermen 
. . .  in a tit-for-tat dispute over fishing rights.”^ In 
order to understand the background of events leading up to 
the 1978 bilateral impasse, this chapter will provide an 
accounting of significant fishery agreements and treaties 
between Canada and the United States. In establishing an his­
toric record of fisheries negotiations, it will be important 
to specify the reasons for fishing conflicts and problems, as 
well as to document the efforts to devise cooperative North 
American fishery management arrangements.
Several years ago, Canadian scholar R. M. Logan 
attempted to describe the bilateral fisheries relationship by 
indicating that " . . .  Canada and the United States have a long 
tradition of cooperation directed towards maintaining fishery 
resources at commercially viable levels." As might be
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imagined, however, conflicts over fishery resources and 
fishing rights have continued to occur between the two North 
American neighbors since the eighteenth century. Moreover, 
fishery concerns cannot be completely divorced from the other 
political, economic, and social relationships existent between 
Canada and the United States. Thus, it would be useful to 
organize the materials of this chapter around a general foreign 
relations framework devised by diplomatic historian Maxwell 
Cohen.
Cohen, in assessing Canada-United States treaty rela­
tions, suggested ”. . .  that roughly there appear to have been 
five periods of development in the relations of Canada to the 
United States which reflect themselves in the particular char­
acter of the treaties to be found in those periods."^ The 
first period, extending from the Treaty of Paris of 1783 to the 
1870s was characterized as a Period of Adjustment— a " . . .  time 
when British North America and the United States were feeling 
their way towards answering the question as to "who gets what'
4on this continent. . . . "  The second period, from the 1870s 
to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, was viewed as a Period of 
Continental Stabilization.^ A third diplomatic period, 
especially important for fishery concerns, began in 1909 and 
extended to the outbreak of World War Two; Cohen referred to 
these years as a Period of Common Resource Conservation and 
Early Joint Management.^ From 1939 to 1946, a Period of War­
time Continental Cooperation existed between Canada and the 
United States.^ Lastly, Cohen believed that the postwar years
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should be described as a Period of Continental Partnership 
in which the two nations were searching for " . . .  the common 
management of a continent, a partnership unequal in power,
Dbut equal in spirit. . . . "
Clearly, new and more complex external pressures 
(chapter 3) and significant domestic activities (chapters 4 
and 5) had begun to influence the direction and form of fish­
eries relations between Canada and the United States by the 
1960s. One evidence of a changing jurisdictional environment 
for fisheries was documented in The International Law of 
Fisheries. "Up to 1960, Canada (and Newfoundland) scarcely 
departed from the three mile rule which they inherited from the 
British, and their fishery claims later took the form of dip­
lomatic proposals for special fishery zones, rather than of 
juridical claims to the older regime of territorial waters. 
Since 1960, however, Canada has taken legislative measures to
9extend her fishing limits." With 1960 acting as a transition 
line, chapter 2 will end with an assessment of selected Canada- 
United States fisheries agreements set forth during the 1950s.
A Period of Adjustment: 1783-1870
Long before the American Revolutionary War, North 
American fisheries provided valuable natural resources for 
Britain, France, and her New World colonies. When France lost 
most of her territories in the area as a result of the 1763 
Treaty of Paris, " . . .  her fishing privileges were seriously 
c u r t a i l e d . M o r e o v e r ,  the British government clamped down
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on the fishing activities of the colonists in New England.
While there were no restrictions placed upon English fishing 
vessels, a 1775 act of the British Parliament prohibited 
" . . .  vessels owned by residents of New England from fishing 
on the banks of Newfoundland, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and 
on the coasts of Labrador, Cape Breton, and Nova Scotia.
It was not surprising that the angered colonists refused to 
sell supplies to British fishing vessels as the Revolutionary 
War drew near.
After the struggle for independence, American nego­
tiators were vigorous in their efforts to include fishing rights 
in the Articles of Peace between the United States and Great 
Britain. Through the actions of John Adams, John Jay, Benjamin 
Franklin, and Henry Laurens, article 3 of the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783 set forth broad fishing privileges for the fishermen of 
the United States. John Adams, in particular, was mindful of 
the desires of New England fishermen, and stressed the neces­
sity of article 3 in its final form.
Article 3^
It is agreed, that the People of the United 
States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the Right 
to take Fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and 
on all the other Banks of Newfoundland; Also in the 
Gulph of st Lawrence, and at all other Places in the 
Sea where the Inhabitants of both Countries used at 
any time heretofore to fish. And also that the 
Inhabitants of the United States shall have Liberty 
to take Fish of every kind on such part of the Coast 
of Newfoundland, as British Fishermen shall use (but 
not to dry or cure the same on that Island,) and 
also on the Coasts, Bays, and Creeks of all other of 
his Britannic Majesty's Dominions in America, and
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that the American Fishermen shall have liberty to 
dry and cure Fish in any of the unsettled Bays 
Harbours and Creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, 
and Labrador, so long as the same shall remain un­
settled; but so soon as the same or either of them 
shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for the said 
Fishermen to dry or cure Fish at such Settlement, 
without a previous Agreement for that purpose with 
the Inhabitants Proprietors or Possessors of theGround.12
The fishing provisions of the 1783 Treaty remained in 
effect until 1818, when a new convention was signed between 
the United States and Great Britain. In a "brief resume" of 
the history of the fisheries question. Sir Robert Bond char­
acterized the beginning of fishery negotiations between the 
two countries. Bond noted that from " . . .  1783 until the 
war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812, citi­
zens of the United States continued to enjoy the ancient 
rights belonging to them as subjects of Great Britain before 
the Revolution, and reserved to them as citizens of the United 
States, to the extent outlined in the article of the treaty 
of 1783. . . ."13
Bond continued by indicating that after the conclusion 
of the treaty following War of 1812,
. . . there being no treaty obligations or reciprocal 
laws in force between or in either of the countries 
respecting commercial intercourse, the British Govern­
ment contended that the fishing rights recognized and 
secured to the citizens of the United States by the 
treaty of 1783 had become abrogated in consequence 
of the war of 1812, on the principle of war annulling 
all unexecuted engagements between two belligerents. 
The fishing rights conveyed to the United States of 
America by the treaty of 1783 having been annulled 
by the war of 1812, the citizens of the United States 
no longer had the right to fish in any of the North American w a t e r s . 14
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Between 1815 and 1818, a number of American fishing 
vessels found in the waters off British North America were 
seized by British w a r s h i p s . I n  order to put an end to such 
fishery conflicts, British and American negotiators once again 
returned to the conference table. On October 20, 1818, a Con­
vention of Commerce was signed between the United States and 
Great Britain. Since the first article of that treaty was 
to become the primary North American fishery agreement between 
the United States, Great Britain, and Canada for over a cen­
tury, detailed attention should be given to its particulars.
Article I
Whereas differences have arisen respecting 
the Liberty claimed by the United States for the In­
habitants thereof, to take, dry, and cure Fish on 
certain Coasts, Bays, Harbours, and Creeks of His 
Britannic Majesty's Dominions in America, it is agreed 
between The High Contracting Parties, that the Inhab­
itants of the said United States shall have for ever, 
in common with Subjects of His Britannic Majesty, 
the Liberty to take Fish of every kind on that part 
of the Southern Coast of Newfoundland which extends 
from Cape Ray to the Rameau Islands, on the Western 
and Northern Coast of Newfoundland, from the said Cape 
Ray to the Quirpon Islands on the Shores of the Mag- 
delen Islands, and also on the Coasts, Bays, Harbours, 
and Creeks from Mount Joly on the Southern Coast of 
Labrador, to and through the Streights of Belleisle 
thence Northwardly indefinitely along the Coast, 
without prejudice however, to any of the exclusive 
Rights of the Hudson Bay Company: and that the Ameri­
can Fishermen shall also have liberty for ever, to dry 
and cure Fish in any of the unsettled Bays, Harbours, 
and Creeks of the Southern part of the Coast of New­
foundland hereabove described, and of the Coast of 
Labrador; but so soon as the same, or any Portion 
thereof, shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for 
the said Fishermen to dry or cure Fish at such Portion 
so settled, without previous Agreement for such pur­
pose with the Inhabitants, Proprietors, or Possessors
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of the Ground. And the United States hereby 
renounce for ever, any Liberty heretofore enjoyed 
or claimed by the Inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, 
or cure Fish on, or within three marine Miles of any 
of the Coasts, Bays, Creeks, or Harbours of His 
Britannic Majesty's Dominions in America not included 
^thin l:hê  above mentioned Limits; provided however, 
that the American Fishermen shall be admitted to 
enter such Bays or Harbours for the purpose of Shel­
ter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing 
Wood, and of obtaining Water, and for no other pur­
pose whatever. But they shall be under such Restric­
tions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, 
drying or curing Fish therein, or in any other manner 
whatever abusing the Privileges hereby reserved to 
them. 16 (emphasis added)
By underlining key parts of article I, it should be 
clear why Douglas Johnston stipulated that the " . . .  1818 
Convention on Commerce marked the beginning of a new era, 
introducing the formal regulation of trade by two governments, 
an idea now taken for granted in the course of modern interna­
tional trade. It is a remarkable document from many points 
of view, not least in that it is the first treaty which com­
muted the cannon-shot rule into the three mile rule for coastal 
jurisdiction."^^ The 1818 Convention did not resolve all dif­
ferences, especially regarding the use of large bays by Ameri­
can fishermen. Britain argued that " . . .  the three mile limit
in the case of large bays extended from headland to headland
» 1ftand did not follow the sinuosities of the shore." Americans
did not agree, and continued to fish in large bays that were 
over 'six miles broad.' As a result of such fishing activi­
ties, " . . .  fifty-one American vessels were seized between 
1818 and 1851, of which twenty-six were released without trial 
or by decree and twenty-five were condemned.
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/ /Sir Robert Bond, in his fisheries resume, detailed 
that provinces such as Nova Scotia " . . .  passed laws in 
respect to the seizure of American fishing vessels for trad­
ing and fishing within the 3-mile limit; . . .  in the year 
1838, the said Province of Nova Scotia complained, by address 
to the Queen, of such aggressions, and asked for naval forces 
to prevent them. The force was supplied by the British Gov­
ernment, and seizures of American fishing vessels became 
20common." Matters became more intense when the British
Government decided to station a naval force in the waters of
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island in May 
21of 1852. In order to "avoid further misunderstanding be­
tween the Government of the United States and Her Majesty the
22Queen of Great Britain," a treaty regarding the North
Atlantic fisheries, commercial reciprocity with British North
American colonies, and navigation of the St. Lawrence River
was signed in Washington, D.C. on June 5, 1854.
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 supplemented the 1818
Convention by noting, in Article 1, that the
. . . inhabitants of the United States shall have in 
common with the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, 
the liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell­
fish, on the sea coasts and shores, and in the bays, 
harbours, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and of the several 
Islands thereunto adjacent, without being restricted 
to any distance from the shore; . . . [it] is under­
stood that the above mentioned liberty applies solely 
to the sea fishery, and that the salmon and shad 
fisheries, and all fisheries in rivers, and the 
mouths of rivers, are hereby reserved exclusively 
for British fishermen."23
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Article II stipulated that British subjects " . . .  shall 
have, in common with the citizens of the United States, the 
liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on 
the Eastern sea coasts and shores of the United States, North 
of the 36th parallel of North Latitude, . . . without being 
restricted to any distance from the shore, . . . A third 
treaty article provided for a twenty-eight item schedule of 
goods that could be freely traded between the British North 
American colonies and the United States. Two of the items 
listed were "Fish of all kinds" and "Fish-Oil.
Even though American fishermen greatly increased their 
catch of cod and mackerel in the decade following the recipro­
city agreement, the United States Congress terminated the 1854
26treaty in December of 1864. Congress seemed bent on a policy
of high protective tariffs for American goods, and thus,
" . . .  American fishing rights and privileges under the treaty
27lapsed and reverted to those under the 1818 Convention."
Between 1864 and the end of the "Period of Adjustment" in
1870, a policy of issuing licenses to American fishermen to
fish in ". , . the waters from which they were excluded for
fishing purposes by the treaty of 1818 was adopted by the
28Canadian government . ..." License fees increased from
fifty cents per ton of fish in 1866, to two dollars per ton
in 1869. Then, in 1870, the Canadian government " . . .  changed
its policy and enacted exclusive laws against American fisher-
29men, forcing them to keep without the 3-mile limit."
37
The "Period of Adjustment" had begun with an infant 
United States negotiating with Great Britain over basic fish­
ing rights in North American waters. Near the end of the 
first treaty period, the British North American Act of 1867 
had provided for the Confederation of Canada. The 1867 Act 
also " . . .  granted the federal Parliament of Canada, estab­
lished in Ottawa, exclusive legislative authority over sea 
coast and inland f i s h e r i e s . T h e  early fisheries negotiat­
ing process was to remain, however, a bilateral series of 
discussions between the United States and Great Britain— with 
Britain acting on behalf of the Dominion of Canada, Prince 
Edward Island, and Newfoundland.^^
A Period of Continental 
Stabilization:
1870-1908
In 1871, as a result of the discussions of a Joint 
High Commission composed of three American and three British 
Commissioners, another reciprocal trade treaty was 
" . . .  entered into between Her Majesty's Government and that 
of the United States which provided that for a period of ten 
years, fishermen of the United States should have, in addi­
tion to their rights under the treaty of 1818, the privilege 
of inshore fishing in the waters of British North America 
under certain limitations. In return for that privilege it 
was provided that the fishery products of Newfoundland and
Canada were to have free entry into the markets of the United
32States." It should be noted that a reciprocal provision
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(article XIX) gave British subjects the right ", . . to take
fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the eastern sea
coasts and shores of the United States north of the thirty-
ninth parallel of north latitude . . . without being restricted
33to any distance from the shore . . . ."
Considering all the articles of the 1871 Treaty of 
Washington that pertained to fisheries (XVIII through XXV and 
XXXII and XXXIII), the British treaty negotiators argued that 
the privileges " . . .  accorded American citizens were of 
greater value than those accorded British subjects. Conse­
quently, a [special] commission was created to evaluate the 
advantage enjoyed by Americans. That commission sat at Hali­
fax in 1877 and awarded $5,500,000 in gold to be paid by the 
United States to Great Britain for the ten year period that 
the treaty was to be b i n d i n g . A n g e r e d  by the decision of 
the Halifax Commission, the United States paid the award under 
protest. Moreover, on March 3, 1883, a joint resolution of 
Congress terminated " . . .  the fishing articles of the treaty 
of May 8, 1871 . . .
Even though the 1854 and 1871 reciprocal treaties had 
been terminated with respect to fisheries, the 1818 Conven­
tion remained in effect. On June 22, 1885, the United States 
and Great Britain continued to pursue a more cooperative fish­
eries climate by signing a new agreement. In part, the agree­
ment specified that " . . .  the President will bring the whole 
question of the fisheries before Congress at its next session 
in December [1885], and recommend the appointment of a joint
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commission by the Government of the United States and Great 
Britain to consider the matter, in the interest of maintain­
ing good neighborhood and friendly intercourse between the 
two countries. . . A commission was established and a
second Treaty of Washington negotiated in 1888; however, the 
United States Senate refused to ratify the Bayard-Chamberlain 
Treaty, arguing that the American fishermen were given less 
than they had been offered in the 1871 Washington Treaty.
While the Senate pondered the 1888 Washington Treaty, 
Secretary of State Thomas Bayard signed a protocol with the
British on February 15, 1888, ". . . in order to afford a
37'modus vivendi* pending the ratification of the Treaty."
The agreement stipulated that in ". . . the absense of such 
ratification the old conditions which have given rise to so 
much friction and irritation might be revived, and might inter­
fere with the unprejudiced consideration of the Treaty by the
38legislative bodies concerned." The protocol therefore pro­
vided that for
. . .  a period not exceeding two years from the 
present date, the privileges of entering the bays and 
harbours of the Atlantic coasts of Canada and of New­
foundland shall be granted to United States fishing 
vessels by annual Licenses at a fee of $1 1/2 per 
ton— for the following purpose:
The purchase of bait, ice, seines, lines 
and all other supplies and outfits. 
Transshipment of catch and shipping ofcrews.39
Following the 1888 protocol, " . . .  the Canadian Parliament 
continued the issuance of modus vivendi licenses by annual 
statute until 1892, and then by orders-in-council from year 
to year until 1924."^®
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As the "Period of Continental stabilization"
culminated, several other fisheries protocols regarding the
41inshore fisheries of Newfoundland were set forth. Moreover, 
Maxwell Cohen recalled that " . . .  the major questions of 
boundaries were concluded through settling the Alaska and 
Passamaquoddy Bay boundaries, . . . and the first modest ven­
tures into some fisheries control over and above the rights
42acquired under the 1818 Treaty . . . "  were attempted.
Although Cohen's statement went no further, it was clear 
that 1908 was a sensible year to conclude the second treaty 
period.
On July 1, 1908, two significant Canada-United States 
agreements were proclaimed. Signed by Secretary of State 
Elihu Root and British Ambassador James Bryce, the "Treaty 
Concerning the Canadian International Boundary" drew a demar­
cation line from the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay at the mouth 
of the St. Croix River across a continent to the " . . .  forty- 
ninth parallel of north latitude along the middle of the chan­
nel which separates Vancouver's Island from the mainland and 
the middle of Haro Channel and of Fuca's Straits to the 
Pacific Ocean.
The second accord signed was the 1908 "Treaty Con­
cerning Fisheries in United States and Canadian Waters."
In order to determine uniform and common international regula­
tions, restrictions and provisions related to the " . . .  times, 
seasons, and methods of fishing in the waters contiguous to
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the United States and Canada," article I stipulated that 
" . . .  the High Contracting Parties agree to appoint . . .  a 
Commission to be known as the International Fisheries Com-
44mission, consisting of one person named by each Government." 
The Commission, once constituted, agreed upon a system of pro­
tection, preservation, and propagation of Fraser River salmon. 
While the Canadians accepted the Commission's guidelines, the 
". . . United States failed to adopt the regulations. . . .
Canada withdrew her support, [and] . . .  the 1908 Convention
45became inoperative."
The second United States-Canada treaty period had 
clarified many boundary questions. Moreover, initial steps 
to jointly control important fisheries resources had been 
attempted. While most of the reciprocity treaties and fish­
eries protocols had lasted for only brief periods of time, a 
policy of fisheries cooperation was incrementally beginning 
to emerge as an important element in the treaty negotiations 
between the United States and Great Britain, still acting on 
behalf of the Dominion of Canada.
A Period of Joint Resource 
Conservation and Early Joint 
Management: 1909-1938
The third period of treaty relations between Canada
and the United States was to be particularly important in a
fisheries sense. It began with the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, which provided for ". . .an equitable use of the
waters what wash the shores of our two countries, including
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those that flow into and out of boundary waters, and rivers
46that cross the common boundary.” As a part of the 1909 
treaty, article III established an International Joint Com­
mission that would . . have jurisdiction over and shall
pass upon all cases involving the use or obstruction or divi­
sion of waters . . . covered by the provisions of the 
treaty. Green H. Hackwroth noted that the Boundary Waters 
Treaty constituted . . a  landmark in the regulation and
use in the common interest of a natural resource of inestim-
48able value to the two countries and their nationals."
Having resolved some important boundary waters ques­
tions, the United States and Great Britain, acting on behalf
of Canada, agreed to submit a number of fishery disputes and
49claims to arbitration in 1910. An award rendered by the 
Hague Arbitration Tribunal on September 7, 1910, was ratified 
by both nations in 1912. The award stipulated that all 
" . . .  future municipal laws, ordinances, or rules for the 
regulation of the fisheries by Great Britain, Canada, or 
Newfoundland . . . should be clearly promulgated by Novem­
ber of each year. Article 1.2 of the agreement also speci­
fied that if ". . . the Government of the United States con­
siders any such laws or regulations inconsistent with the 
Treaty of 1818, it is entitled so to notify the Government 
of Great Britain within forty-five days after the publication 
above referred to, and may require that the same be submitted 
to and their reasonableness, within the meaning of the award.
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be determined by the Permanent Mixed Fishery Commission 
constituted as hereinafter provided.
The Permanent Mixed Fishery Commission, composed of 
one commissioner from the United States, one from Canada/ 
Newfoundland, and one from a third nation was established
, .so that any future fishery disputes, wherever their
52origin, could be settled by arbitration." Five decades
after the Commission was established, Douglas Johnston was
able to report that there apparently had " . . .  been little
cause for complaint regarding the regulations adopted by
Canadian and Newfoundland authorities under the first head
of the Hague Award. The virtual inactivity of the Commission
afford[ed] evidence that these regulations had been generally
S3considered reasonable by American fishermen."
Shortly after the "North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
Arbitration" in 1910, an interesting agreement was negotiated 
between the United States, Britain (for Canada), Japan, and 
the Soviet Union in order to conserve Pacific fur seals. By 
the end of 1911, all four countries had ratified a convention 
" . . .  for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals.
What was significant about the Fur Seal Convention was the 
fact that after decades of overexploitation of the fur seal 
population in the North P a c i f i c , b a n s  had finally been placed 
on pelagic (high seas) sealing. Over sixty years after the 
original 1911 Convention, further joint accords continued to 
support a North Pacific Fur Seal Commission; the Commission
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was " . . .  very successful in restoring the seal population 
to a high level of a b u n d a n c e . M o r e o v e r ,  ". . . the long 
experience in international conservation gained by the Com­
mission serve(d) as a valuable model for more significant 
fisheries.
Perhaps the two most important fisheries compacts dur­
ing the third period of United States-Canada treaty relations
58were the 1923 Pacific Halibut Fishery Convention and the 
1930 Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Exten-
59sion of Sockeye Salmon Fisheries of the Fraser River System.
The Halibut Convention was an interesting document from sev­
eral perspectives. It was ". . . the world's first interna­
tional attempt at high-seas fishery conservation— and the 
first Canadian treaty negotiated and signed independently of 
Great B r i t a i n . I n d e e d ,  Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes 
wrote a letter to President Harding on June 16, 1923, in which 
he clearly explained that the 1923 Treaty was truly a Canadian- 
United States document.
In part, Hughes's letter indicated that the Halibut 
Convention of 1923 " . . .  had placed the Canadian Government 
in an extremely embarrassing position. Believing that the 
protection of the Canadian industry in the Pacific was purely 
an American and Canadian interest, the Canadian Government 
had negotiated and signed the treaty without the usual approach 
to the (British) Foreign O f f i c e . H u g h e s  also noted that 
the " . . .  Canadian Government had insisted that this
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Convention had no concern with Great Britain or the Empire.
The fishing experts on both sides of the border had worked
up the terms of the Convention, which as a matter of fact
had been drafted in Washington and was an American document
with only one or two insignificant and verbal changes offered
62by the Canadians."
Regarding the halibut as the world's largest flatfish 
(Hippoglossus), the 1923 Convention closed both the territor­
ial waters and high seas " . . .  off the western coasts of the 
United States, including Bering Sea, and of the Dominion of 
Canada, from the 16th day of November next after the date of 
the exchange of ratifications of the Convention, to the 15th 
day of the following February. . . During the annual
closed season for the demersal halibut, any " . . .  halibut 
that may be taken incidentally when fishing for other fish 
. . . may be retained and used for food for the crew of the 
vessel by which they are t a k e n . T h e  treaty also created 
an International Fisheries Commission composed of two members 
from each nation; the four member commission was to ". . . make 
a thorough investigation into the life history of the Pacific 
halibut . . . (and) make recommendations as to the regulation 
of the halibut fishery of the North Pacific Ocean, including 
the Bering Sea, which may seem to be desirable for its preser­
vation and development.”^^
The International Fisheries Commission conducted a 
broadbased investigation and " . . .  proved the existence of
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two large, virtually independent halibut populations, one 
to the south, the other to the west of Cape Spencer, Alaska.
It was shown that these stocks, in the southern population 
especially, were in an overfished, low-yielding state.
With such findings, the Commission recommended that additional 
measures be undertaken by Canada and the United States to bol­
ster the declining yields of halibut.
As a direct result of the International Fisheries Com­
mission's recommendations, a new treaty was signed in Ottawa 
on May 9, 1930. Ratified in 1931, the convention called for 
the " . . .  preservation of the halibut fishery of [the] 
Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea."^^ The Treaty also 
provided that the International Fisheries Commission could 
" . . .  suspend or modify the closed season [November 1- 
February 15] . . .  as to part or all convention waters, when
68it found after investigation such changes [were] necessary." 
Moreover, the Commission was given the additional powers to:
(a) divide the convention waters into areas;
(b) limit the catch of halibut to be taken from
each area;
(c) fix the size and character of halibut fishing
appliances to be used therein;
(d) make such regulations for the collection of
statistics of the catch of halibut including 
the licensing and clearance of vessels . . .  ;
(e) close to all halibut fishing such portion or por­
tions of an area or areas, as the International 
Fisheries Commission find to be populated by 
small, immature halibut.69
All of these provisions for a stronger International
Fisheries Commission caused one fisheries expert to remark
that for the ". . . first time in history a true international
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convention authority— with its own regulatory competence—  
had been c r e a t e d . T r u e ,  Douglas Johnston noted, the 
" . . .  implementing legislation by the two states made the 
enforcement of any regulations that might be adopted under 
the Convention the responsibility of the individual govern­
ments, but since 1932 the Commission's regulations of the 
fishery [were] adopted annually by the virtually automatic
approval of the President of the United States and the
71Governor-General in Council of Canada."
The successful regulation of the halibut fishery from 
1932 to 1937 encouraged Canada and the United States to ex­
tend the International Fisheries Commission's functions in
72a third halibut convention in 1937. In addition to their 
previous regulatory capacities, the Commission, by 1938, 
could " . . .  prohibit departure of vessels from any port or 
place, or from any receiving vessel or station, to any area 
for halibut fishing, after any date when in the judgment of 
the International Fisheries Commission the vessels which have 
departed for that area prior to that date . . . shall suffice 
to catch the limit which shall have been set for that 
area . . .
As the third treaty period came to a close in 1938-39, 
the early efforts of joint fishery management between Canada 
and the United States demonstrated that fishery cooperation 
could be a productive, viable practice for all parties con­
cerned. While the halibut catch before 1930 was annually less
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74than forty million pounds, a decade later over ten million 
additional pounds of halibut were caught each year. More­
over, larger " . . .  individual catches were made with one half 
the fishing effort . . . (and as] . . . the density of the 
stocks increased, the Commission occasionally increased the 
annual catches allowed.
Halibut conventions were not the only examples of 
workable joint fishery management arrangements during the 
1930s. After years of struggling to negotiate and ratify an
agreement that would restore the dwindling numbers of anadro-
76mous sockeyesalmon, the Convention for Protection, Preser­
vation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries of the
Fraser River System was signed in Washington, D.C. on May 26, 
7 71930. The treaty took note of the fact that " . . .  the
supply of this fish in recent years has been greatly depleted
and that it is of importance in the mutual interest of both
countries that this source of wealth should be restored and
78maintained. . . . "  To rectify the situation, the 1930 
Convention created an International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission composed of six members— three commissioners from
• 79the United States and three from the Dominion of Canada.
The Commission was to make a thorough " . . .  investigation
into the natural history of the Fraser River sockeye salmon,
into hatchery methods, spawning ground conditions and other
o nrelated matters."
Once the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Com­
mission had conducted its investigations, it was to have the
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power to . . improve spawning grounds, construct, and
maintain hatcheries, rearing ponds and other such facilities
as it may determine to be necessary for the propagation of
81sockeye salmon. . . . "  The cost of all these conservation
measures, including the restocking of the species in the
Fraser River and its tributaries, was to be shared equally
82by Canada and the United States. Moreover, the Commission 
was given the power to remove any "obstructions" to the salmon 
migration, as the fish Returned from open seas to spawn and 
die in the fresh waters of British Columbia's Fraser River.
In addition to the stipulated conservation measures, 
the Commission was empowered to prohibit the taking of sock­
eye salmon in any treaty waters during specified seasons; 
the Commission could also " . . .  prescribe the size of the 
meshes in all fishing gear and appliances that may be oper­
ated during said season in the waters of the United States
83. . . "  and Canada. The general intent of the 1930 Conven­
tion was to establish ". . . b y  joint effort and expense, a 
fishery that is now largely nonexistent . . . land to] share 
equally in the fishery. The Commission shall, consequently, 
regulate the fishery with a view of allowing, as nearly as 
may be practicable, an equal portion of the fish that may 
be caught each year to be taken by the fishermen of each 
High Contracting Party.
While the Salmon Convention was signed in 1930, it 
was not ratified by Canada and the United States until the 
summer of 1937. The long delay in implementing the provisions
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of the treaty were attributed primarily to the desires of 
the United States Senate. On June 15, 1936, in an executive 
session of the Senate, three understandings were set forth 
as part of United States ratification of the treaty. All 
three understandings were directed toward the functioning 
and observation of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries 
Commission. The resolution of ratification stipulated:
(1) That the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries 
Commission shall have no power to authorize any 
type of fishing gear contrary to the laws of 
the State of Washington or the Dominion of 
Canada ;
(2) That the Commission shall not promulgate or 
enforce regulations until the scientific 
investigations provided for in the convention 
have been made, covering two cycles of sockeye 
salmon runs, or 8 years; and
(3) That the Commission shall set up an advisory com­
mittee composed of five persons from each 
country who shall be representatives of the 
various branches of the industry (purse seine, 
gill net, troll, sport fishing, and one other), 
which advisory committee shall be invited to
all non-executive meetings of the Commission 
and shall be given full opportunity to examine 
and to be heard on all proposed orders, regula­tions, or recommendations.85
Thus, after many years of negotiation, a Salmon Commission 
finally came into being.
As the "Period of Common Resource Conservation and 
Early Joint Management" drew to a close in 1938, the halibut 
and salmon conventions symbolized the innovative nature of 
Canadian-American foreign relations. The nationals of the 
two countries were heading commissions designed to protect, 
propagate, and share some of the living resources of the sea. 
Such rudimentary conservation efforts had not occurred
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overnight, but were the result of numerous attempts to 
negotiate fisheries conventions that would be beneficial 
to all parties concerned.
It is interesting to point out that at the same time 
joint Canadian-American marine conservation ventures were 
being established, President Franklin Roosevelt was con­
sidering some unilateral measures regarding Pacific coast 
fisheries. In 1937, Roosevelt thought that it might be 
appropriate to issue a ". . . Presidential proclamation clos­
ing the sea area along the Alaskan coast to all fishing—
Japanese, Canadian and American . . . [as] a kind of marine 
86refuge." One ocean policy expert, Ann L. HoHick, also
pointed out that in a discussion with Under Secretary of
State Sumner Welles, President Roosevelt " . . .  indicated
that he was considering an executive proclamation that would
declare as territorial waters the area of the Pacific Ocean
lying beyond the three-mile limit to a depth of 100 fathoms.
Fishing within this area would be allowed only under a
87license granted by the U.S. government." To quiet such 
Presidential assertions, ". . . it fell to the Department 
of State to call the President's attention to the fact that 
such a claim to control fishing beyond three miles would set 
a troublesome precedent in U.S. relations with other 
countries.
Important American fishery proclamations were thus 
postponed, and the winds of war in Europe encouraged the
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leaders of the United States, Canada, and Britain to pursue 
conservation policies that would help promote wartime con­
tinental cooperation.
A Period of Wartime Continental 
Cooperation: 1939-1946
It would be best to view the years surrounding World
War II as a time when fisheries activities between Canada and
the United States were indirectly linked to the major policy
concerns of decision makers in Washington and Ottawa. After
a series of meetings between President Franklin Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Mackenzie King from 1938 to 1941, a Per-
89manent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD) was established.
Indeed, ". . . several months before the attack on Pearl
Harbor the PJBD had drawn up, and the two govermments had
approved, a joint plan for defending North America— in effect,
Canada, Newfoundland, and adjacent portions of the United
States, including Alaska. Although the coastal areas were
of primary concern, cooperation extended to the locks of
o nthe Sault Ste. Marie. . . . ”
Economic and wartime production programs were also 
to be coordinated between the two North American neighbors 
whenever possible. Intriguingly, it has been argued that 
"World War II both stimulated and retarded developments in 
fisheries. . . . The belligerents had to curtail their fish­
ing efforts during the war because of fear of attack and the 
need to allocate commercial vessels to military uses. The
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result was that some fisheries that had been overfished had
an opportunity to bounce back. . . . The war, however, had
91retarded the evolution of management schemes.”
In specific terms, the fourth treaty period, from 
1939 through 1946, saw a continuance of the halibut and sal­
mon commissions' activities. In 1941, for example, the 
Pacific Salmon Commission recommended that a serious obstruc­
tion on the Fraser River at Hell's Gate Canyon be removed.
"The Commission's recommendation was accepted and by 1945 
fishways had been constructed at Hell's Gate Canyon for less
than $1 million. Smaller obstructions elsewhere were found
92and similar fishways were built." In 1946, as its recom­
mendations were being implemented, the Pacific Salmon Com­
mission was given additional regulatory functions by the 
governments of Canada and the United States. With these addi­
tional powers, the Commission " . . .  could then formulate and 
implement a more comprehensive conservation program on its
own initiative, without the necessity of consulting each
93government at every stage for approval and direction."
The Salmon Commission, imbued with its new regula­
tory powers, announced the primary objectives for salmon con­
servation in 1946. The objectives were;
1. To provide rigid protection to those races that 
have suffered most severe depletion.
2. To increase escapement to all areas, thus allow­
ing for an early return to the maximum produc­
tivity of all races [of salmon].
3. To allow for the maintenance of the industry 
during the first cycle of rigid regulation by 
nearly normal fishing on the most abundant races,
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4. To provide as nearly as practicable for equal 
sharing in the annual catch by the nationals 
of each country.94
Once such regulatory measures were implemented, a definite
95recovery of salmon stocks was recorded.
Other important fishery actions were considered dur­
ing the "Period of Wartime Continental Cooperation." It was 
recently documented that the Uhited States Department of 
k k State’s Departmental Committee had already begun to 
pursue international approaches to fisheries problems» In 
June, 1943, the Canadian government had prôpbSèd to the De­
partment of State that the United States and Canada decide 
on new principles for the protection of coastal fisheries. 
While informal fisheries talks did take place in January and 
February of 1944 between the governments of Canada and the 
United States, further discussions to negotiate a joint 
approach to fisheries jurisdiction never ocCurted.
What did occur was the announcement of the Truman 
Proclamation on September 28, 1945. The two Proclamations 
signed by President Truman contained assertions of jurisdic­
tional control over the natural resources of the continental
97shelf contiguous to the American coasts, as well as the
right to establish fishery conservation zones in parts of
98the high seas adjacent to the United States. These uni­
lateral declarations set a precedent that the nations of 
Central and South America eagerly copied; America's northern 
neighbor had other thoughts, however.
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The Truman Proclamations were not a surprise to the 
Canadian government, since the Department of State 
" . . .  had initiated consultation with Canada and Newfound­
land in the expectation of a joint regional announcement of
gopolicy." When the United States decided to announce the 
two oceanic policies unilaterally, there " . . .  was no for­
mal or public response by Canada but reaction within the 
government was either non-committal or negative. The Minis­
ter of Fisheries disapproved of the Proclamation on the 
grounds that it was unnecessary in substance and unwise in 
procedure as it would provide a precedent for other states.
The fourih United States-Canada treaty period had be­
gun with a definite effort to coordinate as many North Amer­
ican fishery policies for conservation and protection of the 
living resources of the sea as possible. While the joint 
fishery commissions continued to expand their range of activ­
ities, unilateral proclamations on the part of the United 
States were precipitating genuine concern among Canadian 
fishermen. After the Truman Proclamations " . . .  had been 
announced in September 1945, the prime consideration for 
Canada and Newfoundland was how or whether the United States 
would implement it. Canada found itself under substantial 
domestic pressures to join with the United States in 'con­
trolling her offshore fishing waters.
It seemed certain that after World War II, Canada 
and the United States would be tied together in more economic
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and military ventures. To set the stage for the postwar 
continental partnership, historian Mason Wade indicated that 
the north-south continental relationship had become much 
more significant than the traditional transatlantic ones.
"As the North American relationship became closer and more 
complex, inevitably there would be still greater need for 
the mutual tolerance and recognition of the interdependence 
which had overcome the old antipathies still lurking beneath 
the cordial surface of the relationship, in Canada if not in
the United States: antipathies which unhappily could still
. . ,,102 be revived upon occasion."
A Period of Continental
Partnership: 194 6-1960
As a result of the war years, the economies of Canada 
and the United States were more closely integrated. "Canada 
became a major industrial power, which emerged from the war, 
like the United States, unscathed and far stronger. But it 
had become dangerously dependent upon the United States, 
while its prewar markets outside of North America were 
largely closed by the postwar sterling c r i s i s . F o r  these 
reasons, it was argued, Canada " . . .  immediately launched 
a determined effort to develop a more multilateral economy, 
just as it sought relief through the multilateral relation­
ships of the U.N. and NATO from its subordinate role in its 
bilateral relationship with the United States.
In 1947, as a part of its desire for a greater degree 
of economic independence, the Canadian Government decided to
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extend the Dominion's " . . .  jurisdiction over the living 
resources of the continental shelf and to introduce a Resolu­
tion into Parliament similar in terms to the Truman Procla­
mation. Later in that same year, however, Canada decided
not to proceed with its proposed Resolution. A Canadian 
researcher, Wilma Broeren, suggested that Canada's postponed 
jurisdictional efforts were probably the " . . .  result of 
American objections. As consultation had occurred between 
the two governments concerning the Truman Proclamation, in 
all likelihood Canada notified the United States of its in­
tentions. As of 1947 the American government had not estab­
lished fisheries conservation zones as provided for in the 
Proclamation, and therefore it may have made representations 
expressing reservations about or opposition to Canada's 
planned extension of j u r i s d i c t i o n . P r e s s u r e s  from the 
United States were difficult to ignore, and thus Canada with­
held its jurisdictional claims to the natural resources of 
the continental shelf contiguous to the Canadian coasts.
It was evident by 1948 that the United States favored 
the formation of a multilateral regional fishing commission 
for the conservation of the living marine resources of the 
northwest Atlantic. Wilbert McLeod Chapman, the first head 
of a new Office of the Special Assistant to the Undersecretary 
for Fisheries and Wildlife in the U.S. State Department wanted 
" . . .  to establish a conservation regime for the New England 
coast. In 1948, his office issued invitations to an
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International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference to 
meet in Washington on 17 January, 1949. The United States 
extended invitations to Canada, Denmark, France, Great 
Britain, Iceland, Newfoundland, Norway, Portugal, and 
S p a i n . C a n a d a  wanted to postpone the conference for 
one year until Newfoundland officially became one of the 
Canadian provinces; however, American officials persuaded 
the Canadians to attend the scheduled conference in Washing­
ton during January of 1949. As a result of the Washington 
Conference, an International Commission for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) " . . .  was established in 1949
for the purpose of managing the western Atlantic's fishery
108resources on a maximum-sustained-yield basis." All eleven 
nations present at the conference, including the United States, 
Canada, and Newfoundland signed and ratified the ICNAF 
Convention.
Shortly after the ICNAF become a functioning body for 
the Atlantic fisheries, an International Convention for the 
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean was negotiated 
and signed by Canada, Japan, and the United States. As a 
result of the tripartite 1952 treaty, the International North 
Pacific Fisheries Commission was established. Another key 
element of the North Pacific fisheries convention was the 
pledge of ". , . Japan to abstain, east of 175°W, from fish­
ing salmon [and some halibut and herring] stocks which [were] 
being fully exploited by North A m e r i c a n s . T h u s ,  the
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decade of the 1950s was to see the birth of some multilateral 
fishery bodies designed to effectively utilize the living 
resources of the sea. Further analysis of the ICNAF, the 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission and other 
international fishery bodies will be set forth in chapter 3, 
as a part of the external/systemic pressures impacting upon 
contemporary Canadian-United States fisheries negotiations.
While the multilateral fishery bodies were being estab­
lished for both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United 
States and Canada continued to support the bilateral commis­
sions for the conservation of North American halibut and sal­
mon stocks. In 1953 the two continental partners ratified the 
fourth halibut c o n v e n t i o n . T h e  new convention " . . .  in­
creased the responsibilities of the Commission to facilitate 
the development of stocks to levels which will permit the
maximum sustained yield and their maintenance at those
111levels." Since the International Fisheries Commission
was no longer the only international fisheries body, as it 
had been in 1923, a new name was also provided in the 1953 
convention— the International Pacific Halibut Commission. 
Membership in the newly named commission was increased from 
four to six Commissioners, three from each nation.
The International Pacific Halibut Commission, begin­
ning in 1954, extended the amount of time for the catching 
of halibut by using multiple open seasons with intervening 
closed periods. By 1959, ". . . a record catch of 71.5
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million pounds (of halibut] was taken; over the 1954-59
period the annual average catch was 65 million pounds,
6.5 million pounds better than the annual average for the
preceding five year period and 21 million pounds greater
than the total catch in 1931, the year before regulation 
112began.” As the 1960s approached, however, concern over 
diminished yields of fish per effort of catch, seasonal 
unemployment among fishermen, and vastly increased costs of 
fishing equipment created growing problems for the Halibut 
Commission.
Regardless of contemporary problems, Douglas Johnston 
gave emphasis to the accomplishments of the Commission as a 
model in the history of international fishery organizations. 
Moreover, he noted that a former Canadian Minister of Fish­
eries, J. Sinclair, believed that the halibut conventions 
had all satisfied five important conditions of fishery con­
servation. The convention areas of conservation were 
" . . .  clearly defined to allow for the natural movement 
of the stocks; the stocks of fish to be conserved [were] 
equally clearly defined; mutual advantage accrued to the 
participants; enforcement of the regulations [was] adequate 
and consistently applied; and the aggregate [was] cemented 
by good will and mutual trust.
Regarding the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries 
Commission during the fifth treaty period from 1946- 1960, 
expansions of its conservation efforts were clearly evidenced.
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In 1956, Canada and the United States signed a Protocol to 
the 1930 Salmon Convention which provided that the conser­
vation of pink salmon as well as sockeye salmon would be a 
part of the Commission's duties. Beginning in 1957, the 
two nations " . . .  closed their territorial waters and the 
adjacent areas of high seas in the Eastern Pacific to net 
fishing for salmon, thereby complying with the Commission's 
requests of November 21, 1955 and October 15, 1956, ' that 
the Canadian Government together with the Government of the 
United States support the principle that their nationals 
should not be permitted to fish for salmon on high seas of 
the Eastern Pacific Ocean except with hook and line.'"^^^
The end of the 1950s was perhaps a high water mark 
in salmon conservation efforts as an estimated 19 million 
sockeye salmon returned to the Fraser River and pink salmon 
were spawning in once barren tributaries of the rivers of 
British C o l u m b i a . N e w  problems were developing for the 
1960s and 1970s, however, as fishermen of both countries 
argued for their fair share of salmon, and environmental 
changes in waterways as a result of chemical discharges, 
hydro-electric development, mining, and timber operations 
complicated the Salmon Commission's conservation efforts.
Observations and Conclusions 
Having briefly examined five periods of treaty rela­
tions between Canada and the United States regarding oceanic 
fisheries, several summary observations might be made.
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First, it was useful to chart the diplomatic maturation of 
two North American countries as they moved through various 
stages of political development. For over a century, Great 
Britain, as a dutiful parent, was always present as a diplo­
matic negotiator, representative, and/or adviser in fisheries 
concerns. Once the 1923 halibut convention was signed, how­
ever, the Canadian government became a full participant in 
most of the fisheries negotiations with its southern neighbor. 
It was as though Canada's efforts to share oceanic resources 
with the United States paralleled her emergence as a nation. 
Indeed, James Eayrs thought that of all the resources of 
nature, fish and "falling water" had been the greatest 
". . . cause of difficulty between Canada and the United
States. Disputes over fisheries made up a considerable
117part of the diplomatic history of North America."
After studying many decades of treaty relations, 
a second observation was apparent. In order to develop 
successful resource sharing conventions and avoid protracted 
treaty discussions and legislative rejections, Canada and 
the United States created international (or bilateral) com­
missions that could conserve, control, and regulate the liv­
ing resources of the sea. The two nations' negotiators 
were (at times) innovative, willing to take risks, and per­
sistent in their efforts to propagate and share a valuable 
natural resource. Both countries were mindful of domestic 
pressures, and gradually incorporated representatives of
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various fishing interests and groups into the fisheries 
policy-making process. The advisory committee of the Sal­
mon Commission was a clear example of the involvement of 
industry and fishermen in the fisheries regulatory negotia­
tions.
While this dissertation was organized to assess the
living resources of the sea, it should be noted that Canada
and the United States developed model conservation programs
for their inland waters, too. The Great Lakes Fisheries
Convention of September 10, 1954 was a clear example of an
effective arrangement designed ". . .to facilitate methods
of destroying the parasitic sea lamprey of the Lakes. A
second objective of this convention was the co-ordination
118of research on fisheries of the same water."
A third observation that could be made about United 
States-Canadian fishery relations was evidenced after World 
War II. As the ties that linked the wartime allies created 
a web of economic interdependence between them, problems 
became more, rather than less, intense. The growing dilemmas 
of fishing for depleted resources, competing with distant 
water fishing fleets, and recognizing the concerns and pres­
sures of domestic fishermen prompted the governments of the 
United States and Canada to consider both unilateral and 
multilateral resource regulatory actions.
In concluding, it would seem that as the interna­
tional system became more complex and multifaceted after the
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Second World War, so, too, did the questing for fishery 
resources. The fact that the two North American partners 
had created workable conservation arrangements for fisheries 
during the first half of the twentieth century provided some 
hope for the creation of new and/or improved fishery mech­
anisms that could meet the needs of the contemporary Canadian 
and American fishing communities. The remainder of this 
dissertation will be devoted to an assessment of the recent 
efforts of Canadian and American diplomats to resolve their 
shared fisheries problems and produce innovative arrange­
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CHAPTER III
EXTERNAL PRESSURES IMPACTING UPON 
CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN-AMERICAN 
FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS
In order to more clearly perceive both the substance 
and form of contemporary fisheries negotiations occurring 
between Canada and the United States, it seems essential 
that an examination of external/international actors inter­
ested in North American fisheries should be provided. The 
marine revolution^ that has been takina place since World 
War II is an international phenomenon, filled with many 
voices. Regional fishery bodies, international law of the 
sea conferences, newly emerging nations, developed polities 
and their distant water fishing fleets, environmental groups, 
multinational corporations, marine scientists— these are 
some of the actors and bodies interested in the utilization 
of the living resources of the sea. Following the format 
of the fisheries negotiations schema for open polities (FiNS), 
this chapter will provide a first level of analysis discus­
sion of the "transnational actors crucial to the formation of
2North American fisheries policies."
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The thoughts of several oceanic researchers might
help keynote the considerations to be analyzed in chapter 3.
Ann Hollick, Executive Director of the Ocean Policy Project
at the Johns Hopkins University, has suggested that domestic
interests and
. . . international considerations have played a 
greater role in the evolution of U. S. and Canadian 
fisheries policies than have relations between the 
two countries. U. S.-Canadian transgovernmental 
relations, however, become more significant in nego­
tiations within regional fisheries organizations 
(such as the International Commission for North­
west Atlantic Fisheries). Allied against the distant 
water fishing nations, Canadian and American officials 
have coordinated actions in appropriate situations.3
While chapters 4 and 5 will attempt to analyze the domestic 
policy influencers during the 1960s and 1970s who have sig­
nificant roles in the development of new Canadian and Ameri­
can fisheries programs and legislation, this chapter will 
scrutinize the "international considerations" that have 
impacted upon North American fisheries policies.
Barbara Johnson of the Institute of International 
Relations at the University of British Columbia has recently 
concluded that the " . . .  conditions facing the fishing 
communities of coastal states like Canada (have been) altered 
by changes in the size and technological capabilities of 
foreign fleets."^ Moreover, Johnson believes that the 
" . . .  global trend to expansion of national jurisdiction, 
in fisheries and other spheres, in the last two decades 
makes it necessary to view Canada's expansionist policy as 
part of a worldwide political m o v e m e n t . J e r e m i a h Sullivan
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of the University of Washington has stressed the international 
aspects of United States fishery activities. He notes 
that ”. . .  the changes in sea law that are occurring will 
have a significant effect on the production, allocation, 
distribution, and even the quality of fish that Americans 
catch, eat, import, export, and leave in the sea for 
others."^
7As indicated in the FiNS diagram, the first level 
of analysis for Canadian-American fisheries negotiations 
will include comments on (1) the actions of intergovernmental 
organizations, especially the United Nations and selected 
regional fishery commissions, (2) the pressuring attempts 
of nongovernmental organizations such as the Cousteau 
Society and multinational organizations (corporations), 
and (3) the activities of distant water fishing nations, 
particularly the fishing fleets of Japan and the Soviet 
Union. In examining these international actors/policy 
influencers, one central question will be considered. How 
have the actions of such international actors influenced 
the fisheries negotiations between Canada and the United 
States?
Secondarily, it would also be interesting to see if
qany specific fisheries "linkages" between international
actors and United States and Canadian negotiators have been
established. James Rosenau and many other international
9relations experts have expressed great interest in the
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" . . .  external environment (international system] as a 
variable in foreign policy a n a l y s i s . I t  is wise to con­
sider Rosenau's admonition that . . it is not enough to 
categorize various environmental phenomena and to analyze 
them separately as sources of foreign policy. To proceed 
in this manner is not to specify the interdependencies among 
the phenomena that sustain and give coherence to the environ­
ment and that, in so doing, also serve as sources of foreign 
p o l i c y . F o l l o w i n g  Rosenau's advice, this chapter will 
also attempt to point out the various interdependencies that 
do exist among international actors interested in the usage 
of the living resources of the sea.
A contemporary conclusion that has been set forth on 
the development of law of the sea decisions (including 
fisheries) notes that while " . . .  there are periodic inter­
governmental consultations, present [law of the sea] policies 
appear to be formulated primarily in response to domestic 
interests and secondarily to prevailing views in the inter­
national negotiations rather than through close Canadian-
12U. S. cooperation." To determine the validity of that 
statement, it would be useful to turn the clock backward in 
time and examine law of the sea activities (1947-1977) that 
have occurred through the auspices of the United Nations 
and various regional fishery commissions. After summarizing 
law of the sea fisheries activities, the changing roles of 
the United States and Canada in those international
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negotiations can be more precisely assessed. Ultimately,
it should be possible to set forth some conclusions on the
impact of intergovernmental organizations and other external
policy influencers upon American and Canadian fisheries
13negotiations and marine life policies.
Intergovernmental Organizations: The
United Nations Law of the Sea 
Fisheries and Marine Life 
Negotiations (1947-1977)
The newly formed United Nations, observing many of
the unilateral and regional marine life decrees that fol­
ialowed the Truman Proclamations, attempted to develop some 
recommendations of their own regarding law of the sea ques­
tions. The General Assembly, carrying out the charge, in 
Article 13 of the UN Charter, to promote the " . . .  progres­
sive development of international law and its codification, 
created the International Law Commission on November 21, 1947. 
A significant portion of the Commission's regular reports 
contained articles " . . .  related to the legal regimes of 
the high seas and of territorial waters.
By 1956, the Commission had prepared seventy-three 
articles and commentaries on the law of the sea— which they 
submitted to the General Assembly. The Assembly, on February 
21, 1957, authorized the convening of the First Law of the 
Sea Conference, to be held in 1958 ... to examine the law
of the sea, taking account not only of the legal but also 
of the technical, economic, and biological aspects of the
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problem, and to embody the results of its work in one or
more international conventions or such other instruments
17as the conference may deem appropriate.”
As a result of General Assembly desires, the first 
conference was held, followed by a Second Law of the Sea 
Conference in 1960. In general terms, what did these two 
Geneva-based conferences accomplish? According to UN 
Under-Secretary-General Bernardo Zuleta, the First Confer­
ence " . . .  adopted four substantive conventions and an 
optimal protocol for the settlement of disputes. But it 
failed to settle the problems of the breadth of the terri­
torial sea and fishery limits, subjects that had also eluded 
solution in 1930 at the Hague. The Second Conference, con­
vened in 1960 to consider those questions, failed by one
1 ftvote to establish the limits of national jurisdiction."
In specific terms, what had these two conferences
said about fisheries and the living resources of the sea?
Regarding coastal fisheries, the 1958 Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone clearly recognized the
coastal state's exclusive fishing rights within the terri- 
19torial sea. The Convention did not, however, establish 
what the maximum breadth of the territorial sea could be.
In dealing with the question of sedentary species 
of marine life, the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 
stated that the " . . .  coastal State exercises over the con­
tinental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
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20it and exploiting its natural resources." It went on
to explain that the natural resources referred to:
. , . the mineral and other non-living resources of 
the seabed and subsoil together with living organ­
isms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either 
are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable 
to move except in constant physical contact with 
the seabed or the subsoil.2l
Finally, in examining pelagic fisheries, freedom was
guaranteed in all states, coastal and noncoastal, in
22article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. More­
over, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Liv­
ing Resources of the High Sea, signed April 29, 1958, in 
Geneva, called upon all nations to jointly formulate conser­
vation programs " . . .  with a view to securing in the first
23place a supply of food for human consumption." It also 
stipulated that a ". . . coastal State has a special inter­
est in the maintenance of the productivity of the living
resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its ter- 
2 4ritorial sea."
All four of the 1958 conventions on the law of the 
sea came into force during the 1960s. While they had pri­
marily formalized already existent practices, the conven­
tions were a positive step toward more comprehensive mea­
sures regarding utilization of the sea's resources. It 
should be remembered that fisheries remained, according to 
pathobiologist Carleton Ray, " . . .  the most difficult 
aspect of international law of the sea. This is mainly
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because of the fact that most organisms move and cannot 
be claimed.
Behind the scenes, what fisheries and territorial 
sea policies had the American and Canadian governments been 
advocating during the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Confer­
ences? It was argued that during the First Law of the Sea 
Conference, the United States would not abandon its insis­
tence on limiting the territorial sea to three miles. "In 
1960, however, the Canadian delegation succeeded in per­
suading the United States Government that a formula of a 
six-mile territorial sea, with a six-mile contiguous zone, 
would not irreparably damage U. S. strategic needs. For 
the remainder of the Conference, the two delegations worked 
closely, as did the home governments, to sell the six plus 
six formula to the participating nations."
To more clearly understand how both Canada and the 
United States ended up favoring the six plus six formula, 
earlier policy statements and proposals should be mentioned. 
In 1956, for example, Canada had presented the concept of 
a three-mile territorial sea and a nine-mile contiguous fish­
ing zone to the UN General Assembly. Two years later, Canada
submitted this "three plus nine" formula to the First Law
27of the Sea Conference. When this Canadian proposal did 
not receive wide support, Canada " . . .  submitted a simple 
six-mile territorial sea and six-mile exclusive fishing zone 
proposal, which did not recognize territorial seas beyond 
six miles, regardless of when they were declared.
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The United States submitted a separate proposal 
calling for a six-mile territorial sea and six-mile fish­
ery zone that did recognize earlier territorial fishing 
rights in the outer six miles. The Soviet Union proposed
" . . .  that each state could declare the width of its own
29territorial sea between three and twelve miles." Lastly, 
eight Latin American and Asian nations suggested a resolu­
tion which would have allowed a territorial sea of up to
twelve miles with ". . . a twelve mile fishery zone if the
30widest territorial sea were not selected." All four of 
these proposals were rejected by the First UN Law of the 
Sea Conferences. Intriguingly, the United States resolu­
tion received the most affirmative votes, suggesting that 
some combined territorial sea-special fishing zone concept
had the best chance of passage during future law of the sea 
31negotiations.
After the First United Nations Law of the Sea Con­
ference, the Canadian government set forth a paper on "The 
Law of the Sea: A Canadian Proposal." The 1959 document
reiterated Canada's six plus six formula for a territorial 
sea and special fishing zone. In part, the Canadian plan 
specified:
1. A State is entitled to fix the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a limit of six nautical 
miles. . . .
2. A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its 
territorial sea extending to a limit of 12 
nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of its territorial sea is measured
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in which it has the same rights in respect of 
fishing and the exploitation of the living 
resources of the seas as it has in its terri­torial s e a . 32
During the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS II), 
the Canadian delegation persuaded the United States to jointly 
sponsor the "six plus six" plan; added to the proposal was 
an understanding that foreign fishing nations would be
phased out of the outer six mile zone over a ten-year
33period. This joint Canadian-American proposal was narrowly 
defeated, and the delegations left UNCLOS II deadlocked on 
the breadth of the territorial sea and fishing zone issues.
One scholar noted that after the Second Law of the 
Sea Conference, the " . . .  orientation of the Canadian gov­
ernment, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 
particular, in favour of international negotiations, shaped 
the government's response to the lack of agreement on terri­
torial sea and fishing limits. While a number of states 
subsequently extended their territorial sea or fishery limits 
unilaterally, Canada participated in a campaign in the ex­
pectation of the formulation of a multilateral treaty.
Dr. Barbara Johnson, in analyzing Canadian fisheries policies, 
pointed out that after UNCLOS II ". . . Canada engaged in 
an intensive lobbying effort to get a partial multilateral 
treaty signed on the basis of the six plus six formula.
Over forty countries indicated they would sign if the United 
States did. However, the United States administration under
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Kennedy would not accept this partial treaty when it was 
suggested to it in 1963. With this turn of events, the 
emphasis necessarily turned away from global multilateral 
action.
Still, the years following the first two Law of the 
Sea Conferences were quite active at the international level 
as many United Nations organs and agencies increased their 
efforts to contribute to marine life conservation programs, 
oceanographic research projects, and settlement of disputes 
over territorial fishing rights. Special mention should be 
made of the Food and Agriculture Organization and its Com­
mittee on Fisheries, particularly for efforts to coordinate 
regional fishery commissions and provide " . . .  for techni­
cal assistance and transfer of technology to developing 
countries so as to improve both their management capability 
and their fishing capacity and fishing industries.
While the domestic political actions of Canada and 
the United States regarding fisheries will be thoroughly 
assessed in the next two chapters, it would be helpful to 
point out several important jurisdictional proclamations 
that occurred in Canada and the United States prior to the 
convening of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con­
ference (UNCLOS III) in 1973. Canada's Department of 
External Affairs noted that in ". . . 1964, Canada extended 
fisheries control nine miles beyond the territorial sea; 
in 1971, the three-mile territorial sea and nine-mile fishing
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zone were replaced by a twelve-mile territorial sea. Also
in 1971, special fishing zones were established by Canada
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic
Coast, and in Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait, and
37Dixon Entrance on the Pacific Coast." While maintaining
a three-mile territorial sea, the United States followed
Canada's lead by creating a special fishing zone in 1966.
The American fishing zone was to extend nine miles beyond
38its territorial sea.
What angered the United States government during the
late 1960s was " . . .  Canada's refusal to negotiate its
claims to offshore jurisdiction bilaterally or regionally
or to submit them to the International Court [and thus] the
single arena remaining for a U. S.-Canadian policy confron-
39tation was the U.N. Seabed Committee." Ann Hollick spec­
ulated on the significance of the United Nation's Seabed 
Committee to Canadian-American transnational relations.
Perhaps it stimulated the proliferation of national 
offshore claims. Certainly it served the U.S. as 
a court of last resort in 1970. In so doing, of 
course, the U.N. Seabed Committee contributed to 
linking fisheries, territorial sea and straits 
issues with the deliberations on the ocean floor. 
Since 1967, negotiations relating to ocean issues 
had been handled on two separate tracks. While the 
U.N. Seabed Committee was heatedly debating the dis­
position of resources of the ocean floor, the mari­
time powers were quietly discussing with other 
nations the possibility of international agreement 
on the breadth of the territorial sea, straits, and fisheries."40
Now, it seemed, the timing was perfect for the establishment 
of a comprehensive third UN Law of the Sea Conference.
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Canadian diplomat, J. Alan Beesley, pointed out that 
the . . United Nations on December 1?, 1970, took a 
decision of considerable importance to Canada. The world 
body decided that a third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea would be held in 1973 if necessary preparations could 
be made by t h e m . A s  leader of the Canadian delegation 
to the UN Seabed Committee from 1969 to 1973, Beesley helped 
shape the agenda for UNCLOS III. General Assembly Resolu­
tion 2750 had given the Seabed Committee the authority to 
plan a sea conference that would consider;
. . . the establishment of an equitable international 
regime— including an international machinery— for the 
area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean 
floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction, a precise definition of the 
sea, and a broad range of related issues including 
those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the 
continental shelf, the territorial sea (including 
the question of its breadth and the question of inter­
national straits) and contiguous zone, fishing and 
conservation of the living resources of the high 
seas (including the question of the preferential 
rights of coastal States), the preservation of the 
marine environment (including, inter alia, the 
prevention of pollution) and scientific r e s e a r c h . 42
As preparations were being made for UNCLOS III, both 
Canada and the United States attempted to clarify the posi­
tions they would take on the usage and conservation of the 
living resources of the sea. Informally, Beesley noted that 
" . . .  Canada is very seriously concerned about the problem 
of overfishing, and believes the time has come to do some­
thing about it. It is somewhat ludicrous, in an age when 
technology has made fishing quite a different thing from what
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it once was, to say simply that 'freedom of the high seas' 
applies and that one of the freedoms is the right to fish 
at will."^^ The Canadian diplomat maintained: "We are
not arguing that the coastal states should have exclusive 
rights to all the fish in such areas but are supporting the 
inclusive approach whereby other states would be permitted 
to fish subject to certain preferential rights to the 
coastal state.
Within the UN Seabed Committee, Beesley supported a 
species schema for different types of marine life, suggest­
ing that various species:
. . . require different methods of management. Some, 
such as the sedentary species, were already being 
managed under national regimes. The exploitation 
of pelagic species and marine mammals, on the other 
hand, had to be governed by an international authority, 
while anadromous fish constituted a special case. 
Non-sedentary coastal species could be effectively 
managed only by a system under which coastal states 
assumed responsibility for their conservation as 
custodian for the international community under 
internationally agreed principles. Such a system 
would give the coastal states, not exclusive fish­
ing rights, but only preferential rights in partic­ular circumstances.45
The United States also supported the general notion 
of a "species schema" that had been set forth in the UN Sea­
bed Committee. For the American government, however,
" . . .  fisheries policy through 1971 was determined by naval 
interests anxious to prevent the development of a resource 
zone that might evolve into a zone of coastal sovereignty. . . 
Even when the species approach was first elaborated in 1971
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by the fishing industry, it was introduced in conjunction 
with territorial sea and straits provisions of U.S. 
p o l i c y . D u r i n g  1971 and 1972, the United States out­
lined its support of the species schema in a series of draft
articles that stressed the management and conservation rights
47of the coastal state.
The long awaited UNCLOS III held its first session 
in New York in December of 1973. After the initial organi­
zational session, substantive sessions were held in such geo-
4 8graphically diverse sites as Caracas and Geneva. At the
conclusion of the Caracas session (1974), John R. Stevenson,
chairman of the United States delegation to the conference
observed that while a ". . . treaty was not achieved, the
Caracas session accomplished a great deal; the foundations
and building blocks of a settlement are now all present in 
49"usable form." Among the accomplishments, he mentioned the 
transition of the UN Seabed Committee of about ninety nations 
into a conference of almost 150 states, the inclusion in the 
"treaty" of a twelve-mile territorial sea, and discussion 
of a 200-mile economic zone.^® On the latter point, Steven­
son said: "Over 100 countries spoke in support of an eco­
nomic zone extending to a limit of 200 nautical miles as a 
part of an overall treaty settlement. With respect for the 
content of the zone, there is widespread support for the 
following: (a) coastal state sovereign or exclusive rights
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of living
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and nonliving resources. . . Both Canada and the United
States were among those nations supporting a 200-mile exclu­
sive economic zone (EEZ) during the Caracas session.
The 1975 Geneva session of UNCLOS III set forth a 
single negotiating text of the states' discussions, to be
used as a procedural device for further conference negotia- 
52tions. By the time the Sixth Session of UNCLOS III had 
concluded its activities in New York on July 15, 1977, an 
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) containing 303
53draft articles and seven annexes had been formally detailed.
It would be helpful at this point to summarize important pro­
visions of that document related to the living resources 
of the sea— especially fisheries. Once that assessment has 
been completed, an analysis of Canadian and American roles 
in UNCLOS III will be provided.
The New York-based Sixth Session of UNCLOS III was 
supportive of the notion that the territorial sea should 
remain the exclusive fishing right of the coastal state.
The ICNT specified that: "Passage of a foreign ship shall
be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State, if in the territorial sea it 
engaged in any of the following activities: . . . (i) Any 
fishing a c t i v i t i e s . I t  was also made clear that the 
coastal state would be responsible for the conservation of 
the living resources in that area. "States have the sover­
eign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to
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their environmental policies and in accordance with their
55duty to protect and preserve the marine environment."
Of great importance was the fact that every State would have 
the . . right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with the present 
Convention.
The Sixth Session also detailed the guidelines for 
the establishment of an exclusive economic zone. "The exclu­
sive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is m e a s u r e d . M o r e o v e r ,  in the EEZ, the coastal state 
was to have:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
seabed and subsoil and the superadjacent waters, 
and with regard to other activities for the eco­
nomic exploitation and exploration of the zone, 
such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant pro­
visions of the present Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the preservation of the marine 
environment; . . .58
The twenty-one draft articles which were specifically 
related to the functioning of the EEZ contained a number of 
important provisions regarding the conservation and utiliza­
tion of the living resources of the sea. In the area of 
conservation, the " . . .  coastal State shall determine the 
allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive
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economic zone."^^ Moreover, the coastal State " . . .  shall 
ensure through proper conservation and management measures 
that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclu­
sive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation.
As appropriate, the coastal State and relevant subregional, 
regional and global organizations shall co-operate to this 
end."^^ Finally, the ICNT specified that conservation mea­
sures taken by the coastal State in the EEZ should be 
designed ". . .to maintain or restore populations of har­
vested species at levels which can produce the maximum sus­
tainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal 
fishing communities and special requirements of developing 
countries, and taking into account fishing patterns, the 
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended sub­
regional, regional or global minimum standards.
Regarding the utilization of the marine life of the 
EEZ, the coastal State was to ". . . determine its capacity 
to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic 
zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to 
harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agree­
ments or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, con­
ditions and regulations referred to [in the ICNT], give other 
States access to the surplus of the allowable catch." It 
was made clear that the nationals of other States fishing 
in the EEZ would have to comply with the conservation measures
90
and other specific regulations established by the coastal
State. Eleven general types of fishery regulations were
then enumerated in the ICNT.®^ Overall, the coastal State
was charged with promoting " . . .  the living resources in
64the exclusive economic zone."
The Sixth Session of UNCLOS III took note of special 
problems and concerns related to certain species and stocks 
of fish found in the EEZ. Where, for example, ". . . the 
same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States, 
these States shall seek either directly or through appro­
priate subregional or regional organizations to agree upon 
the measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conser­
vation and develoment of such stocks. . . Regarding,
highly migratory species of fish and cetaceans, the coastal 
State and other polities whose nationals fished in the EEZ 
for such marine life were to ". . . co-operate directly or 
through appropriate international organizations with a view 
to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of opti­
mum utilization of such species throughout the region, both 
within and beyond the exclusive economic zone."®^
In dealing with anadromous stocks of fish, the ICNT 
stipulated: "States in whose rivers anadromous stocks
originate shall have the primary interest in and responsi­
bility for such s t o c k s . O f  particular importance to 
Canada and the United States were further convention provis­
ions that detailed how anadromous fishing efforts would be
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. conducted only in the waters landwards of the outer
limits of exclusive economic zones, except in cases where
this provision would result in economic dislocation for a
68state other than the State of origin." Moreover, the
State of origin was to . . co-operate in minimizing
economic dislocation in such other States fishing these
stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode
of operations of such States, and all the areas in which
such fishing has o c c u r r e d . F i n a l l y ,  the ICNT set forth
an article which directly paralleled the situation facing
the Canadian and American salmon fisheries. "In cases
where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters
landwards of the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone
of a State other than the State of origin, such State shall
co-operate with the State of origin with regard to the con-
70servation and management of such stocks."
Catadromous species of fish (those living in fresh
water which spawn in the sea) were to be handled in the same
manner as anadromous species. "A coastal State in whose
waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their
life cycle shall have responsibility for the management of
these species and shall ensure the ingress and egress of
migrating fish."^^ Intriguingly, the provisions of the ICNT
pertaining to the EEZ did not apply to sedentary species
72of marine life.
The final draft articles on the EEZ dealt with enforce­
ment of laws in the zone and the delimitation of the area
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between adjacent or opposite States. Recognizing the
jurisdictional problems facing nations like Canada and the
United States, UNCLOS III delegates specified that the
" . . .  delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between
adjacent or opposite States shall be effected by agreement
in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where
appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking
73account of all relevant circumstances."
While UNCLOS III devoted great energies to the formal­
ization of the exclusive economic zone concept, earlier 
international conventions on the continental shelf were not 
to be jeopardized. The ICNT clearly reiterated that the con­
tinental shelf of a coastal state was comprised of ". . . the 
sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond 
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of 
its land territory to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the base­
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is mea­
sured where the outer edge of the continental margin does
74not extend up to that distance." Moreover, the Third Law
of the Sea Conference upheld the idea that " . . .  the
coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
75natural resources." Among the natural resources cited 
were the living organisms belonging to sedentary species.
The definition given for "sedentary species" was identical
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to the one provided in the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental S h e l f . I n  sum, the draft articles of the 
ICNT were protective of coastal states' rights over the 
resources of the continental shelf, and were strongly sup­
ported by a majority of UNCLOS delegations— especially the
forty-eight countries whose continental margins extended
77beyond 200 miles.
When UNCLOS III turned to the open ocean, the exclu­
sive economic zone concept altered earlier definitions of 
the "high seas." The ICNT specified that "high seas" 
referred ". . . t o  all parts of the sea that are not in­
cluded in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archi-
78pelàgic waters of an archipelagic State." One scholar
noted that with the creation of 200-mile economic zones,
over thirty percent of the high seas would potentially be
79brought under national regulation.
The ICNT reinforced earlier conventions regarding the
freedom of the high seas. "The high seas are open to all
80States, whether coastal or landlocked." Freedom of fish-
81ing was to be a right of all nations. "All States have
the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the
high seas subject to; (a) their treaty obligations; and
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of
82coastal States. . . . "  It was also made clear that all 
" . . .  States have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate with
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other States in adopting, such measures for their respective
nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the
83living resources of the high seas."
The UNCLOS delegates encouraged regional management 
of high seas marine life. "States shall co-operate with 
each other in the management and conservation of living 
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose na­
tionals exploit identical resources, or different resources 
in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view 
to adopting the means necessary for the conservation of the 
living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate,
co-operate to establish subregional or regional fisheries
84organizations to this end." Moreover, in determining the 
allowable catch for the living resources in the high seas. 
States were to adopt measures designed, ". . . o n  the best 
scientific evidence available to the States concerned, to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at
p Clevels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield. ..." 
Finally, States concerned were to ". . . ensure that conser­
vation measures and their implementation [would] not dis­
criminate in form or in fact against the fishermen of any 
State."GG
The ICNT contained lengthy provisions for activities
in "the Area" (the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil
ft7thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction). The 
resources in the Area were to be the common heritage of
95
mankind; however, in defining such resources, it was clear
that only mineral resources were being considered. Any
living resources found in the Area did not appear to have
current marketable capacity or value. Thus, the proposed
88establishment of an International Seabed Authority 
was tied to the management and utilization of mineral re­
sources, but not to the conservation and usage of the living 
resources of the sea.
The concluding portions of the ICNT discussed the pro-
89tection and preservation of the marine environment, the
necessity of global emd regional cooperation for marine
90scientific research, the development and transfer of ma­
girine technology, and the establishment of marine scientific
92and technological centers. Lastly, the ICNT provided
guidelines for the settlement of disputes which might arise
between States regarding the interpretation and application
93of the UNCLOS III Convention. Options and settlement pro­
cedures ranged from a conciliation commission to a Law of 
the Sea Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, and 
special arbitral tribunals.
It had taken over four years and six sessions of 
UNCLOS III to produce the Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text. During that time, what fisheries and zonal positions 
had the Canadian and American delegations supported at the 
Conference, and how had the prevailing views at that inter­
national forum influenced the national fisheries policies
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and interactions between Canada and the United States? As
one law of the sea scholar noted, the major maritime states,
including Canada and the United States
. . . accepted the concepts of a 12-mile (19 km.) 
territorial sea and a 200-mile (322 km.) economic 
zone (188 nautical miles beyond the territorial 
sea), while the [Third World countries] Group of Seventy- 
Seven agreed not to press for a broader territorial 
sea, agreed to the general principle of free navi­
gation through straits and economic zones, and 
accepted the concept of compulsory settlement of 
disputes arising out of the uses of the seas.9*
Several procedural and substantive aspects of UNCLOS 
III negotiations should be mentioned before commenting on 
Canadian and American roles in the development of an exclu­
sive economic zone. First, the " . . .  Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (ICNT), while officially only a procedural 
device to facilitate negotiation, nevertheless, is function­
ing as a draft treaty and most of it represents informal 
95consensus." Harlan Cleveland, director of the Aspen 
Institute’s Program on International Affairs recently sug­
gested that the
. . . draft treaty will have a good deal of status—  
so much status that the parts to which no one objects 
will amount to 'customary international law.’ . . . 
Therefore, if enough national governments act for a 
sufficient length of time as though some principle 
were the law, the rest of us have the right to assume 
that it is— even if no formal treaty is ever signedor ratified.96
Second, during its substantive sessions, the work of the 
Conference was divided into three major committees. The 
First Committee dealt with the creation of an international 
regime for the deep seabed and ocean floor, the Second
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Committee handled a variety of issues including the exclusive 
economic zone, and the Third Committee concentrated on the 
protection of the marine environment, the transfer of marine 
technology to less developed nations, and the growth of 
marine scientific research.
It was the Second Committee's work on the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) which contained most of the draft articles 
on fisheries. This would seem reasonable since 85 to 95 per­
cent of the world's current fish catch had been taking place 
in areas which were designated as economic zones. Moreover, 
James Bridgman of the Ocean Education Project noted that 
Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, 
the Soviet Union, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, and Chile stood to
gain the greatest amounts of underwater territory in the 
97EEZ. Collectively, those ten nations would acquire more 
than half of the ocean's new economic zones. All of this 
caused geographer Martin Glassner to speculate that while 
it was true that existing fisheries organizations had not 
been " . . .  uniformly successful in protecting many species 
of fish from being overfished, and while it is undeniable 
that some distant-water fishing fleets of major maritime 
countries have not been much concerned with conservation, 
it remains to be seen whether more than a hundred coastal
gostates will do any better."
Realizing that a rather limited number of maritime 
states would reap the greatest material benefits from the
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harvesting of marine resources in the EEZ, it came as no
surprise when both the United States and Canada formally
espoused support for the EEZ concept during the 1974 UNCLOS
session in Caracas. While the Canadian government had
initially supported an EEZ concept at the United Nations 
99in 1973, the 1974 UNCLOS session gave Canadian diplomats 
the change to push their overall fisheries objectives.
Canada ”. . .  sought to maximize its position by lobbying 
for coastal-state control over stocks between two hundred 
miles and the edge of the margin (when the margin extended 
seawards of two hundred miles) and anadromous stocks.
In the Second Committee, Canada also lobbied for a ban on 
high seas salmon fishing by circulating a "Working Paper 
on Salmon.
The United States UNCLOS delegates set forth a pro­
posal on a special economic zone and the continental shelf
102during the Caracas session. Barbara Johnson indicated
that the United States position on the EEZ " . . .  was still 
more conservative than the Canadian approach, since it 
called for use of the maximum sustainable yield, a combina­
tion of flag and coastal state enforcement and compulsory 
dispute settlement. After the major maritime states 
went on record as favoring some type of economic zone with 
preferential rights to the coastal states, Jens Evensen, 
chairman of Norway's UNCLOS delegation, led an informal dis­
cussion of delegates interested in drafting fisheries articles
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for the proposed economic zone. The Evensen group worked 
during the months following the Caracas session, and by the 
time of the 1975 UNCLOS meetings in Geneva, was ready to 
propose new draft articles for an exclusive economic zone. 
Both Canada and the United States were basically supportive 
of the Evensen proposals. Thus, both nations accepted the 
concept of coastal states managing the fisheries in the 
200-mile zone so as to produce an optimum sustainable yield 
of the living resources in the EEZ.
In 1975, while domestic pressures mounted in both 
Canada and the United States for a unilateral extension of 
fisheries into a 200-mile exclusive economic zone,^^^ diplo­
mats in each nation forcefully defended UNCLOS III efforts 
to formalize EEZ convention articles. In testimony before 
the United States House Committee on International Relations 
various State Department officials stressed the importance 
of the multilateral UNCLOS efforts. Carlyle Maw, Special 
Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Con­
ference pointed out that
. . . we are actively supporting the creation of a 
200-mile economic zone that would include coastal 
fisheries as part of a comprehensive law of the sea 
treaty. However, it is one thing to establish a 
fisheries zone by agreement with the nations con­
cerned. It is quite another to establish such a 
zone unilaterally in contravention of the existing 
rights of other nations to fish on the high seas.
The President supports the establishment of a 200- 
mile fisheries zone by negotiation; he strongly 
opposes unilateral claims to jurisdiction on the high seas. . . .105
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In the same congressional hearing. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, Thomas Clingan, 
added his thoughts on a 200-mile fisheries zone. "We hope 
that such a zone will eventually be recognized by a law of 
the sea treaty. Fisheries questions, like other ocean 
issues, can best be resolved within the context of broad 
multilateral a g r e e m e n t . C l i n g a n  concluded that distant- 
water fishing nations such as the Soviet Union had already 
indicated their willingness to accept a 200-mile fishing 
zone. Other ". . . nations must be prepared to negotiate 
mutually acceptable arrangements that will permit their con­
tinued participation in coastal fisheries. Our own distant- 
water fishing fleets are similarly affected, and we believe 
the course of bilateral and multilateral agreement will also
permit negotiations on behalf of our shrimp and tuna fleets
107that unilateral action on our part might preclude."
By 1976, Canadian UNCLOS Representative J. Alan 
Beesley, commenting on the economic zone concept, clarified 
his Government's position on the zone. The EEZ was to be 
a sui generis zone that was neither high seas nor territor­
ial sea, but "embodied the right of functional jurisdiction" 
by coastal states. Said Beesley;
The major maritime powers continue, for example, to 
assert that the waters of the economic zone have the 
status of high seas, while some states would con­
sider them as quasi-territorial sea. The majority 
view, however, is quite clearly that the waters of 
the economic zone are neither high seas nor terri­
torial sea but have a status incorporating some 
elements of each of these two regimes, but constitut­
ing, in fact a totally new legal r e g i m e . 108
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The Canadian diplomat concluded that there . . is 
criticism of the concept on the grounds that it divides 
up large portions of the world amongst coastal states.
These criticisms characterize coastal states as being some­
how outside the international community when, in fact over 
90% of the peoples of the world reside in coastal states,
and the coastal states comprise the majority of the states 
109of the world.
It was apparent through the various UNCLOS III ses­
sions that both Canada and the United States remained suppor­
tive of the economic zone concept- The two nations, however, 
were concerned about high seas fisheries— especially regard­
ing the taking of salmon beyond the 200-mile EEZ. At the 
encouragement of Norway's Jens Evensen, five nations par­
ticularly interested in the salmon question met in 1975 and 
drafted an article which gave coastal states primary respon­
sibility over such anadromous stocks. Thus it was that 
Canada and the United States along with Japan, Denmark and 
the Soviet Union, drafted the salmon provisions which UNCLOS 
III delegates favorably a c c e p t e d . D u r i n g  the 1976 and 
1977 UNCLOS sessions, the fisheries provisions of the Nego­
tiating Text were not drastically changed from earlier 
sessions. Canada and the United States seemed satisfied 
with the approaches that had been taken by the Conference 
regarding the EEZ, high seas fisheries, and the rights and 
obligations of coastal states to utilize the living resources 
of the sea.
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Time was becoming the crucial factor in UNCLOS III 
negotiations. By 1976 delegates were at an impasse over 
the usage of "the Area" and its seabed mineral wealth as 
part of the common heritage of mankind. The longer the Con­
ference struggled for a comprehensive treaty over all law 
of the sea issues, the provisions (including fisheries 
articles) already agreed upon by a majority of the dele­
gations were being jeopardized. Moreover, the domestic 
pressures within coastal states for unilateral fishing zones 
extensions could not be postponed indefinitely. This reali­
zation prompted one fisheries expert to note that during 
" . . .  much of 1976, the most significant developments in
Canadian fishery policy occurred outside the formal setting
111of UNCLOS III." By 1976 new United States fisheries poli­
cies were also being finalized as Congress debated the merits
112of unilateral fishery zone extensions.
A series of observations and summary thoughts on the 
impact of United Nations (FiNS— first level) actions and 
negotiations upon United States and Canadian fishery policies 
through the Sixth UNCLOS III Session would be helpful at this 
point. By taking the time to trace the evolutionary nature 
of law of the sea discussions at the United Nations over 
three decades, it was possible to see how concensus was 
solidified on a broad range of oceanic topics. Especially 
in the area of the living resources of the sea, it became 
apparent that new concepts and territorial expansions by
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coastal states were desired by a majority of the nations 
of the world. The United Nations became a forum in which 
many states could argue for new zonal concepts and attempt 
to persuade coastal, maritime, and landlocked countries that 
agreements on the usage and conservation of the living 
resources of the sea were absolutely essential before fur­
ther depletion of fish stocks and pollution of coastal 
waters occurred. Canada and the United States were active 
in all UNCLOS negotiations, and used the multilateral con­
ference to advance their ideas on the usage of the sea's 
resources.
It should be made clear that the United States and 
Canada, while ready to initiate fishery policies at the law 
of the sea conferences, were also willing to work with other 
nations in reaching compromise maritime life articles. As 
detailed in earlier analysis, the two countries favored var­
ious three plus nine, six plus six territorial sea/fishery 
zone concepts. Eventually, as more nations began to accept 
the concept of an exclusive economic zone, the governments 
of Canada and the United States joined other coastal nations 
in formalizing the guidelines for the usage of such a zone.
Were Canadian and American fishery policies shaped 
by the deliberations at the United Nations? To a degree, 
partially, or secondarily— such terms would be the qualifiers 
given in reply to that decision-making question. Barbara 
Johnson provided the most logical answer by indicating that:
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Bilateral politics were also affected by the changes 
occurring as a result of preparations for UNCLOS 
III, especially Canadian-American salmon relations.
The uneasy relationship among salmon interests had 
been upset by Canadian pressure to terminate the 
Fraser River Convention, which as it stood favored 
the United States. The Canadian move stemmed partly 
from domestic opposition to the Fraser River arrange­
ment within British Columbia, partly from technologi­
cal changes, and partly from international develop­
ments on the law of the sea.113
Not only UNCLOS observers but also key delegates to 
the international sea law negotiations stressed the signifi­
cance of the multilateral forum in bringing Canadian and 
American decision-makers together. Ambassador Thomas Clingan, 
Jr., a representative of the United States UNCLOS delegation, 
stated that the United States and Canada had worked effec­
tively together on Committee Two sea law deliberations.
"When the Law of the Sea Conference started, overall, the 
objectives of Canada and the objectives of the United States 
were compatible, and we worked pretty well together.
Clingan noted that " . . .  particularly on the fisheries 
articles advanced through the Second Committee text, we did 
not have any serious disagreements. On our most sensitive 
area, we managed to work out our differences; the negotia­
tion of the salmon article succeeded because our interests 
were mutual but not identical.
Thus, the UNCLOS III deliberations acted as a forum 
for the advancement of United States and Canadian fisheries 
policies, enabled the two nations to reach a consensus on 
sensitive fishery articles (i.e., salmon), and eventually
105
provided the two North American countries with an additional 
decision-making advantage. The longer the UNCLOS III dele­
gations continued to support the EEZ and fishery articles 
contained in the draft treaty, the more likely it was that 
the ICNT would be accepted as customary international law.
By 1976 and 1977, as the UNCLOS sessions plodded on, both 
the United States and Canada used the ICNT articles to 
legitimize the creation of 200-mile fishing zones off their 
coasts. The Canadian government was quite explicit in stat­
ing why they expected other nations to accept their declara­
tion of a 200-mile Canadian EEZ. ". . . [T]he concept of 
a 200-mile fishing zone has won acceptance by the interna­
tional community, as reflected in developments within the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The concept is 
now reflected in state practice, with an increasing number 
of countries having already taken action to extend their 
fisheries zones to 200 miles.
Several years ago, the Ocean Policy Project of Johns 
Hopkins University, in developing a national ocean policy 
for the United States, made a series of projections for 
"1976 and beyond." The study stressed that at
. , . the international level, perhaps the most 
important activity with regard to fisheries is the 
present UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. . . .
The task of UNCLOS III has been to determine a legal 
regime for the oceans which deals, among other things, 
with fisheries. It is understandable, therefore, 
that international and regional organizations as 
well as coastal and distant water fishing states 
attach great importance to the results of the law 
of the sea negotiations.
106
Closer to the 1980s, it would be safe to suggest 
that UNCLOS III did provide consensus on a new legal frame­
work for fisheries. Once international desires for an exclu­
sive economic zone were formalized, it was difficult to hold 
back the heightened enthusiasm of coastal states to extend 
their fishing zones to 200 miles. Thus, nations utilized 
UNCLOS III convention articles to give a sense of legitimacy 
to their unilateral zonal extensions. Deliberations at the 
United Nations, coupled with domestic pressures from a var­
iety of policy influencera, led the governments of Canada 
and the United States into a new era of fishery politics—  
the dimensions of which will be explored in the chapters 
ahead.
Intergovernmental Organizations:
Regional Fisheries Commissions 
Activities
The decade following World War II, as detailed in the 
previous chapter, was a time when the birth of a number of 
multilateral regional fisheries commissions occurred. The 
United States and Canada were instrumental in the formation 
of the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fish­
eries (ICNAF) in 1949 and the International Commission for 
North Pacific Fisheries (INPFC) in 1953. While the latter 
body remained a tripartite conservation effort with Japan, 
the ICNAF grew into a seventeen-nation fishery forum by the 
mid-1970s. While the ICNAF and INPFC were the multilateral 
commissions "most directly concerned" with the coastal
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fisheries of Canada and the United States, other post-war 
fishery bodies were formulated with the support of the two 
North American polities. Canada and the United States be­
came members of such bodies as the Inter-American Tropical 
Tuna Commission, the International Commission for the Con­
servation of Atlantic Tuna, the North Pacific Fur Sea
118Commission, and the International Whaling Commission.
The activities of the ICNAF could be cited as a repre­
sentation of the hopes initiated and problems encountered by 
regional fishery commissions over the past quarter century. 
Moreover, the impact of the ICNAF actions on United States 
and Canadian fishery policies (up to 1977) should demonstrate 
the growing difficulty of attempting to share the living 
resources of the sea. At birth, the ICNAF was to become 
involved in ". . . the investigation, protection and conser­
vation of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, in
order to make possible the maintenance of a maximum sustained
119catch from those fisheries." The Commission itself was 
to hold annual meetings and make decisions and recommenda­
tions by a two-thirds majority vote of all contracting 
governments.
Reporting on the first meetings of the ICNAF in 1951, 
Edward Castleman of the U.S. Department of the Interior indi­
cated that in ". . . accordance with the terms of the Con­
vention, which divides the overall Convention area into five 
subareas in order to make the studies and recommendations of
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the Commission more effective, five panels with primary
responsibility for the five subareas also met, adopted
120rules of procedure, and elected officers." Castleman
also noted that the " . . .  United States, at the moment,
is particularly interested in subarea 5 (the banks off the
coast of New England) and, accordingly recommended that this
panel give attention to possible conservation action in the
121subarea as soon as possible."
The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention had stipu­
lated that each contracting Government participating ", , . i n  
any Panel shall be represented on such Panel by its Commis­
sioner or Commissioners, who may be assisted by experts or 
122advisers." Interestingly, the Convention encouraged
each contracting Government to also set up
. . .  an Advisory Committee composed of persons, 
including fishermen, vessel owners and others, well 
informed concerning the problems of the fisheries 
of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. With the assent 
of the Contracting Government concerned, a repre­
sentative or representatives of an Advisory Commit­
tee may attend as observers all non-executive meet­
ings of the Commission or of any Panel in which 
their Government participates.
In a functional sense, the ICNAF was responsible 
" . . .  for obtaining and collating the information necessary 
for maintaining those stocks of fish which support interna­
tional fisheries in the Convention area. . . while each 
Panel was to ". . , be responsible for keeping under review
the fisheries of its sub-area and the scientific and other
125information relating thereto." In specific terms, the
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ICNAF was to make proposals to member governments based upon 
the recommendations of one or more Panels. The proposals, 
designed to keep the stocks of fish in the Convention area 
at maximum sustained catch levels, were to include one or 
more of the following measures:
(a) establishing open and closed seasons;
(b) closing to fishing such portions of a sub-area 
as the Panel concerned finds to be a spawning 
area or to be populated by small or immature 
fish;
(c) establishing size limits for any species;
(d) prescribing the fishing gear and appliances the 
use of which is prohibited;
(e) prescribing an over-all catch limit for any 
species of f i s h . 126
Once any proposal was reaffirmed by the ICNAF, it was to
" . . .  become effective for all Contracting Governments four
months after the date on which notifications of acceptance
shall have been received by the Depository Government from
all the Contracting Governments participating in the Panel
or Panels for the sub-area or sub-areas to which the pro-
127posai applies."
From the perspectives of the United States and Canada, 
what could be said about the functioning of the ICNAF over 
the years? Regarding the first decade of the ICNAF's exis­
tence as an experiment in international fishery management, 
marine policy expert Douglas Johnston thought the Convention 
was a ". . . timid venture, and the shared authorities of
the contracting parties to exploit and conserve the resources 
• 1 9 Ain the convention waters [were] scarcely affected."
There was increasing competition among the fishermen from
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many nations in the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic—
fisheries that included sizable quantities of scallops,
lobsters, herring, flounder, redfish, and cod. By the end
of the 1960s, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and eleven European states
were fishing in Northwest Atlantic waters along with Canada
and the United States. As Barbara Johnson envisioned the
situation, the " . . .  increase in the number of participants
was paralleled by major changes in fishing technology which
made operations much more efficient. These changes made it
increasingly difficult for the International Commission for
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries to satisfy its coastal-state
members, Canada and the United States, that it would con-
129serve and regulate the fisheries."
Canadian writer, R. M. Logan, analyzed the ICNAF's 
actions in the most emphatic terms. "Canada and the United 
States are very dissatisfied with ICNAF's performance. The 
Commission has failed utterly to control the massive in­
creases in fishing effort by certain of its member states
1 noff North America's east coast during the past fifteen years." 
Logan concluded that species ". . . o f  vital importance to 
Canadian and U.S. fishermen have been decimated. Haddock, 
for instance, have practically disappeared, and the herring 
catch has been reduced by over 90 percent in less than a 
decade of intensive fishing. North America's fishing indus­
try has suffered from the intensification of foreign fish- 
131ing effort." Repeatedly during the 1950s and 1960s, the
Ill
United States and Canada worked actively within the ICNAF
to protect their coastal fishery interests, " . . .  but the
member nations consistently refused to accept the catch
limits regarded by American scientists as essential for
132rebuilding and for conserving badly depleted stocks."
The 1970s saw some dramatic changes' occurring in the 
ICNAF, as member nations realized that the Canadian and 
American government were both indicating support for some 
type of 200-mile fisheries zone at UNCLOS III. Logan reiter­
ated that the ICNAF "disregarded Canadian and U.S. proposals 
for stringent conservation measures during the post-World 
War II period when catches were increasing, but the Commis­
sion could not ignore indefinitely the inevitable declines 
in yield that resulted from the many years of overfishing. 
Commencing with the imposition of national quotas oh haddock
and plaice in 1969-70, ICNAF began to implement policies
133long advocated by Canada and the United States."
In 1972 some two dozen new proposals were adopted by
the ICNAF. Perhaps the most significant agreement realized
was one for the development of a national quota system which
" . . .  divided the yield of fifteen separate stocks of fish.
The total allowable catch (TAC) for each stock was calculated
on a '40-40-10-10' f o r m u l a . T h i s  formula was
derived from the catch of each country based on estab­
lished fishing patterns (40 percent of the average 
catch over the last three years and 40 percent of 
the average catch over the last ten years, with 10 
percent extra for coastal states and 10 percent left 
over for new entrants to the fishery). Out of this
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formula Canada received about 16 percent of the total 
ICNAF catch in tons and the United States receivedabout 10 p e r c e n t . 135
Still, reluctant acceptance of the proposals by distant water 
fishing nations active in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries 
did not quell Canadian and American demands for additional 
fisheries concessions.
As nations formulated the exclusive economic zone con­
cept at UNCLOS III in 1973 and 1974, ICNAF members developed 
a joint enforcement scheme which gave Commission members 
the right to board all fishing vessels and check the catches 
of fish within the Convention area. With the passage of each 
additional year, the possibility of unilateral extensions 
of Canadian and American fishing zones loomed ever larger 
in the minds of ICNAF member nations. There was an under­
standable willingness to accept more of the ICNAF proposals 
suggested by Canada and the United States. At a special ses­
sion of the ICNAF in Montreal, September 22-28, 1975, U.S. 
Under Secretary for Security Assistance Carlyle Maw read a 
message from President Gerald Ford to ICNAF members;
This special meeting of the ICNAF takes up the most 
difficult problem in the Commission's twenty-five 
year history. . . .  It is imperative that the Com­
mission succeed in establishing adequate conserva­
tion measures and enforcement procedures to rebuild 
the important fishery stocks of the Northwest 
Atlantic. . . .  I am strongly opposed to unilateral 
claims by nations to jurisdiction on the high seas. 
However, pressures for unilateral measures do exist, 
and will continue to mount, if international agree­ments do not prove to be effective.136
The United States "Statement" issued at the conclusion
of the Montreal meeting indicated that the seventeen-member
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ICNAF had accepted many of the United States and Canadian
proposals. Two significant examples were cited. First,
further " . . .  progress in the critical area of improved
international enforcement was a principal U.S. objective
at the special meeting. This was achieved to a significant
extent with the approval of a U.S.-proposed system of national
registration for vessels engaged in fishing or fish process-
137ing in the convention area." The American government also 
credited Canada with a second ICNAF agreement reached in 
Montreal. "Canada was successful in securing approval for 
a regulation designed to substantially reduce fishing effort 
on groundfish stocks in five portions of the convention area 
off the Canadian coast. The regulation provides for reduc­
tion in fishing days for various fishing vessel tonnage and 
gear categories ranging from 40 to 50 percent from that 
reported in the 1972 and 1973 periods.
During 1976, both Canada and the United States enacted 
legislation which called for the implementation of 200-mile 
fishing zones off their coast. While not unexpected, the 
unilateral moves had profound effects upon the ICNAF. Allan 
Mac Eachen, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
indicated that there would be ". . . a continuing need, fol­
lowing extensions of fisheries jurisdiction by coastal 
states, for multilateral fisheries cooperation. New multi­
lateral arrangements will be needed to bring the Interna­
tional Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)
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and other fisheries conventions, into line with the new
139jurisdictional realities."
The United States, after passage of the Fishery Con­
servation and Management Act of 1976, . . had little
interest in seeing ICNAF continue, in part since its east 
coast fish stocks were within the 200-mile zone. Canada 
was strongly in favor of renegotiating ICNAF's mandate to 
deal with the management of stocks lying between two hundred 
miles and the m a r g i n . T h u s ,  while Canada remained in 
the ICNAF, the American government announced its intent to 
withdraw from the Convention on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 
"As a consequence of our extended domestic jurisdiction, 
and in keeping with the intent of the act, the President has 
decided that the United States would withdraw from the ICNAF 
effective December 31, 1976."^^^
While the ICNAF was struggling to deal with the inten­
sified fishing efforts in the Northwest Atlantic, the Inter­
national Commission for North Pacific Fisheries (INPFC) con­
tinued to function with the support of its three members—  
Canada, Japan, and the United States. It should be remembered 
that the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries 
of the North Pacific Ocean (Norpac Treaty), which established 
the INPFC, contained an important abstention principle. The 
Convention compelled Japan to abstain from fishing for salmon 
and some herring and halibut stocks east of 175® East longi­
tude. This was, in fact, the first time that such an
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abstention principle appeared in an international fisheries 
142convention.
After Canada and the United States established their 
200-mile fisheries zone in 1977, ". . . it became necessary 
to amend the [Norpac] Agreement. Following extensive nego­
tiations, agreement was reached on a final text of a Protocol 
to amend the existing C o n v e n t i o n . S o m e  of the essential 
points of the Protocol included the continuance of the INPFC 
Commission in its present form, the promotion and cooperation
of ". . . scientific research with respect to the fisheries
144resources within the Convention area . ..." and support 
for the " . . .  principle established in the existing Conven­
tion forbidding the fishing of salmon in specific areas of
145the Eastern Pacific. . . ." The Canadian government
clearly expressed their pleasure with the new agreement. "As 
a result under terms of the Protocol no salmon fishing on 
the high seas is permitted east of 175® East longitude except 
in the Bering Sea. This will ensure complete protection for 
salmon of Canadian o r i g i n . M o r e o v e r ,  Canada's External 
Affairs Department ". . . hoped that close cooperative rela­
tions established between Canada, Japan and the United States 
with regard to the conservation and management of the fish­
eries resources of the North Pacific will continue.
Having briefly commented on ICNAF and INPFC activities, 
it would be useful to detail the impact of such regional 
fisheries commissions on United States and Canadian fisher­
ies policies. First, such bodies served as vehicles through
116
which the two coastal fishing states could communicate 
their concerns for the management and conservation of fish 
stocks in the convention areas. Moreover, as distant water 
fishing nations began intensive fishing efforts in the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the regional fisheries commis­
sions became arenas in which Canada and the United States 
often coordinated their proposals regarding the regulation 
of international fisheries. Especially at the ICNAF meet­
ings, when other member-nations did not appear to be inter­
ested in the suggestions set forth by Canada and the United 
States, the two North American neighbors would join forces 
in order to provide a more cohesive coastal states nego­
tiating unit.
Regional fisheries commissions also encouraged the 
development of private advisory groups from member nations. 
Canadian and American fishermen, vessel owners and marine 
science experts were afforded the opportunity of having an 
input into the regional fisheries bodies. While the inter­
action of public officials and private advisory groups pro­
vided potential benefits in the formulation of equitable 
fishery policies, there were some inherent problems in the 
decision-making process. As an example, the International 
North Pacific Fisheries Commission did
. . . not employ its own research staff. Each dele­
gation on the Commission relies on the advice of 
experts of its own choosing. Consequently, the 
scientific recommendations received by the commis­
sioners rarely agree and often display national bias,
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Since the Commission operates on the basis of 
unanimity, it is practically impossible for Canada 
and the United States to have new species added to 
the list of species that quality for a b s t e n t i o n . 148
In sum, long before Canada and the United States 
extended their coastal fishing zones to 200 miles, it was 
clear that the regional fisheries commissions were having 
only limited success in the regulation of designated fish­
eries. It was difficult to reach useful conservation agree­
ments among all the member nations; moreover, many distant 
water fishing fleets were from countries that did not even 
participate in the regional fisheries commissions. This 
later situation necessitated additional bilateral and multi­
lateral fisheries negotiations between Canada, the United 
States,and other distant water fishing nations. Lacking 
universal membership and stultified by the fact that most 
governments were " . . .  unwilling to accept a limitation of
their fishing effort until a resource [was] severely
149depleted . . .," regional fisheries commissions became 
the pawns instead of the knights of international fisheries 
politics.
Even though problems persisted, however, the regional 
fisheries commissions continued to function. When the United 
States withdrew from the ICNAF at the end of 1976, the 
regional fisheries commission made plans to adjust to the 
situation. By May of 1978, meetings were held in Ottawa 
". . . to prepare the text of a multilateral convention 
establishing a Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
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(NAFO). . . .  Experts undertook to refer to their 
respective authorities a draft Convention providing for a 
successor organization to ICNAF, to be known as NAFO."^^^ 
Marine life authorities and diplomats from all ICNAF nations, 
as well as the United States and the European Community 
attended the Ottawa meetings. The 1978 draft Convention 
called for the ". . . efficient management and control of 
fisheries in areas of the Northwest Atlantic beyond national 
jurisdiction, including the continuation of the ICNAF scheme 
of joint international enforcement, to ensure that all agreed 
measures are effectively carried out by the vessels of the 
contracting parties.
It was suggested that the approval of the NAFO efforts 
". . . b y  participating governments would provide the best 
evidence of cooperation and understanding between coastal 
and long-distance fishing nations in areas of international 
management such as the rich fishing grounds found immediately
ICObeyond Canadian fishing limits off the East coast." The
current response of both Canada and the United States to a 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, as well as their 
continued involvement in other regional fisheries commissions 
will be detailed in the latter dissertation chapters.
Clearly, the need for effectively functioning regional fish­
eries commissions did not die out when the two North Ameri­
can polities extended their fishing zones to 200 miles in 
1977.
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Intergovernmental Organizations; The 
Pressuring Efforts of Nongovernmental 
and Multinational Organizations
When William Coplin analyzed transnational organi­
zations, he noted the significance of nongovernmental
organizations— groups formed " . . .  among individuals or
153private organizations in different countries." The ques­
tion to be addressed as a part of the Fisheries Negotiations 
Schema for Open Polities (FiNS) should be clearly stated.
Did nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a significant 
impact upon any of the recent international or regional 
fisheries negotiations in which the United States and Canadian 
governments were active participants? An immediate response 
to that question would be that there was little evidence 
which would indicate the NGOs had an important bearing on 
such regional/international fisheries discussions. To clarify 
that response, several points should be made. First, there 
were (and are) few NGOs interested in fisheries that fit the 
Coplin definition. Most marine life pressure groups tend 
to be composed of the nationals of one country, and will 
accordingly be assessed in the next two chapters on domestic 
policy influencers. Moreover, fisheries negotiations were 
usually conducted as closed bargaining sessions between gov­
ernmental representatives. Thus, there were few opportunities 
for direct contact between NGOs and fisheries negotiators.
The largest clusterings of nongovernmental organiza­
tions were logically to be found at international conferences—
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especially the UN Law of the Sea Conferences. Such groups 
as the World Federation of United Nations Associations, 
the Friends World Committee for Consultation, the Interna­
tional Law Association, Society for International Develop­
ment, and Friends of the Earth had observers at recent 
UNCLOS III s e s s i o n s . M o s t  of these NGOs were particu­
larly interested in the development of an International Sea-
155bed Authority and its mining Enterprise, rather than the 
living resources of the sea articles which had been agreed 
upon in earlier sessions. Still, the author of this dis­
sertation was given an NGO pass by the Friends World Com­
mittee for Consultation, whose official representative, Mrs. 
Miriam Levering, indicated that it was important to assess 
the Committee Two efforts to share the living resources 
of the sea.^^^
Acting as an observer for an-NGO can become a very 
frustrating experience. Since all UNCLOS III sessions were 
closed, some observers expressed concern over their limited 
access to official conference delegates. Mrs. Edna Rossiter 
of the World Federation of United Nations Associations indi­
cated that after four full weeks, she had been unable to
157have a single discussion with any UNCLOS delegates. Some
delegates did permit interviews between Conference meetings, 
but schedules were so hectic that appointments had to be 
made days in advance— preferably before the Conference ses­
sions began. Even some UNCLOS III delegates acknowledged
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how difficult it would be for outsiders (NGO observers and 
scholars) to develop a clear picture of UNCLOS III deliber­
ations. Mrs. Rosemary Forrester, an Australian representa­
tive to the Law of the Sea Conference expressed the candid
view that NGOs had little impact upon Conference 
158discussions.
Perhaps the most successful NGO operation at UNCLOS 
III was headed by Miriam and Samuel Levering. Representing 
the Ocean Education Project of the Friends World Committee 
for Consultation, the Leverings and a small staff of volun­
teers held receptions for UNCLOS delegates and published 
Neptune, a source of ". . . independent news at the Law of
1 egthe Sea Conference (including soundings and discovery)." 
Through the years, UNCLOS delegates came to respect the 
Leverings, and thus the Ocean Education Project became a 
private voice that often reached UNCLOS delegates' ears. 
Clearly, members of the American and Canadian Conference 
delegations were informed of the pressuring/educational 
efforts of the Ocean Policy Project staff.
In addition to NGOs that were active at UNCLOS III, 
several other organizations might be cited for their inter­
est in marine life laws and negotiations. The Sierra Club, 
". . . a non-governmental organization with a world-wide
membership of over 173,000 . . . has [since 1972] broadened
’  ,1.
its concerns to environmental problems that do not respect 
national boundaries. The oceans are therefore of special
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concern 1.161 sierra Club, through its Office of
International Environmental Affairs, conducted meetings
162on the conservation of living resources and supported 
publication of scholarly papers on fisheries deliberations. 
The clearest example of recent Sierra Club fisheries re­
search was a paper on "Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction 
and the Law of the Sea: Effect on Whales and Other Migra­
tory S p e c i e s . T h e  paper concluded that in ". . . many 
cases individual [fish] stocks cross from 200 mile zones to 
the high seas even when not migrating. Both the Whaling 
Convention and the RSNT [UNCLOS III text] need to evidence 
more awareness of these facts. International research should 
be encouraged and might include consideration of how 200 mile 
zones and coastal state unilateral action affects such 
research.
The Cousteau Society should be mentioned as another 
environmental NGO that evinced both interest and concern over 
fisheries negotiations. Through policy statements and a 
variety of publications, members of the Cousteau Society 
expressed their alarm over the political attempts of nations 
to carve up the high seas. Daniel Morast, Environmental 
Coordinator for the Cousteau Society, reflected on the chang­
ing law of the sea and fishery politics.
The Concept that he [Jacques-Yves Cousteau] wants to 
develop is that the 200 mile exclusive economic zone 
actually be turned into a 200 mile zone of responsi­
bility. It should not be an area belonging to a 
country that they can exploit any way they want to, 
but rather an area which a nation has been given to
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protect, preserve and improve according to 
internationally accepted g u i d e l i n e s . 165
The Cousteau Society, Morast concluded, supported the view 
that the oceans were the common heritage of all people, not 
the liquid asset of a few developed nations and distant 
water fishing fleets.
In sum, NGOs with genuine international memberships 
tried to approach fisheries negotiations as concerned con­
servationists and humanitarians. Such private groups stressed 
the necessity of international standards/criteria for fishery 
conservation and management, and abhorred the political con­
siderations that shaped many of the UNCLOS III articles and 
bilateral fisheries agreements. Perhaps realizing their 
limited impact upon diplomats and politicians, many NGOs 
directed their interest articulation/aggregation efforts 
toward private citizens. Through newspapers, magazines, 
pamphlets, books, and films, nongovernmental groups con­
cerned about the living resources of the sea attempted to 
arouse world-wide public interest in the international pro­
tection and wise utilization of oceanic fisheries.
In contrast to NGOs, multinational organizations were 
those bodies motivated by economic considerations in divid­
ing up the living resources of the sea. Using Coplin's 
definition of multinational organizations as corporations 
", . . initially based in one country bût [having] opera­
tions, interests, and/or employees in other countries. . . 
what role did such multinational corporations play in American
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and Canadian fisheries deliberations? The essential point 
to be made would be that the Canadian and American commer­
cial fishing industries were primarily composed of smaller 
national fishing enterprises. The pressuring efforts of 
such national fishing entrepreneurs will thus be catalogued 
in the next two chapters. Multinational corporations of 
North American origin did exert some control over distant 
water fishing operations, especially regarding highly migra­
tory species of fish.^^® Still, " . . .  about 80 percent of 
the [American] boats are individually owned, most of which 
are under five tons. Fully 80 percent of the processors 
have annual sales under $1 million, while only 43 plants 
have sales over $10 million.
The largest foreign investments in North American 
commercial fisheries during the past decade were made by 
multinational corporations originally based in Japan. In 
1977 it was asserted that of some " . . .  fifty million dol­
lars in total foreign investment in the U.S. fishing
industry . . . Japanese trading and fishing companies
170account[ed] for most of it." Japanese multinationals
gained control of a number of American fishing vessels and
processing plants. Even Japan's ". . . Prime Minister,
Takeo Miki, made a point of asking President Ford to head
off congressional action on extended jurisdiction when the
1 71two men met at the economic summit in Paris in 1975."
It was hoped that a delay in United States action would
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. give the Japanese more time to buy into the U.S.
fishing industry and thus assure themselves of continued
172access to U.S. fisheries."
The real impact of multinational corporations upon 
American and Canadian fisheries policies was the reinvigor- 
ation of domestic fisheries groups' pressuring efforts.
Such local fisheries associations prodded the Canadian 
Parliament and United States Congress to move more rapidly 
toward the implementation of 200 mile-fishing zones. The 
actions of multinational corporations coupled with the gov­
ernmental policies of distant water fishing nations helped 
convince Canadian and American leaders that unilateral zonal 
extensions were necessary to protect North America's domes­
tic fishing industries.
Even after Canada and the United States established 
their 200-mile fishery zones in 1977, Japanese multinational 
corporations continued their buying sprees. One of 
". . . Japan's largest trading companies, Sumitomo Shoji 
Kaisha, is awaiting approval from Canada's Foreign Invest­
ment Review Agency to begin full-scale operation of a wholly
173owned subsidiary. Western Canada Seafood." Moreover, 
Japan's multinational interests ". . . g o  beyond Canada to 
the U.S. Though the 1972-74 wave of buying that included 
the purchase of Seattle's Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods Inc. by 
Kyokuyo Co. has slowed, the Japanese control a substantial 
share of the crab and salmon industry along Alaska's west
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c o a s t . T h e  ambitious Japanese multinationals thus
caused the two North American polities to consider further
protectionist fisheries legislation designed to aid Canadian
175and American fishermen and processors.
Distant Water Fishing Nations; The 
Intensive Fishing Efforts of Japan 
and the Soviet Union
While earlier sections of the dissertation noted some
of the important multilateral fisheries conventions and
regional fisheries commissions that the United States,
CanadaJapan, and the Soviet Union helped formulate, it
would be useful to indicate how the intensive fishing efforts
of the two major distant water fishing nations of the world—
Japan and the Soviet Union— impacted upon recent United States
and Canadian fisheries policies and negotiations. In less
than fifteen years, the Soviet Union and Japan built the
most aggressive and effective fishing fleets in the world.
By 1966, approximately five hundred new Soviet and Japanese
fishing vessels were operating in the Northeast Pacific
waters off American and Canadian coasts. Each year
" . . .  the Soviets were taking sixty million pounds 
of Pacific perch, or twice the U.S. amount. Over 
one hundred Russian vessels were concentrating on 
hake . . . and [annually] harvested about eighty 
million pounds. By 1972 they and the Japanese who 
were seeking salmon, crab, and herring were taking 
almost six billion pounds of groundfish and herring 
off Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and C a l i f o r n i a . 176
There should be no surprise as to the immediate rami­
fications of Soviet and Japanese fishing activities in North­
east Pacific and Northwest Atlantic waters. Foreign fishing
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fleets put many American and Canadian fishermen out of 
business " . . .  both by depleting traditional stocks and 
by ripping through gear with their large ships. Both sta­
tistics and empty nets indicate[d] that massive foreign 
operations— particularly those of factory ships— made sev­
eral once abundant species scarce to the point of 
177depletion."
Author William McCloskey, Jr., made several interest­
ing observations about Soviet and Japanese distant water 
fishing efforts during the 1970s.
Off Alaska, both the Soviet Union [down to Northern 
California] and South Korea also fish extensively, 
although not on the Japanese scale, while Poland 
and Taiwan have tentatively entered the scene. 
Neighboring Canada shares the halibut fishery.
The massive Soviet activity centers on the East 
coast, where factory fleets work the waters sea­
sonally from New England to Virginia. Soviet fac­
tory ships are half the size of the Japanese 
equivalents, but every bit as efficient.178
McCloskey also mentioned that the ". . . Japanese in par­
ticular are under heavy pressure, one Japanese captain told 
me, to take heavy catches. But Soviets and Japanese have 
been known to cheat in reporting tons of fish below their
actual catch [thus] staying on paper within their negotiated 
179quotas. . . . "  Was it any wonder that in such a 
competitive fishery environment, Canadian and American 
fishermen demanded that their governments take strong uni­
lateral actions to protect the North American fisheries?
Once Canada and the United States created their 200 
mile fishery zones, Japan and the Soviet Union made it clear
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that they, too, were supportive of some type of special 
economic zone for coastal states. Japan noted, however, 
that in supporting the establishment of a 200-mile economic 
zone, the Japanese government felt " . . .  the rights of the 
coastal States should not be so broad as to restrict free­
dom of navigation, distant fisheries, and scientific research 
180in the zone." Thus, Japan took the position that
". . . legally speaking, the economic zone falls into the
181category of the high seas." Japanese and Soviet govern­
mental officials were understandably concerned with the crea­
tion of exclusive 200-mile fishery zones, since their distant 
water fishing activities would be dramatically curtailed in
182some of the most productive marine life areas of the oceans.
Mr. Kazuo Shima, a noted Japanese fisheries official 
from the International Affairs Division of the Oceanic Fish­
eries Department, Japanese Fishery Agency, expressed exas­
peration over Canadian and American quota restrictions 
placed upon Japanese fishing efforts in North American 
waters.
Japan must bear the pressures that coastal states 
place upon us with annual quotas. Japan must con­
tinually move to new fishing grounds because of a 
big home market and sizable distant water fishing 
fleet to support. Yet even though Japan fears the 
unrealistic fisheries allotments established by the 
United States for such species as Alaskan pollock, 
hake, and even squid, Japan will have a strong 
fishing future in the ten years a h e a d . 183
In sum, the intensive fishing efforts of Japan and
the Soviet Union in North American waters during the 1960s
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and 1970s encouraged the governments of Canada and the
United States to create 200-mile fishery zones. Once the
zones were established in 1977, more restrictive annual
fishing quotas for distant water fishing fleets were
established. While nations such as Japan and the Soviet
Union were upset by smaller fisheries quotas and some zonal
184violations were noted, foreign fishing fleets demonstrated 
". . . a remarkable degree of compliance with the provisions 
[of fishery conservation and coastal management acts] in 
both our Atlantic and our Pacific w a t e r s . I n d e e d ,  in 
order to assure themselves of continued access to North Amer­
ican fisheries, Japan and the Soviet Union began to form 
joint fisheries ventures with Canadian and American fisher­
men and processors— an intriguing harbinger of things to 
186come.
Observations
While each section of this chapter contained separate
summary remarks, several final observations need to be
stressed. First, specific fisheries "linkages" between
international actors and United States and Canadian policy
makers were firmly established. Nongovernmental observers
such as Samuel and Miriam Levering were well known by
Canadian and American diplomats at UNCLOS III. Personnel
and advisors on regional fishery commissions also acted as
fishery experts for United States-Canadian fisheries 
187negotiations. Thus, a small body of private and public
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marine life policy influencers played multiple roles in 
the creation of new North American fisheries policies.
Secondly, none of the information in this chapter 
refuted the assertion that while there were " . . .  periodic 
inter-governmental consultations, present [marine life] 
policies appear to be formulated primarily in response to 
domestic interests and secondarily to prevailing views in 
the international negotiations rather than through close
TOOCanadian-U.S. cooperation." It should be kept in mind,
however, that the first-level of the FiNS analysis will not
be complete until contemporary American-Canadian fisheries
negotiations have been detailed in chapter 6.
Finally, this research effort will need to analyze
Barbara Johnson's 1977 fisheries prognostication, which is
on the verge of being fulfilled in 1979. "Canadian-American
fishery relations are likely to continue to be cordial, since
the two countries have more common than conflicting interests.
Eventually they are likely to sign a formal arrangement for
189reciprocal fishing within each other's 200-mile zones."
The remainder of this study will be devoted to an examina­
tion of the Canadian and American polities, fisheries policy­
making processes, and policy influencers. Moreover, the 
current bilateral negotiation dealt with in chapter 6 will 
help demonstrate the special relationship and innovative 
mechanisms the two countries are developing in an attempt 
to share the living resources of the sea.
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CHAPTER IV
POLITY, PROCESS, AND POLICY INFLUENCEES;
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY 
CANADIAN FISHERIES POLICIES
In the preface to The Unknown Country, Bruce 
Hutchison speaks of the hidden potential of his native 
Canada.
No one knows my country, neither the stranger nor 
its own sons. . . . My country has not found itself 
nor felt its power nor learned its true place. It 
is all visions and doubts and hopes and dreams.
It is strength and weakness, despair and joy, and 
the wild confusions and restless strivings of a 
boy who has passed his boyhood but is not yet a 
man.l
In its strivings for political maturity and desires to become 
a more cohesive polity, Canada is a land of potential— a 
land of expectancy. As the second largest nation in the 
world in area, Canada has ample room for its twenty-four 
million citizens. Today, the vast territory is divided into 
ten provinces and two territories, with most of the populace 
living near a 5,500 mile border shared with the United 
States.
Before discussing the contemporary fisheries policies 
of this vast land, chapter 4 will attempt to provide the
142
143
materials necessary for an understanding of the Canadian 
political system. The goals of the chapter will be to:
(1) assess the nature of the Canadian polity as well as 
other relevant national attributes (FiNS second level of 
analysis), (2) detail important Canadian fisheries policies 
of the 1960s and 1970s, and (3) provide an analysis of the 
fisheries decision making process and Canadian policy influ­
encera that impact upon that process. In order to accom­
plish this latter goal, a FiNS third level of analysis 
will be employed to assess the significant individual and 
group policy influencera involved in the political process 
of fisheries' decision making. Chapter 4 will thus ponder 
the question: How active have influencera such as Canadian
bureaucrats, political parties, the press, consumers/public 
opinion, and fishermens' associations been in shaping new 
Canadian fisheries legislation and programs?
The Polity and National Attributes 
Relevant to Canadian 
Fisheries Policies
Canada is an "open polity"— a representative democracy
with a responsible, parliamentary government and federal gov-
2emmental structure. Yet, in real terms, Robert Alford 
argues that Canada ". . . is not a nation in the full sense 
of a socially unified people possessing a consciousness of 
nationality and a sense of patriotism. Although the Canadian 
state has the instruments of national sovereignty, it has 
neither the embedded symbols of legitimacy nor the deep
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loyalties to the political community which Americans and 
Britishers take for granted."^ Alexander Brady adds that 
Canada is an "aggregation of sectional communities."^
In a general sense, Canada comfortably mirrors 
R. Barry Farrell's characteristics for an open polity— a 
political system in which there are". . . competitive 
regular electoral contests, legalised two-or multiparty 
organizations aimed at offering alternative governmental 
leadership, a high degree of toleration for autonomous 
groups in politics, and an acceptance of constitutional
5restraits on governmental power." Still, in order to pro­
vide a meaningful second level of analysis of Canada as a 
nation state, it will be essential to briefly comment on 
Canada's political culture, political parties, and interest 
groups (as interest articulation and aggregation mechanisms), 
and legislative and executive arenas of governmental decision­
making. Canada's vast geographic size and wealth of natural 
resources, especially the marine life off the Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts, must also be considered as a relevant na­
tional attribute. Additionally, the nation's degree of eco­
nomic development as related to the absolute size and nature 
of the Canadian fishing industry should be examined as a 
part of the second level of analysis.
In assessing Canada's political culture, there are 
several important ingredients to mention. First, there is 
a tendency toward political sectionalism in Canada. Alford
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notes that the tendency toward Canadian regionalism .
”. . .  cannot be attributed either to the recent origin of 
the nation, the distance of the western populations from 
the major political centers in the East, or the existence 
of a federal nation. All of these exist (in nations such 
as Australia), but without the consequences of an exag­
gerated regionalism such as Canada's.”  ̂ Having so argued, 
Alford concludes that the main factors " . . .  sustaining 
Canadian political regionalism— and [in turn] its lack of 
class voting— are its economic and social heterogeneity—  
unless Canada's 'frontier,' . . .  is of crucial importance."^ 
The social heterogeneity of Canada has been care­
fully analyzed. The "two Canadas," English and French, are 
the largest components of Canada's growing number of ethnic
pgroupings. Henry Albinski points out that Anglo-Canadians, 
". . .as the numerically most powerful group, have not, as 
a whole had any special reason to dissociate themselves from
9positive feelings toward Canada." On the other hand, the 
French ". . . particularly in their ancestral home of Quebec 
[over three-quarters of which is French], have had less rea­
son to embrace the notion of nationhood with equal convic­
tion. Not only did they begin as a minority at Confedera­
tion [1867], and have remained so, but they remember that 
they were once thé paramount group, only to be conquered and 
then outscored in numbers and wealth by Anglo-Saxons."^®
The social separation of French-Canadians from the 
remainder of their countrymen has long been reinforced by
146
primary agents of political socialization. "Generations 
of French-Canadian children in Quebec have been inculcated 
with a version of history stressing the plight of the French 
and the sturdiness of their defense against waves of English- 
Protestant i n f l u e n c e . I n d e e d ,  since 1918, when separatist 
resolutions were first debated in the Quebec legislature, 
talk of dividing Canada into separate nations has persisted. 
Recent political violence in Canada can be linked to Albin­
ski' s belief that separatist " . . .  sentiment in contemporary
Quebec represents the strongest challenge to national unity
12ever faced by Canada. . . . "  Anyone who has ever studied 
Canadian governmental documents is aware that biculturalism 
and bilingualism are "officially sanctioned" by the Govern­
ment in Ottawa.
Considering all facets of Canadian society, what 
additional ideas should be mentioned about the country's 
political culture? One scholarly study succinctly states 
that Canadian society is not " . . .  especially noted for
cultural tendencies for risk and success......  Canadian
society bears many resemblances to the American society.
But its evolution reveals a more subdued approach to indi­
vidualism, greater natural acceptance of authority, and a 
greater disposition to compromise, owing to circumstances
T 3associated with nation-building and cultural plurality."
14Numerous scholarly studies seem to suggest " . . .  that 
collectivism, corporatism and an organic view of the state
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are more prominent in Canada, while 'small 1' liberalism 
and a belief in the individual are more prominent in the 
Untied States.Paradoxically, it has been concluded 
that " . . .  the conservatism of Canadian society supports 
collectivist tendencies in the nation since the state is 
viewed as responsible for its citizens and therefore obli­
gated to provide some minimum level of subsistence for 
them."^^ Thus, compared to the United States, " . . .  Canada, 
on the one hand, has been more amenable to the norms of eco­
nomic egalitarianism and the use of state power to implement 
those norms. On the other hand, it is suggested that U.S.
society is more highly committed to social and political
17egalitarianism."
Erwin Hargrove has clearly summarized the essence 
of Canada's political culture. "Canadian political society 
has thus stressed order, loyalty, and deference to govern­
ment more than popular assent. Rather than 'life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness,* the need has been peace, 
order, and good government. Social equality is desired but
with less fervour than in America. Hierarchy in all spheres
18of life is taken for granted," It remains to be seen how 
a "deference to government" and acceptance of hierarchy can 
impact upon the centralized nature of governmental decision­
making and the creation of new Canadian fisheries policies.
What are some of the most significant interest aggre­
gation mechanisms which help develop and perpetuate Canada's
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political culture? As vehicles for values, attitudes, and 
public opinions, Canada's political parties are vitally 
important. For Canadians, ". . . t o  think of politics is 
to think of political parties. Media reports on politics 
concentrate on party reactions to issues of the day.
Millions of Canadians simplify the complexities of politics 
by viewing politics almost exclusively through the focus of
19'their' party. . . . ” Given the power of such political 
mechanisms, it would be helpful to comment on the types of 
political parties that have emerged to fuel the formal insti­
tutions of Canada's government. Since Confederation of 
Canada in July of 1867, two political parties have dominated 
the national arena of government— the Conservative and 
Liberal Parties. Engelmann and Schwartz, using Maurice 
Duverger's party typology, have attempted to indicate that 
both the Liberals and Conservatives are closest to the "cadre” 
type. "The most successful parties in Canada, in terms of 
popular appeal and the exercise of power both nationally and
provincially, have been broad-based, cadre parties of elec-
20toral success."
R. M. Dawson and Norman Ward have generalized that
parties in Canada " . . .  must, to form a government, obtain
substantial support from at least two and probably three of
the five regional areas into which Canada is divided— the
Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie provinces,
21and British Columbia." It follows that a successful
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Canadian party ”. . .  must therefore be founded on compromise. 
It must pick and choose. It must balance one interest 
against another. It must postpone decisions. Its policies 
must be based on those things which are generally accept­
able and then be gradually enlarged when and where the
22occasion suggests."
It is true that a number of third parties have dev­
eloped in Canadian politics, but their basic strength has 
been in provincial politics. The Progressive Party, a 
farmer's party, had the greatest national parliamentary
success; in 1921, the Progressives won over a quarter of the
23seats in the House of Commons. The New Democratic Party 
CNDP), which has succeeded the Co-operative Commonwealth 
Federation (CCF), has formed governments in various provinces, 
The social democratic NDP " . . .  has made a fairly success­
ful appeal to labour over all Canada* [except in Quebec], to
farmers in a number of provinces, and to urban dwellers in 
24many areas." One should also cite the success of the 
Social Credit Party in the politics of Alberta and British 
Columbia, and the separatist activities of Le Parti 
Québécois in Quebec. During the 1976 Quebec provincial 
elections, ". . . the separatist-minded Parti Québécois 
ousted the Liberal Party from its seat at the head of the 
Quebec government and put itself in a position to actualize 
its ideal of an independent state of Q u e b e c . T h e  fact 
remains, however, that the Liberal and Conservative Parties
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have " . . .  retained a dominant position in Canadian
political life. With the exception of the Progressives
in 1921, no third party has ever obtained the second largest
26number of seats in the federal parliament."
From 1968 to the end of the 1970s, the Liberal Party
under the leadership of Pierre Elliott Trudeau headed the
federal administration. In the 1972 national elections, the
Liberals lost some ground to the Progressive Conservative
Party, especially in Ontario; lacking a majority of seats
in the House of Commons, the Liberals were forced to form
27a coalition with the New Democratic Party. As a third
party with only 18 percent of the popular vote, the NDP was
able to hold " . . .  the balance of power in Commons [and]
possess bargaining power on issues out of all proportion
28to its popular support." In 1974, however, the Liberal
Party was able to score a remarkable electoral victory and
again form a majority government.
29Through 1977, what characterizations could be set 
forth for the Liberal and the Conservative Party (now 
referred to as the Progressive Conservatives)? Peter 
Regenstreif, author and syndicated political columnist in 
Canada, thinks that Liberals have been " . . .  heavily sup­
ported by French Canadians, young people, and better 
educated— especially those with university training—  
and urban dwellers. Having controlled the federal adminis­
tration for many years, they tend to reflect the mentality
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of Ottawa bureaucrats and the national economic elite which 
is so closely tied to them. Accordingly, they tend to see 
the country from the perspective of Central Canada and to 
neglect some of the regional nuances of their policies.
On the other hand, the " . . .  Conservatives, reflecting 
their regional base, draw a considerable portion of their 
strength from small towns and rural areas, and from Protes­
tants and older people.
It has been suggested that whichever of these major 
Canadian political parties is in power in the years ahead,
. . their openness to communication with almost all asso- 
ciational groups, especially when the party is in office, 
and the party's basic intelligence and soundings of communal
grievances, have all helped the governing party of the day to
32achieve a fair measure of mass legitimacy." In balance, 
one must note, however, that Canadian " . . .  parties are 
much less effective articulating and aggregating agencies 
than they could be. This leaves the field of policy initia­
tion and priority determination open to the bureaucracy, 
the cabinets, and to the federal-provincial bargaining 
process.
While the latter portion of this chapter will assess 
the impact of political parties and specific interest groups 
upon the fisheries policy-making process, what general 
remarks could be made about interest groups in contemporary 
Canada? Few sources dispute the notion that interest groups
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. . are active everywhere in Canadian p o l i t i c s . I n  
addition to their manifest political function of influencing 
political decisions, interest groups " . . .  may perform 
other functions in Canadian society. The vast majority of 
Canadian groups make their demands through legitimate chan­
nels and by legitimate means. They thus tend to buttress
the political system in its present form and to provide, at
35least, implicitly, support for that system.” Moreover,
there is ". . . perhaps an even more important way in which
the interest group structure of Canadian society provides
support for the political system, and that is by providing
an integrating force in society which can 'connect' the
individual to the political system.
Considering all of the interest group activity in
Canada, it is rather surprising to note "the relative paucity
37of information” on such groups in Canada. Robert Presthus's
excellent studies on the role and activities of Canadian
interest groups do stress the importance of private policy
influencera. Presthus maintains that the Canadian polity
" . . .  tends to legitimate interest groups, to endorse their
full participation in the political system, despite the
assumptions of parliamentary government, which logically,
at least, place severe limits on their influence because
of the assumed supremacy of the Cabinet. Interest groups,
in effect, are conceptualized as organic parts of the 
38society.” Presthus concludes that:
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. . . several factors in the Canadian system prove 
sympathetic to a viable system of interest group 
politics: the positive view of government and its
use to subsidize and protect private interests 
encouraged articulate groups to fashion and present 
a multitude of claims; the corporatist philosophy 
further ensures that interest groups will be 
accorded a legitimacy they do not always enjoy in 
Lockeian . . . societies such as the United States; 
the quasi-participative nature of the political 
culture in turn tends to result in delegation of 
governmental authority to elites who possess, as 
everywhere, disproportionate amounts of political 
resources, including education, income, interest,and access.39
There are some other factors which can be noted about
Canadian interest groups with certainty. Since Canada has
a federal system of government, ”. . .  decisions are often
taken at both levels of government simultaneously, giving
an interest group more points upon which to focus its
activity, but forcing it at the same time to spread its
40resources rather thinly." Moreover, the national govern­
ment in Canada " . . .  concentrates the bulk of power in the 
cabinet and the bureaucracy. Parliament, therefore, is not 
likely to provide interest groups with a successful arena.
A prominent Canadian lobbyist once remarked, "When I see 
members of Parliament being lobbied, it's a sure sign to 
me that the lobby lost its fight in the civil service and 
the cabinet.Importantly, the . , main focus for input 
activities of interest groups is neither parliament nor 
cabinet but the bureaucracy, . . . [especially] at the middle 
and upper levels of the bureaucracy."*^
Still, an . . analysis of interest group interac­
tions vith legislators and higher bureaucrats suggests that
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both the substance and the implementation of public policy
in Canada are largely shaped by accommodation among three
political elites, comprised of legislators and higher
bureaucrats and the leaders of major interest groups.
Among them they possess disproportionate shares of such
scarce political resources as legitimacy, expertise, con-
44tinuity, access and power." Pragmatically, there are some 
limits placed upon all interest group lobbying efforts.
"The cabinet has a collective policy role which may effec­
tively counter the pressure on individual ministers, and 
the requirements of party unity in the parliamentary system 
limits the legislature as an arena for lobbyists.
In order to more clearly understand the relationship 
between the informal and formal agencies of government, cer­
tain basic facts about the Canadian Parliament, Prime Min­
ister, and Cabinet should be set forth. The national parlia­
ment contains two houses, the Senate and the House of Commons.
The House, composed of 264 members after the 1974 Federal
46General Election, has its backbenchers chosen from single­
member districts throughout the provinces. The Canadian 
House of Commons, patterned on the British model, ". . . is 
of ideal size in that it is large enough to bring to bear 
sufficient specialized skills and aptitudes required for 
solving difficult problems, but small enough to permit con­
siderable person-to-person interaction and, potentially, 
the formation of a large network of close interpersonal 
relationships.
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As is the case with its British counterpart, the
Canadian House of Commons " . . .  must make many decisions,
[but] it is not primarily an initiating body: its function
is essentially one of review, approval, and criticism.
The cabinet initiates; the House [and, to a much lesser degree,
the Senate] takes proposals and subjects them to a thorough
48examination before giving its assent." The political 
parties usually maintain firm discipline over their back­
benchers in the House. However, Henry Albinski notes that 
" . . .  when divisive French-English issues are at stake, 
Canadian parliamentary discipline, on both the government 
and the opposition side, has a decided tendency to break 
down. Here, in its parliamentary manifestation, is evidence
of the pervasive political import of Canada's uneasy cul-
49tural dualism."
The Canadian Senate is a rather intriguing political 
body. "Senators are appointed by the Governor-General-in- 
Council, and were originally appointed for life; all new 
Senators since 1965 must retire at age seventy-five."^^
The total membership of the Senate is 102, with the smaller 
provinces obtaining a "proportionately greater share [of 
seats] than in the C o m m o n s . D a w s o n  believes that the 
Senate
. . . has been able to do some genuinely useful 
work. It revises and checks legislation sent up 
from Commons; it conducts occasional investigations 
of undoubted merit; it takes by far the greater 
part of the load of private bill legislation from 
the overworked Commons. However, it has not been
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a conspicuous success in guarding the rights of 
the provincial or other minorities, although this 
was one of the chief reasons for its c r e a t i o n . 52
On account of this latter problem, the special Task Force
on Canadian Unity recently recommended " . . .  replacing
the present government-appointed Senate by a Council of
53Federation composed of provincial delegates." Recent 
parliamentary changes, an assessment of the 1979 national 
federal elections, and other pertinent governmental activi­
ties (1978-1979) will be provided in the final portion of 
the dissertation.
Through 1977, what comments could be made about the 
national executive structures in Canada? Canada's Governor- 
General ". . . occupies almost the same position in relation 
to his government as does the queen in relation to the gov­
ernment in the United K i n g d o m . I n  most formal matters, 
the Canadian Cabinet " . . .  acts through the governor gen­
eral and in the name of the Governor-General-in-Council,
which is simply the governor speaking under the advice of 
55the cabinet." Real executive authority, however, is cen­
tered in the Prime Minister and his cabinet. As is the 
case in other parliamentary polities, the Canadian Prime 
Minister is the leader of the majority party in the House 
of Commons.
The Canadian Prime Minister is certainly more than 
a first among equals. He selects his cabinet colleagues, 
leads them, and can dismiss them. Still, under the practice 
of collective responsibility, the Prime Minister and his
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Cabinet attempt to act as an effective executive unit.
In general, the Cabinet " . . .  formulates and carries out
all executive policies, exercises virtual control over all
financial matters, assembles the legislative proposals that
Parliament considers, and serves as the political head of
the several departments of g o v e r n m e n t . P e r h a p s  one of
the most interesting aspects of the Canadian Cabinet is its
". . . use of special means of ministerial recruitment.
. . While attempts are made to include ministers from
all the provinces,prime ministers, especially Liberal ones,
have been " . . .  co-opting previously nonpolitical people.
Such persons have entered the higher stratum of politics
laterally, rather than by working their way up. They have
often been found safe Commons seats and quickly appointed
59to ministerial positions."
Canadian scholar W. A. Matheson also suggests that 
even " . . .  after he has made his appointments, the Prime 
Minister is inhibited by certain rules of the game that re­
strict his freedom of action regarding decisions taken by 
previous cabinets. In spite of all these constraints, the 
role of the Prime Minister is crucial in cabinet making and 
in cabinet ope ra tio ns. P os s es s i ng  ". . . the power to 
appoint, promote, and demote, the Prime Minister decides 
the agenda and determines the organization of the cabinet, 
has a monopoly of the most important patronage positions, 
appoints all deputy ministers, and controls his political
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party. These all assist the Prime Minister in dominating 
his cabinet, in determining how it is to function, and in 
setting the tone of government during his term in office.
What is the nature of the national bureaucracy which
has developed in Canada to aid the Prime Minister, cabinet,
and parliament in the formulation of policies? Thomas
Hockin believes that the " . . .  most durable image about
the bureaucratic part of the government of Canada is that
it is a gigantic administrative pie sliced into hermetically
62sealed, rigorously hierarchical, departments." From a 
myriad of departments, agencies, boards, commissions, Crown 
corporations, federal-provincial committees, and interdepart­
mental committees, governmental policies are created and 
shaped by Canadian public servants. In important areas of 
national policy, " . . .  managers and top administrators 
find themselves in the best position" to wield decisive lever­
age on policy and hence become what could be called 'legiti­
mate actors' in the Canadian policy-making system at the 
Federal l e v e l . I n d e e d ,  not only do the ". . . top public 
servants in departments occasionally hold 'departmental 
meetings' without the ministers, but ministers often allow 
deputy ministers . . . and other public service executives 
to conduct vital policy negotiations with interest groups, 
with provinces, or with foreign states.
Information is power in all polities, a fact amply 
demonstrated by the Canadian bureaucracy. "The bureaucracy's
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near monopoly over many types of information ensures that 
the cabinet is highly dependent upon it when many priority 
decisions are made. . . . Interest groups, which in other 
polities sometimes form a counterbalance to the power of 
the bureaucracy, work through and with it in Canada.
As a Canadian scholar recently pointed out, the " . . .  fact 
that public servants often have more specialized and com­
prehensive information than do outsiders on public policy 
makes them not only indispensable sources of information 
but, within countless areas of public policy, often authori­
tative on what is currently considered 'possible' or 
'advisable.'
Canadian public servants " . . .  are well aware of
their influence. Certain steps of coordination and rules
of consultation can build up in the bureaucracy and these
can become legitimized to such an extent that ministers
67have difficulty altering them." Robert Presthus quotes
one Canadian minister's frustration in realizing:
. . . that all the expertise needed to sustain me 
was available right within my department, and I'm 
sure that it is available to ministers of all 
departments. However, it seemed to me that every­
thing was arranged to keep the expertise beyond 
my grasp. I found it very difficult to communi­
cate, to seek out advice, when I needed it. I 
felt that the ritual of the paperwork— the chain 
of command— made it virtually impossible to get 
the kind of information I needed when I needed it and I felt very helpless.68
The policy formulation activities of the Canadian 
bureaucracy are so extensive that with ". . . the exception
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of certain broad powers exercised by the cabinet . . .  or 
by a vigilant press (which may criticize policy formulation 
on those rare occasions when it can penetrate the veil of 
secrecy) there are very few direct checks over the policy 
advice provided by bureaucrats."^® Indeed, the ". . . press, 
academics, interest groups, the parliamentary opposition and 
even the provincial governments are to a large extent pre­
vented from evaluating the policies formulated by federal 
bureaucrats by the near monopoly over information and tech­
nical expertise possessed by the large numbers of federal
policy advisors. The situation is exacerbated by strong
70Canadian traditions of administrative secrecy. . . . "
It will be one of the challenges of the remainder of this 
dissertation to strip away some of the secrecy surrounding 
the fisheries decision-making process that is dominated by 
the Canadian national bureaucracy.
Before analyzing contemporary (1960-1977) fisheries 
policies and processes in the remaining sections of this 
chapter, it would be useful to assess the significance of 
several other national attributes that have impacted upon 
Canada's maritime policies through the years. The nation's 
geographic size, rich natural resources, and degree of eco­
nomic development have helped determine the nature of 
Canada's fishing industry. The Canadian government is proud 
to note that by 1977, Canada's maritime jurisdiction extended 
over 857,000 square miles of Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic 
waters. Moreover, the ". . . waters off Canada's coasts
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comprise some of the most important fishing grounds in the
world. Those off the Atlantic coast have been continuously
71exploited for more than 400 years,"
The availability of marine life off both the east 
and west coasts of Canada has fostered the growth of a siz­
able coastal fishing industry. "Fishing is Canada's oldest 
industry and . . . is of greatest importance to many of the
communities along Canada's many thousands of miles of 
72coastline." In the most recent comprehensive study of
73Canada's fisheries, a clear image of the fishing industry 
emerges. The Canadian fishing industry has remained coastal 
in nature, with little desire or need to take part in dis­
tant water fishing operations. The total 1977 production 
of fish in Canada has been valued at over one and a quarter 
billion dollars. While this represents just over one per­
cent of Canada's gross national product, the potential for 
additional fisheries income is very high. As will be de­
tailed later in this chapter, Canada's 1977 extension of 
its exclusive fishing zone from twelve to 200 miles on both 
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts has provided the coastal 
fishing industry with great hopes for future growth. It is 
estimated that " . . .  Canada has the potential of becoming 
the world's leading exporter of fish, expanding its export 
sales from $825 million in 1977 to between $1.5 to $2 bil­
lion by 1985. This represents a growth of more than 200% 
in real terms.
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While there are great fisheries expectations in 
Canada's future, additional economic information is needed 
to understand who will benefit from the growth of the 
industry. The entire fishing labor force in Canada totals
85.000 to 90,000 individuals. The number of persons engaged 
in fishing (through 1977) is 66,000 with the remaining
20.000 individuals working in the fish processing industry. 
While fishermen make up only one percent of Canada's total 
labor force, their concentration in the coastal provinces 
should not be forgotten. In the four Atlantic provinces, 
seven percent of the labor force is tied to the fishing indus­
try, and for Newfoundland alone, fourteen percent is directly 
involved in the fishing industry. Intriguingly, only two 
percent of the labor force in British Columbia is involved
in the fishing industry.
Comparing the fishing industries on Canada's east 
and west coasts, it is interesting to note that almost seventy 
percent of Canadian fishermen are from the Atlantic coast, 
just over twenty percent are from the Pacific region, and 
the remainder are from the Central (freshwater) region. The 
Atlantic region produces eighty percent of the annual com­
mercial catch, the Pacific region, sixteen percent; however, 
the Atlantic catch is only sixty percent of the total catch 
in dollars while the Pacific region's share of the revenue 
is thirty-five percent. As might be imagined, salaries for 
fishermen are generally higher on the west coast than on the
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east coast. Overall, Canadian fishermen on larger vessels 
can earn between $15,000 and $20,000 annually. However, 
" . . .  the great majority of fishermen, those in the in­
shore and nearshore fisheries typically have [in 1977] 
incomes from . . . $9,000 to $12,000."^^
In recent years, especially the Atlantic fishermen 
have experienced underemployment and diminishing catch re­
turns as they have tried to compete with distant water fish­
ing vessels from other nations. Therefore, as the remainder 
of this chapter will document, the federal government has 
attempted to provide more aid and support to its fishing 
industry during the 1960s and 1970s.
Before exploring Canada's fisheries policies and 
decision-making processes (at the third-level of analysis), 
several concluding remarks on Canada's modernization efforts 
might aid the reader in understanding the actions of the 
federal government in Ottawa. Concerning economic develop­
ment, the utilization and management of Canada's natural 
resources are important parts of the country's attempt to 
determine its own destiny. "Canadians are concerned not
only about the use of,oil, gas, and minerals but also about
76the control and use of their land . . . "  and waters.
The "Canadianization" of Canada is a popular topic, and 
one well known writer believes that for over eleven years. 
Prime Minister Trudeau embodied and supported " . . .  the 
new nationalism through his firm stand on Canada's economic 
rights.
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Canada's economic muscles are flexed for the future.
In the area of fisheries and maritime policies, the federal 
government has a number of advantages in its efforts to co­
ordinate an effective national fisheries program. Since the 
Confederation of Canada over a century ago, the federal gov­
ernment has been given exclusive legislative authority over
78its coastal fisheries. ' This has led to the creation of a 
centralized apparatus in Ottawa which has tight bureaucratic 
control over the ocean fisheries which produce ninety-five 
percent of the commercial catch in Canada. Bolstered by 
this legal authority, the federal govenrment has established 
a separate Department of Fisheries headed by a minister 
with cabinet rank. This federal department oversees a fish­
ing industry which is coastal in nature, unified in its 
desire for protectionist national fishing policies, and 
willing to work cooperatively with Ottawa.
As the second level of analysis has detailed, even 
though divided regionally, the Canadian people have a sub­
dued approach to individualism, a national acceptance of
authority, and a positive view of government in its efforts
79" . . .  to subsidize and protect private interests." It 
is from this cultural perspective that the Canadian fisher­
man should be viewed. He remains full of Bruce Hutchison's 
"visions and doubts and hopes and dreams." Today, the fed­
eral government has given the Canadian fishing community 
greatly increased hope by indicating that for " . . .  groundfish
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species [of fish] alone, it is projected that an additional
$1.5 billion per year in wholesale value can be achieved on
the Atlantic coast and $120 million on the Pacific coast 
80by 1985.” Before looking too far into the future, how­
ever, it is essential to document the fisheries policies 
and processes occurring in Canada during the 1960s and 1970s.
Changes in Canadian Fisheries 
Policies (1960-1977)
The two previous chapters have detailed Canada's 
historic fisheries relationship with the United States; 
moreover, Canada's policy initiatives at the Law of the Sea 
Conferences and regional fisheries bodies such as the ICNAF 
have been analyzed through 1977. This section of the dis­
sertation will assess four major unilateral actions under­
taken by the Canadian government— actions that have produced 
important changes in Canada's oceanic fisheries policies.
Once these four fisheries jurisdictional changes have been 
cited, it will be possible to scrutinize the Canadian fish­
eries decision-making process and note the policy influencera 
involved in pressuring for such unilateral fisheries 
extensions.
The Canadian government, in concise fashion, detailed 
the four major fishing zone changes it proclaimed during the 
1960s and 1970s. "In 1964, Canada extended fisheries con­
trol nine miles beyond the territorial sea; in 1971, the 
three-mile territorial sea and nine-mile fishing zone were
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replaced by a twelve mile territorial sea. ,.81 A third
jurisdictional extension, also undertaken in 1971, called
82for the creation of special Canadian fishing zones in the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence (Zone 1) and Bay of Fundy (Zone 2) on 
the Atlantic coast, and in Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate 
Strait and Dixon Entrance on the Pacific coast (Zone 3).* 
Finally, " . . .  on January 1st, 1977 Canadian fisheries
83
management jurisdiction was extended an additional 188 miles 
to establish a 200-mile fishing zone on both coasts.”®^
In specific terms, what considerations encouraged 
the establishment of these four major jurisdictional changes 
in Canadian fisheries? Once the. 1958 and 1960 UN Law of the 
Sea Conferences had failed to establish new limits on the 
breadth of the territorial sea, domestic pressures in Canada 
for unilateral extensions of fisheries zones heightened.
During the 1963 Canadian federal elections, the " . . .  Liberal 
party promised that it would take unilateral action if inter­
national agreement could not be reached whereas the Conserva­
tives argued that unilateral action would invite retaliatory
85action by the United States." Following the electoral
victory of the Liberal Party, Prime Minister Lester Pearson
announced that Canada would establish a twelve mile fishing 
86zone. Clearly, Pearson's position " . . .  was affected by
87the position taken by the fishing industry." In 1963, 
the Fisheries Council of Canada, a national federation of 
regional fishing industry associations, had submitted A Brief
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Concerning Canada's National and Territorial Waters to the
goCanadian Parliament. The brief called for " . . .  the
establishment of a fishing zone adjacent to the territorial
sea and the use of straight baselines to close off other
89fishing areas of key interest to Canadians."
To formally enact the twelve mile fisheries zone,
the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act (Bill S-17) was
90passed by the House of Commons in July of 1964. The Act, 
in Section 3, clearly stipulated that the width of Canada's 
territorial sea was to remain limited to three miles; how­
ever, the territorial sea was ". . . to be measured from 
straight base lines joining consecutive coordinates of points
along the coastline, as determined by the Governor in Council. 
91. . . "  Moreover, Section 4 of the Act created " . . .  exclu­
sive fishing zones contiguous to the territorial sea extend­
ing nine additional miles outward from the outer limits of
the territorial sea, so as to constitute a twelve mile zone
92of unshared exploitation authority.” In order to avoid 
confusion over the implementation of Section 4, the Governor- 
General-in-Council amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection 
Regulations by adding the following sections;
1. Fishing vessels of the United States of America 
are authorized to continue to fish in the fish­
ing zones established by section 4 of the Terri­
torial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.
2. Fishing vessels of France, Britain, Portugal, 
Spain, Italy, Norway, and Denmark are authorized 
to continue to fish in the fishing zones on the 
Atlantic coast of Canada established by section 4 
of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.93
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What impact did the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Act have upon Canadian fishing activities? While " . . .  the
intent of the act was to create an enlarged and exclusive
preserve for Canadian fishermen . . ., [in] practice, nothing
of the sort happened. . . . From a Canadian standpoint, the
only positive effect of the legislation was that no new
foreign vessels were able to enter the fishing zone and
94establish traditional fishing rights." Still, as Canadian
diplomat L. H. Legault recently recalled, Canada " . . .  was
among the first countries to move from the three to the
twelve-mile fisheries limit, in 1964. Canada applied the
new limit to newcomers, however, and allowed established
foreign fishing to continue for the time being. In 1964
even the 12-mile limit was disputed, and the USA, among
others, protested Canada's action (but followed suit within 
95two years)." One can sense from the Legault remarks that 
Canada, while not fully successful in implementing the 1964 
jurisdictional changes, was becoming a leader rather than a 
follower in the realm of expanded fisheries jurisdictions.
As noted earlier in this section, 1971 was to become 
another important year in Canada's movement toward 200-mile 
fishing zones. L. H. Legault suggested that in ". . . 1971, 
in the face of more protests, Canada went still further and 
established exclusive Canadian fishing zones in certain very 
large semi-enclosed coastal waters, subject to phasing-out 
arrangements with the foreign countries fishing there. At
171
about the same time also, we began to prepare for the eventual
move to 200 miles through inter-related multilateral, regional
96and bilateral negotiations," The 1971 zonal extensions 
were the result of amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fish­
ing Zones Act; proposed in April of 1970, the amendments
(Bill C-203) detailed plans for the establishment of a twelve-
97mile territorial sea and creation of fisheries closing lines.
It was argued that Bill C-203
would provide for a greater area of jurisdiction for 
anti-pollution controls on the east and west coasts; 
it would expedite Canada's bilateral negotiations 
concerning the original Territorial Sea and Fishing 
Zones Act; it would protect Canada's security inter­
ests by permitting the government to exercise greater 
control over the movement of foreign ships'; and it 
would extend the inner limit of the continental shelf 
which begins at the outer limit of the territorial sea by nine m i l e s . 98
Intriguingly, the amendments to the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act were proposed in the House of Commons
at the same time as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
99Act. The Arctic Waters legislation " . . .  was adopted in 
response to a perceived threat to Canada's claims in the 
A r c t i c . B a r b a r a  Johnson, an expert in Canadian fisher­
ies relations recently suggested that " . . .  the principal 
motive for introducing the Arctic Waters Act and the amend­
ment to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act together 
was that the twelve-mile sea would close the gateways to the 
Northwest Passage in the event that the Arctic Waters legis­
lation was found wanting. While there was no question that 
there was dissatisfaction with the 1964 act, the time at
172
101which the amendment was introduced cannot be disregarded."
As a result of the 1970 legislative initiatives, Canada thus 
emerged in 1971 with a twelve mile territorial sea, new fish­
ing zones off both coasts, and jurisdiction to prevent pollu­
tion in Arctic waters " . . .  adjacent to the mainland and
islands of the Canadian Arctic within the area enclosed by
the sixtieth parallel of north latitude, the one-hundred and 
forty-first meridian of longitude and a line measured sea­
ward from the nearest Canadian land a distance of 100 miles,
except in the area between the islands of the Canadian Arctic
102and Greenland where the equidistance principle applied."
It was asserted that once the Arctic Waters Act and
amendments to the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act were
implemented in 1971, " . . .  the politics of the twelve-mile 
zone passed away and the politics of the 200-mile zone came 
to the f o r e f r o n t . C h a p t e r  3 documented the major regional 
and Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) initia­
tives that Canada favored regarding a 200-mile fishing zone 
or exclusive economic zone. As detailed in that material, 
once it became apparent that UNCLOS III would be unable to 
finalize a comprehensive marine law treaty without years of 
further debate, many coastal states began issuing unilateral 
proclamations establishing their own 200-mile fishing zones. 
Canada, again, was a leader in the formalization of such 200- 
mile extensions.
On June 4, 1976, the Canadian Government announced 
that, ". . . i n  light of the crisis situation pertaining in
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the fisheries off Canada's coasts, the areas under Canadian 
fisheries jurisdiction on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts 
would be extended to 200 miles as of January 1, 1977. This 
action is in conformity with the emerging consensus of the 
ongoing Law of the Sea Conference, and is being taken to 
ensure the proper conservation and management of the living 
resources of the sea adjacent to these c o a s t s . O n  
November 1, 1976, a special edition of The Canada Gazette 
contained the text of the Order-in-Council in which the Gov­
ernment proposed to extend to 200 miles the fisheries limits 
of C a n a d a . I n  part, the Order called for the creation of 
two additional fishing zones (Zone 4 on the Atlantic coast 
and Zone 5 on the Pacific c o a s t ) T h e  Proposed Fishing 
Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order also noted that 
" . . .  the Government of Canada is engaged in consultations 
with the Governments of the United States of America, of 
France and of Denmark on the delimitation of waters subject 
to the respective fisheries jurisdiction of Canada and of
these countries in those areas where their respective coasts
107are adjacent or opposite to the coast of Canada."
Shortly after announcing the creation of Fishing Zones 
4 and 5, Canada also proclaimed a Fishing Zone 6. The Cana­
dian " . . .  Government is also aware of the importance of 
safeguarding the fishing interests of the native peoples 
of the Arctic and the need to provide for development of 
fisheries in the Canadian Arctic regions. Consequently, the
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Government has decided to extend the fisheries limits in
108the Arctic to 200 miles by March 1, 1977." Thus, by
the spring of 1977, Canada had extended all of its oceanic 
fisheries jurisdictions to 200 miles. The next section of 
this chapter will examine how these important Canadian fish­
eries policies were made and who the important domestic 
policy influencers were— especially during the 1970s.
In sum, Canada's zonal extensions were dramatic
moments in Canadian fisheries policy-making. Leonard Legault,
recently characterized by Romeo Le Blanc (Trudeau's Minister
of Fisheries) as ". . . the Saskatchewan lawyer who was the
109main architect of our 200-mile zone takeover . . . "  ex­
pressed some interesting thoughts about Canada's 1977 zonal 
extensions. While admitting his biases as a participant in 
the law-making process, Legault concluded that Canada's 
establishment of a 200-mile fishing zone in 1977 in fact 
represented one of the notable achievements of Canadian diplo­
macy and was the fruit of years of effort. "After all, no 
cod or shrimp or lobster war broke out with any other country—  
in sharp contrast to what had happened elsewhere between 
Brazil and France and Iceland and Britain, . . . More­
over, Legault added, the " . . .  absence of conflict or con­
frontation is all the more remarkable in that Canada had off 
its coasts one of the greatest concentrations of foreign fish­
ing fleets in the world, and in all cases by countries deter­
mined to resist any 'takeover' of the high seas and to
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protect their investments, their efforts and their fish 
supplies.
Barbara Johnson concluded that the " . . .  1977 200- 
mile fishing zone legislation marked a continuation of exist­
ing trends. It was not a radical departure from past policies,
nor can it be simply explained as a reaction to changes in
112objective conditions." In diplomatic architect Legault's
words, " . . .  when Canada's unilateral extension of juris­
diction was proclaimed, without incident, on January 1, 1977, 
the Canadian Government could act in confidence that what it 
had done and what it was doing were fully consistent with the
new law of the sea and the new lawmaking process, and indeed
113represented a positive contribution to both."
The Fisheries Decision-Making Process 
and Important Canadian Fisheries 
Policy Influencers
Given the higher degree of centralization of govern­
ment in Canada, assessing the fisheries decision-making pro­
cess in that country is easier than detailing the more 
pluralistic fisheries policy-making process in the United 
States. One Canadian fisheries expert provides this initial 
overview of the Canadian process. "In the Canadian politi­
cal system, ocean fisheries are the primary responsibility 
of the federal government. The coastal provinces all take 
an active interest in fisheries, however, and all the Mari­
time provinces have Ministries of F i s h e r i e s . M o r e o v e r ,  
in . , Ottawa, the Department of the Environment (DOE),
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which replaced Fisheries and Forestry in 1971, is the chief
agency concerned. DOE's Fisheries Division is generally
responsible for Canadian fisheries, but the International
Fisheries and Marine Directorate has responsibilities for
international problems. . . . The only other agency active
in the international aspects of Canadian fisheries has been
115the Department of External Affairs." The equivalent to
the State Department in the United States, External Affairs 
has been actively involved in international fishery diplomacy, 
as will be evidenced in the next chapters.
Since the early 1970s, the Government of Canada has 
taken a much more active role in managing the oceanic fish­
ing industry. There are some understandable reasons for in­
creased governmental involvement. During the 1960s, the 
Canadian fishermen steadily expanded their catches to a high 
point of over 3.3 billion pounds of fish in 1968. Since that 
time, the annual fisheries harvest has declined until 1974 
because of such problems as fisheries depletion, overcapacity 
of vessels and Canadian processing facilities, and unstable 
prices for Canadian groundfish. To bolster its domestic 
fishing industry the Canadian " . . .  Government has been and 
will continue to be involved in all aspects of industry 
operations, such as controlling the harvest, restructuring 
the fleet and processing plants, and planning for the manage­
ment of an extended fisheries zone to (200 miles] under 
Canadian jurisdiction.
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In the Department of the Environment (DOE), the 
Fisheries and Marine Service has had total responsibility 
for fisheries management and research since its creation 
in early 1973. The importance of the Fisheries and Marine 
Service (FMS) is demonstrated by the 1974 appointment of a 
Minister of State for Fisheries ", . . t o  serve as its in­
formal head and as a spokesman for the fishing industry.
The Minister for Fisheries is assisted by a Senior Assistant 
Deputy Minister who serves as the operational head of the 
Service with a staff of about 5,500."^^^ The FMS makes sub­
sidies available to Canadian fishermen to construct new 
fishing vessels, provides a Fishing Vessel Insurance Plan 
to insure domestic fishing vessels at below-market interest 
rates, and even has developed a Fish Chilling Assistance Pro­
gram designed to provide ", , . assistance for additional
ice-making and ice-stprage facilities at processing plants
118and for refrigeration on fishing vessels."
The FMS also has a Fisheries Prices Support Board
which is empowered ". , . t o  protect fishermen against sharp
declines in prices and consequent loss of income due to
causes beyond the control of the fishermen or the industry.
The Board has a working capital fund of about $25 million
to support prices of fishery products when there is a 
119decline." The FMS also conducts extensive fisheries 
research, with four major laboratories involved in biologi­
cal research and two in fisheries marketing efforts. The
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Service also operates some 660 vessels which support fisheries
research, protection, and survey programs.
Finally, it has been the Fisheries and Marine Service's
function to manage Canadian fish stocks. The FMS, rather than
establishing specific harvest limits, " . . .  attempts to limit
fleet size to keep it at a level commensurate with fish stocks 
120available. " According to FMS officials, limited entry 
programs " . . .  are now in effect for all but the underutilized 
fisheries. The programs are intended to lead to greater catch 
per vessel and greater earning capacity for the fleet. . . .  
Level of [fishing] effort is also controlled by regulating 
gear, fish size, catch limits, and length of seasons, but, 
according to Government officials, these regulations are not 
relied upon as much as eligibility requirements for fleet 
entry.
Since the implementation of Canada's 200-mile fishing
zone in 1977, Trudeau's Minister of Fisheries, Romeo LeBlanc,
has spoken enthusiastically of Canada's fisheries management
efforts. "Fisheries have made great headway in recent years.
The new zone and our new management approach have created a
new stability and strength. . . . We predicted that with the
200-mile zone, Canada would become the world's Number One
fish exporter. Now we can boast that it's happened. In 1978,
export value was $1.1 billion, up by over $300 millions and
12238 per cent over a year ago." LeBlanc indicated that 
Canada's fishery management program will continue to include 
a , fair, stable fleet licensing system" and the
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possibility of a . . catch royalty, a 'finnage' akin to 
stumpage in the forest industry. I suggest we should now 
set up a fishermen/processor/government group, including the
provincial government, to sift the evidence and settle the
123matter." ^
LeBlanc*s suggestion demonstrates the manner in which 
Canada is attempting to make fisheries policies. The federal 
Minister of Fisheries, in coordination with provincial fish­
eries ministers, and with the crucial help of officials in 
the International Directorate, Resource Services Directorate, 
Marine Fish Division, and Fisheries and Marine Service of 
the newly named Department of Fisheries and Oceans, estab­
lishes Canada's fisheries policies. The Department of Fish­
eries and Oceans, spawned in 1978 from the Department of Fish­
eries and Environment, demonstrated Canada's extensive interest 
in fisheries and continuing elevation of fisheries matters 
into a single resource department of cabinet rank.
Once important national fisheries policies are dev­
eloped by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Depart­
ment of External Affairs becomes importantly involved in 
negotiating fisheries and boundary agreements with other 
nations— most recently the United States. Private indi­
viduals, fishermen, and processors are also invited to give 
their advice on Canadian fisheries policies. Indeed, there 
are a number of management advisory groups, some for par­
ticular species of fish (halibut) as well as more general­
ized fisheries bodies (such as the Atlantic Groundfish
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Advisory Committee). The new Pacific Region Fisheries 
Management Advisory Council is a further example of how the 
fishing industry has an advisory input concerning Canadian 
fisheries policies.
Canada's fisheries decision-making process shows signs 
of becoming more open. Mr. Bernard Applebaum of the Depart­
ment of Fisheries and Oceans, and a central figure in the 
development of Canada's international fisheries policies, 
has provided a succinct overview of changes in the fisheries 
policy-making process. During the 1960s ". . . it is true 
to say that the fisheries policy making process in Canada 
was very highly centralized. The department's regional 
establishments were directed from Ottawa and all decisons 
of any impact were made by public servants in Ottawa. Our 
regional offices were in fact only expected to administer 
policy decisions made in Ottawa.
Applebaum suggests that beginning
in the late 1960's and continuing throughout this 
decade a major shift has taken place in fisheries 
policy making in Canada. The Minister has become 
much more directly involved in making fisheries 
policy decisions, the degree to which the provinces, 
the processors and the fishermen have become involved 
has increased substantially, and the department itself 
has become much more decentralized. I believe there 
are a number of factors which have contributed to this 
major shift; (a) the Liberal government decided that 
Deputy Ministers need not necessarily be experts in 
the field relevant to their departments and that 
Ministers would play a more direct role in running 
their departments; (b) the impact of foreign over­
fishing began to be felt and the belief that the 
resource was finite, requiring careful management, 
began to prevail; (c) more comprehensive fisheries man­
agement policies were introduced to limit effort and orotect
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fishermen's incomes? (d) fishermen and processors 
began to insist on greater consideration and input 
into the making of policy which affects them;
(e) the need to gain control over the distant water 
fishing fleets, concluding in the declaration of the 
200-mile limit, became a major issue-125
While key changes have thus occurred in Canada's fish­
eries decisional procedures during the 1970s, Applebaum notes 
that " . . .  the provinces and the processors are demanding 
a still greater say in the policy making process. They feel 
that consultation alone is not enough. I believe it is safe 
to conclude that further substantial and far reaching changes
will occur over the next few years with respect to Canada's
12 6fisheries policy making process."
There are four basic types of Canadian policy influ­
encers involved in pressuring for new Canadian fisheries 
policies and programs. Following the FiNS third or decision­
making level of analysis, the policy influencers to be con­
sidered are; partisan, mass, bureaucratic, and interest. If 
partisan influencers are activists in political parties who 
seek to influence policy by pressuring those in power and 
supplying personnel for decision-making roles, what can be 
said about their impact on fisheries policies during the 1960s 
and 1970s? Given the nature of the Canadian parliamentary 
system and the disciplined political parties, most partisan 
inputs regarding contemporary federal fisheries policies have 
been directed through the leaders of the Progressive Conser­
vative, Liberal, and New Democratic Parties in the House of
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Commons. In particular, the Canadian Prime Minister, as 
leader of the majority political party, submits Government 
bills to Parliament, fully expecting the support of his own 
party in the House of Commons.
There are, of course, extensive committee hearings, 
parliamentary discussions, and debates over Government init­
iated fisheries legislation. Backbenchers from Canada’s 
coastal areas are particularly outspoken on the fisheries 
problems existent in their constituent areas. Still, when 
Prime Minsiter Lester Pearson proposed a twelve-mile fishing 
zone for Canada in 1964, he was strongly supported in his 
policy initiatives by members of his own party. The Conser­
vative Party, as the loyal Opposition, spoke out against the 
Government's implementation of the 1964 Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zone Act ". . . a t  opportune moments. The government 
commented that the negotiations with foreign fishing states 
had failed because co-ordinates had not been drawn for the
straight baselines and that foreign countries had complained
127they did not know what they were negotiating about."
The point to be derived from this 1964 example is not that 
there have been great partisan differences over Canadian fish­
eries policies; rather, it would seem that partisan policy 
influencers have debated the timing and implementation of 
new Canadian oceanic zonal extensions— not the necessity of 
such unilateral moves.
Barbara Johnson and Mark Zacher have concisely summar­
ized partisan Canadian impact upon law of the sea issues--
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including fisheries. They note that the " . . .  public and
its representatives in Parliament rarely actively influenced
policy. Generally, foreign policy issues are less affected
by public input than purely domestic ones are. Also, the law
of the sea has generally been a non-partisan issue in Canada,
although the opposition parties have criticized tbê government
128for not taking an aggressive enough position." During
Trudeau's years in office, with pressures mounting for a 200-
mile Canadian fishing zone, " . . .  both the Conservatives
and New Democrats pressed for an immediate declaration (of
200 miles), while both the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia
legislatures passed unanimous resolutions in support of 
1 2 9such action."
The comments of Johnson and Zacher refer not only to 
partisan policy influencers, but also hint at the role of 
mass influencers in the development of Canadian fisheries 
policies. Viewing mass influence as the "climate of opinion 
shared by a population that decision-makers consider in 
shaping foreign policies," several notions about the Canadian 
public should be made. First, the " . . .  mass public in 
Canada tends to be deferential toward the Government; it 
also tends to be uninterested in foreign a f f a i r s . F i s h ­
eries agreements and boundary disputes are not typical for­
eign affairs, however; they are bread and butter issues for 
large segments of Canada's Atlantic and Pacific coastal com­
munities. Thus, the Canadian populace tends to be more
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informed on fisheries policies than its American counterpart. 
Secondly, the Canadian people have at times demonstrated 
enough cohesiveness to affect fisheries decisions. Canadian 
scholars contend that " . . .  with respect to pressure from 
the general public, it partly determined the decision to 
take unilateral action on fisheries. During 1975, the deep­
ening hostility on the east coast to foreign fishing led to 
frequent debates in the House of Commons. This debate cul­
minated in the government defeating an opposition motion to
declare sovereignty over living resources to two hundred miles
131or to the edge of the margin, whichever was greater."
Still, one must not overplay the impact of ma£s influ­
encers on fisheries policies. Given the nature of Canada's 
political culture and the public's deference to authority, 
public opinion has mainly been a supportive device for the 
Government's fisheries policies. Ann Hollick believes that 
law of the sea policies pursued by the Canadian government 
". . . are satisfactory to most of Canada's indigenous 
interests. Certainly, Canadian policy 'vis-a-vis' extending 
fishing jurisdictions, protecting the Arctic environment,
and generally standing up to the United States has struck
132responsive chords within the Canadian public."
Canadian mass influencers, most notably the Canadian 
press on both coasts, have acted as opinion leaders in the 
development of public sentiment on regional fisheries con­
cerns. Nationally, The Globe and Mail, "Canada's National
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Newspaper, " has provided a series of articles and editorial
comments on Canada's fisheries policies and Canadian-American
133fisheries negotiations. The Canadian Broadcasting Cor­
poration has also covered the Canadian-American fisheries 
conflicts; however, Spencer Moore, Assistant Director of 
International Relations for the CBC, indicated that " . . .  
this Corporation has no information such as articles, peunph- 
lets or editorial comments relative. . ."to Canadian-Ameri­
can fisheries policies and bilateral negotiations."^^* Thus, 
while the Canadian media and populace at large have generally 
discussed and favored Canada's unilateral extension of fish­
eries zones during the 1960s and 1970s, their voices have 
often been reactive to fisheries policies significantly 
shaped by other policy influencers.
It seems safe to suggest that the most important policy 
influencers for Canadian fisheries decisions are of the 
bureaucratic and interest types. Bureaucratic policy influ­
encers, those individuals and organizations within the execu­
tive branch that aid decision makers in developing and exe­
cuting policies, are a small, powerful elite in Canada. 
Barbara Johnson suggests that
Canada's foreign policy on fishery matters was devel­
oped in the context of bureaucratic politics on the 
law of the sea. A relatively small number of officials 
and an even smaller number of politicians have been 
significantly influential in fishery and law of the 
sea politics. They have been responsible for the 
development of fishery policy over the past fifteen 
years, although the general nature of that policy has 
been determined by Canada's character as a coastal 
fishing country with strong domestic fishinginterests.135
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One Canadian scholar suggests that although ”. . .  they 
interact with, draw on, and use the bureaucracy, the politi­
cal elite is conceptually— and in Canada empirically— distinct 
from the bureaucracy. Thus, there is a political process of 
political elites which is separate from bureaucratic politics. 
The most prominent and powerful member of the political elite 
in Canada is the Prime M i n i s t e r . C e r t a i n l y  Pierre 
Trudeau's efforts to create a more forceful, nationalistic 
foreign policy encouraged the expansionist trend in Canada's 
fishing zone policies. In recent years, Canada's Minister 
of Fisheries has carried great weight as a political elite, 
too. Since the British North America Act gives the federal 
government control over fisheries, " . . .  federal Fisheries 
Minister Romeo LeBlanc has been using the power this gives 
him; it is a lot. 'He has fantastic power,' one Halifax 
fishing executive said. 'He can decide who can fish, where 
he can fish, how much he can fish and the type of boat he 
can use.’ Mr. LeBlanc has admitted that his bias is toward 
small fishermen— the 17,000 inshore fishermen who go to sea
each morning in boats under 65 feet long and return at night
137to their homes along the coast."
While Canadian political elites can chart the direc­
tion, determine the guidelines, and impose their biases on 
the decision-making process, who are the bureaucratic policy 
influencers who impact upon the shaping of fisheries policies 
in contemporary Canada? Having already cited the general
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importance of civil servants in the Department of the 
Environment and Department of External Affairs, several 
specific bureaucratic mechanisms should receive special 
mention. When Prime Minister Trudeau reorganized the Cabi­
net committees in 1970, an interdepartmental Committee on 
Territorial Waters was reshaped into the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Law of the Sea (ICLOS). ICLOS now includes 
bureaucrats from nine major departments including the Depart­
ments of External Affairs, Environment, and National Defence. 
ICLOS meets a half dozen times a year to coordinate law of 
the sea policies, including international fisheries stances. 
Such policy formulations can provide Canada with cohesive 
bargaining positions in such international forums as UNCLOS 
III. It has been suggested that ICLOS recommandations and 
initiatives are clear examples of how bureaucratic policy 
influencers help shape government policies. "As long as 
policy proposals reflect the prevailing views of the govern­
ment and as long as agreements exist among civil servants 
of the several departments or a preponderance thereof, the 
parliamentary system offers substantial latitude to the 
bureaucrat. The operations of ICLOS exemplify the type of
policy influence that the civil servant wields within the 
138government. "
Given the relatively small size of the specific fed­
eral departments most involved in international fisheries 
concerns, key civil servants in DOE's International Direc­
torate, such as Bernard Applebaum, have exerted significant
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impact on Canada's fisheries policies. In overall oceanic 
affairs, including recent Canadian-American fisheries nego­
tiations, civil servants in External Affairs also have acted 
as central policy influencers. Several factors have combined 
. .to give External Affairs a dominant position among 
the agencies involved in oceans policy. These include its 
traditional role in matters of foreign policy, its role as 
co-ordinator of law of the sea policy among the departments, 
the concentration of legal and political expertise in that
department, and finally the general willingness of other
139departments to defer to its judgements."
In sum, because of their small number, their general 
agreements on international fisheries policies, their exper­
tise and cohesiveness, Canadian bureaucratic policy influ­
encers have played significant roles in the development of 
Canada's fisheries policies. Barbara Johnson believes, 
however, that it is not enough to mention the activities of 
the Department of the Environment civil servants to under­
stand the international aspects of Canadian fisheries stances. 
"Nor was the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of the 
Sea (ICLOS) a key institution which resolved the conflict­
ing goals of competing agencies, since there was relatively 
little c o n f l i c t . I n s t e a d ,  it is necessary to observe 
how much of the responsibility for law of the sea policy 
initiatives have been transferred ". . .to official nego­
tiators, who have been solidly supported by Ottawa,
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Chapter 6 will observe some of those official Canadian 
negotiators as they have been involved in Canadian-American 
fisheries agreements to see how their actions and attitudes 
mesh with the bureaucratic influencera in Ottawa.
The interest policy influencera, as a fourth general
type, have been active and vocal on fisheries concerns.
Viewing interest influencera as those individuals tied
together by a common set of interests, the Canadian coastal
fishing industry has understandably supported Government
efforts to establish new oceanic fisheries zones during the
1960s and 1970s. At the outset, ". . . it must be noted
that the role of the Canadian industry has been to support
and promote initiatives taken by government rather than to
participate actively in policy formulations. There are
instances, such as in 1963, in the case of the Fisheries
Council brief, where industry played a major, role, but such
142cases are the exception rather than the rule."
It has been suggested that Canadian " . . .  fishermen 
wield influence as a result of their concentration in coastal 
communities and of their strong viewpoints on the issues 
that concern the industry. The extent of their influence 
depends partly on the degree to which they are unionized 
and partly on their perceived impact on provincial and na­
tional elections on both c o a s t s , C a n a d i a n  fishermen 
have some potent unions, especially on the west coast. In 
British Columbia, the most powerful fishermen's union is
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the highly protectionist United Fishermen and Allied Workers 
Union (UFAWU). On the east coast, such unions as the Mari­
time Fishermen's Union and New Brunswick Seafood Workers'
Union have often coordinated their efforts to obtain support 
for the Atlantic coastal fishing industry.
As pressures for a 200-mile Canadian fishing zone con­
tinued to increase in the 1970s, labor unions attempted to 
provide a strong front in favor of unilateral zonal actions. 
Once the 200-mile fishing zone became a reality, the Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC) called its first national conference 
of unions in the fishing industry in mid-January of 1977.
Joe Morris, then the President of the CLC told the union 
leaders that the " . . .  Canadian Labour Congress has been 
a consistent promoter of extended fishing limits. We now 
want to assure that the people involved will have some in­
put to the implementation and administration of this measure 
which will so directly affect their lives.
Donald Montgomery, CLC Secretary-Treasurer, keynoted 
the concerns of the national labor congress. "Recommenda­
tions to the government will bear more weight if they are 
made in a co-ordinated fashion that has the endorsation of 
all the workers' organizations involved. The CLC conference 
on the fishing industry this week will be the kickoff to an 
ongoing process which will result in a strengthened voice 
for workers employed in all aspects of the fishing industry. 
In March of 1977, the CLC approved a fifteen-point policy 
statement " . . .  calling upon the Canadian government to
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initiate talks with the United States on the establishment
of a Joint Commission for the Atlantic and Pacific
o c e a n s . T h e  policy statement also " . . .  commits the
CLC to the establishment of a council of unions involved
in the fishing industry 'to carry on a program of support
147for a comprehensive fishing policy. '"
Other groups within the Canadian fishing industry have 
also been active interest policy influencers. The Fisher­
ies Council of Canada, an organization of regional fishing 
interests including processors, fish exporters, and large- 
vessel owners has always been an effective interest aggre­
gator; as detailed in earlier comments, the Fisheries 
Council's 1963 brief submitted to the government of Canada
helped persuade federal decision makers that the time was
148right for the expansion of Canada's fishing zones.
Overall, almost all portions of Canada's fishing industry, 
because of their coastal orientation, are highly protection­
ist and openly outraged by the activities of distant water 
fishing vessels off their shores. In comparison to the 
highly fragmented U.S. fishing industry, Canadian fishermen 
are united in their efforts to encourage the federal govern­
ment to develop exclusive zonal fishing rights for the 
domestic fishing industry.
While the demands of the Canadian fishing industry have 
not always been met by the bureaucrats in Ottawa, the 
. . evidence for the years from 1974 to 1977 leads to
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the conclusion that interest group pressure did make
unilateral extension necessary at some point prior to a
149federal election.” Now that the national elections have 
been held, and the Progressive Conservatives are in power, 
it will be interesting to see if the new Government carries 
out its campaign pledges to link federal and provincial 
fisheries policies influencers into a more open, effective 
fisheries policy-making apparatus.
Conclusions
Having assessed the polity, decision-making process, 
and fisheries policy influencers of Canada, what summary 
observations might be set forth? Throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, Canada's role in oceanic fisheries activités has been 
that of an activist. Canada has often been a leader in uni­
lateral fisheries zone extensions, has developed effective 
management and conservation policies for the living marine 
resources in those zones, and has encouraged the continuation 
of regional and international efforts to sanely utilize the 
sea's depleted bounty. Moreover, it is important to real­
ize that while there are definite differences between seg­
ments of Canada's fishing industry on the Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts, the country has maintained its essential 
coastal fishing orientation. This cohesiveness of fisher­
ies concerns has enabled the federal government to provide 
strong leadership in the development of domestic fisheries 
policies suited for a coastal nation. Finally, it will be
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apparent, in comparing the fishing industries of Canada 
and the United States, that the latter is much more frag­
mented than the former.
In terms of the FiNS second and third levels of analy­
sis, Canada is a striking example of how a populace's sub­
dued individualism and acceptance of authority have enabled 
the national government to become increasingly involved in 
the domestic fishing industry. The fishermen of Canada, 
especially in the Maritime provinces, expect the federal 
government to protect and bolster their fishing efforts. 
Highly protectionist attitudes are understandably preferred 
by most segments of the fishing industry. Thus, whenever 
the national government has taken active, unilateral steps 
to create new coastal fishing zones, it has received the 
support and applause of Canada's fifty thousand fishermen.
Regarding the fisheries policy influencers of Canada, 
there seems to be little doubt that the most potent are the 
bureaucratic and interest types. The relatively small num­
ber of federal bureaucrats involved in making fisheries 
policies has encouraged the establishment of a cohesive, 
centralized decision-making apparatus. In Canada, there 
is a close tie between civil servants and interest group 
leaders. Interest policy influencers, especially the fish­
ermen's unions and fisheries councils of Canada have been 
organized, vocal, and forceful in their pressuring efforts. 
Still, they have been willing to use legitiamte channels, 
to work "within the system," and to act quite often as
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supporters of national fisheries policies already 
determined in Ottawa.
While Canada is a nation of regions and sectional 
interests, and the British Columbian fishing industry has 
often been held up ". . , as a model to the Atlantic, 
it seems likely that successful, unified national fisheries 
policies will provide better days ahead for all of Canada's 
fishermen and processors. The advent of the 200-mile zone 
has led to the creation of new fisheries advisory groups, 
the formation of more co-ordinated labor union and associa­
tions! fisheries policy stances, and the promise of federal 
politicians to listen more openly to the provincial govern­
ments’ fisheries demands. Whether the Canadian fisheries 
decision-making system is becoming more open to a broader 
range of policy influencers has yet to be determined.
There is no doubt, however, that federal fisheries 
decision makers are positive-minded about the future. "We 
took over 630,000 square miles and we're running it well.
The significance of the 200-mile zone . . .  is only begin­
ning to unfold. And in fisheries diplomacy Canada has one 
of the best records in the w o r l d . T r u d e a u ' s  Minister 
of Fisheries, Romeo LeBlanc, concludes that it is heartening 
". . . t o  realize again the different beauty of the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts, and to realize also the shared character­
istics, such as self-reliance, of people who live from the 
sea. This too, besides the practical matters of fishery 
policy, reminds me that if the mountains appear to divide us.
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152the seas rejoin us." Canada's growth as a progressive 
coastal fishing nation seems assured.
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CHAPTER V
POLITY, PROCESS, AND POLICY INFLUENCERS;
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICAN FISHERIES POLICIES
Having survived Watergate and the bicentennial 
celebrations, Americans are full of some of the same hopes 
and fears as their Canadian neighbors. In the search for 
greater confidence in governmental institutions and leaders, 
appropriate foreign policy directions, and a revitalized 
economy, Americans face their future with a sense of uncer­
tainty. To challenge their lethargy, it has been suggested 
that like " . . .  a much earlier generation, the third cen­
tury of Americans will have to learn what those of the first 
learned through struggle: that confidence in liberal and
democratic values can come about only when people are willing 
to proclaim the ideal of self-government and to take the steps 
necessary to make that ideal a reality.
Paralleling the format of the previous chapter, chapter 5 
will: (1) assess the nature of the American polity as well 
as other relevant national attributes (FiNS second level of
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analysis); (2) detail important American fisheries policies 
of the 1960s and 1970s; and (3) provide an analysis of the 
fisheries decision-making process and United States policy 
influencers that impact upon that process. In a nation of 
over two hundred and twenty million people, who are the 
significant policy influencers involved in fisheries inter­
est articulation and aggregation activities? How potent are 
American policy influencers when compared with their counter­
parts in Canada? What similarities and differences exist 
between the American and Canadian fishing communities?
These questions will all be pondered in the analysis of 
this chapter.
The Polity and National Attributes 
Relevant to American 
Fisheries Policies
The United States is an "open polity"— a representative 
democracy with a federal governmental structure and presi­
dential system that features a separation of powers between 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and the 
independent election of a chief executive for a fixed term. 
While there are those scholars who continue to debate just 
how democratic America is today, or if it is democratic at 
all,^ it can be asserted that wide public acceptance of the 
symbols of legitimacy and deep loyalties to the political 
community provide the United States with a stable, effective, 
limited government of accommodative, egalitarian politics.
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As de Tocqueville so amply noted a century and a half ago, 
in . . America, the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people is not either barren or concealed, as it is with some 
other nations; it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed 
by the laws; it spreads freely, and arrives without impedi-
4ment at its most remote consequences.”
In order to provide a useful second level of analysis 
of the United States as a nation, it will be necessary to 
briefly comment on America's political culture,^ political 
parties and interest groups (as interest articulation and 
aggregation mechanisms), and legislative and executive arenas 
of governmental decision-making. America's vast geographic 
size and wealth of natural resources, especially the marine 
life off the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, must also be con­
sidered as a relevant national attribute. Additionally, 
the nation's degree of economic development as related to 
the absolute size and nature of the American fishing indus­
try should be examined as a partof the second level of 
analysis.
In assessing America's political culture, several im­
portant elements should be mentioned. First, the political 
regionalism so prevalent in Canada is less intense in the 
United States today. No clearer example of the weakening 
of political sectionalism could be cited than the contem­
porary American South. Having struggled through agrarian 
discontents, a civil war, reconstruction, and civil rights 
movements, a "less solid South" has produced a peanut farmer
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that a majority of American voters have been able to accept 
as their chief executive. The blending of vast geographic 
regions and a heterogeneous population into a national 
community . . is an amazing feat and is often not suf­
ficiently appreciated. The United States is a large and 
diverse nation, 'a nation of immigrants.' To have created 
a political system which has enjoyed such legitimacy— and 
stability— for so long for such a people is an enormous 
achievement. And in spite of the system's limitations, the 
behavior of elites during such crises as Watergate surely 
demonstrates that the system's values do permeate elites 
and serve as some restraint on their behavior.
A second facet of America's political culture that has 
received much attention is the usage of violence to advance 
individual and group purposes. "For more than two hundred 
years, from the Indian wars and farmer uprisings of the 
eighteenth century to the labor-management and racial dis­
turbances of the twentieth, the United States has experienced 
regular episodes of serious mass violence related to the 
social, political and economic objectives of insurgent
7groups." Today, Harry Holloway and John George maintain 
that the " . . .  language of peace, due process, and nonvio­
lence persists. But in practice large numbers of Americans 
support instrumental violence for one purpose or another and
Qrationalize away much of the discrepancy."
Kenneth Prewitt and Sidney Verba, while not discount­
ing the significance of violence in the American polity.
208
maintain that in the United States there is general 
consensus on democratic principles, " . . .  along with a ten­
dency to limit these values in practice. This tendency is, 
however, partly offset by the fact that the citizens who 
are likely to be most politically involved and active—  
the better educated, the leaders of organizations— have a
Qgreater commitment to democratic values. " The two politi­
cal scientists conclude, however, that the " . . .  most strik­
ing thing about the basic political beliefs of Americans is 
the fact that there have been important changes in the past 
decade. For one thing, Americans are no longer as optimis­
tic about their nation as they once were. And this has 
happened at a time when politics has become more visible 
to the average citizen and when citizens seem to be developing 
more consistent sets of political attitudes.
Stressing individualism and social and political 
equality, the agents of political socialization in America 
still inculcate participatory values into new members of 
the political community. "A child raised in the United 
States grows to become an adult citizen who is likely to 
understand and normally to accept as desirable, or at least 
as necessary, the concepts and practices of majority rule, 
competitive elections, the federal form of government, the 
limitations to the authority of police agencies, and the 
right of a citizen to make certain choices affecting his 
personal life without interference from agents of the
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s t a t e . E v e n  though there has been a recent decline in
their sense of political efficacy, the American people
" . . .  feel that they have some political influence. If we
compare Americans to citizens of other nations, we find that
they are more likely than most others to think they can have
some effect on a local government regulation or a law of Con-
12gress they consider unfair or unjust."
In summarizing the thrust of the American political 
culture, Prewitt and Verba suggest that American citizens 
". . . do not feel helpless before the government. And, to 
some extent at least, believing they are not helpless makes 
them less helpless. . . .  In addition, Americans believe one 
has an obligation as a citizen to try to influence the 
g o v e r n m e n t . K e y  values in the American political culture 
persist — popular rule, liberty, equality, property, achieve­
ment, a belief in God— enabling the polity to remain stable 
and full of "the seeds of the civic culture"^^ assessed by 
Almond and Verba over fifteen years ago. Holloway and George 
believe that the " . . .  core values that pervade the system 
and legitimate it have a further major consequence. It makes 
for a politics of consensus which limits extremes and pushes 
political discussion toward the middle. . . . The political 
culture of the United States has been and continues to be a
potent influence on the system and on the mass of ordinary
16Americans it governs."
What are some of the most significant interest aggrega­
tion mechanisms which help develop and perpetuate America's
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political culture? Certainly the political parties and a 
plethora of interest groups are vitally important as vehicles 
for values, attitudes, and public opinions. As agencies out­
side the formal structure of government, political parties 
in the United States have helped expand and democratize the 
political processes. Hugh Bone and Austin Ranney emphasize 
the fact that since . . the beginning of the United States,
the major parties have been diversified and heterogeneous in 
17composition." Also since the beginning, the United States 
has maintained a two party system composed of cadre-type,
18undisciplined parties of electoral support. Frank Sorauf,
19 20Marian Irish and James Prothro, and E. E. Schattschneider
all strongly believe that it was because of the nature of 
America's governmental and electoral institutions that a two 
party system evolved. The rationale behind the "institutional" 
school of thought suggests that since Americans choose many 
of their most important governmental officials from single­
member electoral districts on the basis of plurality elec­
tions, only large broad-based types of parties can regularly 
win election contests. Minority parties are usually unable 
to place many people in legislative and executive govern­
mental positions.
Since the American Civil War, the two major political 
parties in the United States have been the Republican and 
Democratic Parties. Their most basic roles have remained 
unchanged through the years. The parties are to recruit.
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nominate, and support candidates for elected office. They 
also attempt to represent large aggregates of interests in 
the United States; moreover, they identify and reduce to 
palpable size some rather complex economic/social/political 
issues. By presenting candidates and issues to the elector­
ate, they hope to perform their ultimate function— organizing 
and running the decision-making agencies of government. In 
addition to their major functions, the Republicans and Demo­
crats act as important cues, symbols, or objects of loyalty
21for large portions of the electorate. They enable the 
American political system to pass political power from Presi­
dent to President, Congress to Congress, state legislature to 
state legislature in a relatively routine and stable manner.
In recent years, it has been suggested that the United 
States is developing a two-tiered party system. "There is no 
majority party at the presidential level, but disaffection 
from the Democrats stemming from that party's leadership in 
areas of social and cultural change, coupled with Republican 
success in articulating neopopulist resistance and resent­
ment, has produced a situation in which contenders running 
under the GOP label are at least competitive. Outside pres­
idential politics, the Democrats operate as the majority 
22party." One author has recently suggested that the Demo­
crats are "the everyone party." Democrats are;
. . . well ahead of the GOP (Republicans) in every 
age group, from the youngest segment of the elec­
torate to the oldest, and their margin is remark­
ably uniform. Wage workers are more Democratic 
than businessmen and executives, but a majority of
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even the latter now identify with the Democrats 
and vote for Democratic congressional candidates.
All educational groups show a Democratic margin.
So do all income levels, including the very pros­
perous. . . . The Democrats lead the Republicans 
in every region, among all religious groupings, 
among virtually all ethnic groups.23
The Republican Party today has almost no support
among Black Americans.
Catholics and Jews are grossly underrepresented in 
its ranks. To a striking extent, the Republicans 
have become a party of northern white Protestants.
In 1976, for example, 56 percent of all those identi­
fying themselves as Renublicans were northern white 
Protestants, compared to 25 percent of Democrats.
This WASPish image, and the reality it reflects, has 
seriously weakened the Republicans' ability to re­
cruit in an ethnically diverse s o c i e t y . 24
Still, it would not be correct to indicate that the Republi­
can Party is finally dead. "In leadership base and mass 
support— some 34 million adult Americans identify themselves
as Republicans— the GOP dwarfs any possible rival for
25second-party status."
As for the future of America's two party system, the
26growth of the political independent poses genuine concerns 
among the major parties. However, the author of this disser­
tation is in total agreement with Ladd and Hadley when they 
suggest that as long as ”. . . the United States operates, 
with a one-man executive (in contrast to the cabinet type) 
and with a winner-take-all electoral system (the electoral 
college), prospects for a regularized multiparty system appear 
dim. Much more likely is the continuance of a greatly weak­
ened but still, ostensibly, two-party system, characterized
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by frequent reversals of massive proportions and nothing
27approaching a stable presidential majority."
While America's political parties have become less 
effectual as aggregating mechanisms, interest groups have 
grown in size and political significance. "Interest groups 
have always been a prominent part of the cluttered United 
States political scene. Muckrakers for generations have 
righteously exposed 'special interests' and condemned their 
insidious influence. Yet an increasingly middle-class 
society has become ever more diversified and has produced 
interests of all kinds that are willing and able to seek 
access to those in office. And in recent times this flour­
ishing thicket of interests has induced a healthy growth of
28public interest groups." In a functional sense, American 
interest groups ". . . have changed their methods and tech­
niques of influence, relying more heavily, for example, on 
the provision of technical and complex information to harried 
and overburdened legislators, and using sophisticated tech­
niques to activate grass-roots communications. . . . But
perhaps the most significant change is the general expansion
29in group numbers and range of activity."
In order to accomplish their goals, interest groups 
in the United States electioneer, lobby at all level of the 
federal system, and attempt to influence public opinion. 
Moreover, some interest groups, through litigation, are using 
the courts to achieve their objectives.^® Whether one
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31 32accepts a pluralistic or power elitist image of American
politicsr there is no denying that the proliferation of organ­
ized groups in the United States is having an impact upon 
governmental accountability and the making of public policy. 
American interest groups " . . .  attempt to monitor govern­
mental activity that might affect them, initiate governmental 
action to promote their interests, and block action that would 
work to their detriment. Each of these areas of activity
requires, above all else, access— access to key decision- 
33makers."
In comparing American and Canadian interest groups, 
it has been argued that perhaps " . . .  the essential differ­
ence is that whereas interest groups in the United States 
have often been regarded as exogenous, discontinuous, and 
frequently illegitimate elements of the system, in Canada, 
from Conférâtion onward, they have been both.normatively and 
symbiotically woven into the political fabric; indeed, the 
distinction between political and industrial leadership and 
interests was virtually imperceptible among the 'founding 
fathers of Confederation.'"^^ Moreover, ". . . the 'quasi­
part icipative' tendency in Canadian politics makes interest 
group penetration easier, compared with the United States, 
where democratic rhetoric demands that politicians appear 
to be armed against their reputedly pernicious influence. 
Still,
. . .  despite salient variations in both political 
culture and political structure in the two national 
contexts, interest groups seem to play a sustained
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functional, integrative role in both systems.
The differences are largely of degree, with direct 
participation in interest group politics restricted 
to fewer groups in Canadian society. The propor­
tions of groups employing lobbyists, for example, 
is only a little over half as great in Canada, 
compared with the United States.36
In sum, Robert Presthus believes that in the United 
States, " . . .  political structure, more intensive functional 
specialization, and a more egalitarian social context tend 
to encourage somewhat greater group intensity and partici­
pation in the shaping of public policy. Somewhat higher 
rates of political efficacy, among both elites and rank-and- 
file members of society, probably reinforce such positive
incentives in producing a somewhat more competitive system
37of group politics." The thousands of interest groups active 
in the United States are " . . .  part and parcel of a muscular 
interest group system that [has] both supplemented and in 
many ways undermined the parties. . . . This pluralistic 
diversity would be seen as creating an ungovernable political 
system. Certainly it has made for a complex form of coalition 
politics.
Indeed, the expanding number of interest groups in 
America has caused political writer Meg Greenfield to remark: 
"I can't remember a time in Washington when interest-group 
issues and politics so dominated events. And every day the 
units of protest and concern seem to be subdividing into 
even smaller and more specialized groupings." The problem 
with all of this interest group activity is that it can lead
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to more fragmentation in the decision-making process. "By 
now, there can hardly be a cultural, racial, regional, eco­
nomic or professional group for whom the lawmakers of Wash­
ington have not fashioned some special blessing— a preroga­
tive, a grant, an exemption, a reimbursement . . . something. 
It puts a premium on identifying yourself with the special 
subgroup and helps to thin, if not destroy, whatever feel-
40ings of larger national loyalty various citizens may have."
In order to better understand the relationship between 
political parties, interest groups, and the formal agencies 
of government in the United States, certain basic facts about 
the American Congress, the Presidency, and the national 
bureaucracy should be set forth. The United States Congress 
is a bicameral legislative body composed of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives. It is a powerful institution 
which, " . . .  unlike most other national legislatures in the 
twentieth century, is at the heart of public policy-making. 
. . .  It shares its policy-making powers principally with the 
executive branch— both the president and the vast bureaucracy 
that has developed— and the interaction between Congress and 
the executive, often with spokespersons for private interests 
also involved, is responsible for most of the detailed deci­
sions about what specific policies to pursue and what spe­
cific programs to implement.
In functional terms legislation is painstakingly 
shaped in the committees and on the floor of Congress. To
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understand the inner-workings of Congress, it is essential
to study the elaborate network of committees and subcom-
42mittees through which legislative enactments flow. In 
. . legal and formal terms, Congress is master of its 
own house; its committees are its creatures. Committees 
exercise those powers which Congress chooses to grant or to 
recognize. Over the years, however, there has been a steady 
accumulation of powers by committees, and powers either 
developed upon the committees or quietly assumed by them 
have proved difficult to recapture. Thus, at times Congress 
seems to be very little more than the sum of its committees.
In addition to their prime legislative function of 
shaping legislation, members of Congress represent constit­
uent interests, and as critics of the executive branch, con­
duct investigations, and attempt to inform the public about 
societal concerns. While the 100 U.S. Senators, individually 
have more power and visibility than the 435 members of the 
House of Representatives, all of the legislators tend to be 
undisciplined and capable of exercising independent judgments 
on legislative matters. In comparing the two chambers, it 
is also interesting to note that both bodies are relatively 
decentralized political institutions, and both are equal in 
legislative power— in that they each have the capability of 
defeating any bill. There are several important constitu­
tional exceptions to this notion of legislative equality, 
however. Only the Senate ratifies treaties, and advises
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and consents on political appointments; moreover, the House 
originates all revenue bills— and in practice, appropriation 
bills, too.
Through time, the American President has become
" . . .  the acknowledged leader of the legislative branch,
as well as director and general manager of the executive.
Congress wait[si for the State of the Union Message, the
Budget Message, and the Economic Report of the President to
set the agenda for its session. Then it wait[s] for admin-
44istration bills." However,
. . . changes wrought by a single Congress— the 93rd 
[1973]— are truly momentous. Ever since the era of 
congressional government at the close of the Civil 
War . . . the flow of power had been all one-way, 
in the direction of the president. In just two years, 
the trend of a hundred years was dramatically 
reversed. An extraordinary abuse of presidential 
power triggered a counteraction equally extraordinary, 
and the ponderous processes of institutional change 
were expedited.45
Still, one should not expect all Congresses to be as 
reformist in nature as the 93rd. One congressional scholar 
believes " . . .  that Congress itself is unlikely to leap at 
wholesale changes of any variety and will reform itself 
slowly and painstakingly as it has in the past, acting when 
the lawmakers themselves are persuaded that change is neces­
sary or cannot be r e s i s t e d . F o r  those who are hoping for 
a revitalized national legislature, there " . . .  are no per­
manent solutions to making Congress a body that arrives at 
responsive and intelligent decisions. . . . But in a dynamic 
setting such as that surrounding Congress, adjustments and
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changes to afford at least temporary solutions to perceived
problems can be important in determining both the standing
of the national legislature and the kind of policy it helps 
47produce."
The twentieth century has been a time when the Amer­
ican Presidency reached a "pinnacle of power." With expand­
ing capabilities in both foreign and domestic affairs, the 
Presidency has survived the immediate and negative impact of 
Watergate upon the populace's opinions of the office,*^ 
demonstrating that " . . .  public support for the Presidency
may be robust enough not to be permanently damaged by the
49actions of one man." Today, the President performs many 
functions as chief— executive, legislator, diplomat, and 
administrator— as well as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces and leader of his political party. Unlike 
many parliamentary systems, there is no dual executive 
arrangement in the American polity; thus, the President acts 
as the ceremonial head of the government, too.
In terms of practical politics, Harry Truman once 
observed, "The principal power that the President has is to 
bring people in and try to persuade them to do what they ought 
to do without persuasion. That's what I spend my time doing. 
That's what the powers of the President amount to."^® Like 
the Canadian Prime Minister, the American President has vast 
executive powers; with Senate confirmation, the President 
nominates all members of his cabinet. Unlike the Canadian 
Prime Minister, American Presidents do not operate under the
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concept of cabinet collective responsibility. "It is unlikely 
that a Prime Minister [in Canada] could triumph over a ser­
iously divided cabinet for very long. In the American system, 
however, the cabinet does not make decisions, the President 
does."51
Today, the American " . . .  Presidency possesses the
capacity for action, for achieving specific results in the
shortest possible time— valuable traits in a political system
that is diffuse and characteristically slow moving. Its
capacities and resources embrace the power of decision and
command, vast stores of information, legions of experts, huge
sums to spend. The burden for action falls readily on the 
52President." But how does the President accomplish his 
administrative actions with such a massive bureaucracy com­
posed of twelve major executive departments, over 120 separate 
agencies and nearly three million civilian employees? Robert 
DiClerico suggests that " . . .  the bureaucracy and the Presi­
dent are both members of the same branch of government. And 
even more important, it is the President who sits at the 
head of it. Thus, one might expect the President to encounter 
little difficulty in gaining the cooperation of those under 
him. Such an expectation would not be grounded in fact."^^ 
Indeed, shortly after becoming President, Jimmy Carter noted; 
"Before I became president, I realized and was warned that 
dealing with the federal bureaucracy would be one of the
worst problems I would have to face. It has been even worse
5 4than I had anticipated."
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It has been pointed out that so much " . . .  emphasis
is usually placed on presidential-congressional relations
that the role of the bureaucracy is often shortchanged. . . .
But the bureaucracy is, in fact, at the heart of what Ameri-
55can government can and does achieve." As the "continuing 
executive," the bureaucracy administers the policies of 
government. Additionally, it proposes and makes policies 
and rules, develops governmental programs, and acts as a 
valuable source of research information for the President 
and Congress. As in most democratic Western countries, a 
majority of America's bureaucrats/civil servants have per­
manent jobs gained through competitive examination, thus giv­
ing a sense of continuity to the political system. While 
continuity can be beneficial, a sizable portion of the growth 
in government is the result of bureaucratic self-perpetuation. 
In America, because " . . .  bureaucrats fear and resist new 
and innovative policies or large-scale changes in policy, 
old programs never die, they just have new programs tacked 
on to t h e m . P e t e r  Drucker concludes that the " . . .  moment
government undertakes anything it becomes entrenched and 
57permanent."
While the American federal bureaucracy has great
power, its relationship with the President and with Congress
is not always omnipotent. Today,
. . . bureaucrats prefer to reach a consensus among 
themselves and make a decision without involving 
either the president or his political appointees.
If that is unsuccessful, they will seek to have a 
decision reached among the cabinet officials
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involved without going to the president himself. 
Bureaucrats recognize that they are likely to 
have considerably more control over what is 
decided if the decision is a compromise within 
the bureaucracy rather than a decision handed down 
to them by the president.58
Morton Halperin believes that the amount of presidential con­
trol over the bureaucracy ”. . .  varies greatly depending on 
the issue, the degree of presidential concern, and the degree 
to which he is cutting against strongly felt organizational 
interests. All other things being equal, however, the more
the president personally involves himself, the more likely
59(but not certain) he is to get what he wants."
As for the relationship between Congress and the 
national bureaucracy, several notions can be set forth. "The 
points of contact between the bureaucracy and Congress are 
numerous. There is much personal interchange between members 
and staff members on Capitol Hill and civil servants and 
political appointees in the executive b r a n c h . M o r e o v e r ,  
Randall Ripley states that Congress " . . .  has not become 
. . .  a passive reflector of the wishes of bureaucrats.
Members of both houses make important inputs of their own 
in the policy process. And Congress as an institution main­
tains extremely important powers that allow it to have influ­
ence on the way in which the bureaucracy conducts the business
of government.
In sum, T. Alexander Smith suggests that it is help­
ful to view the American political process in the form of 
numerous triangles " . . .  individually encompassing three 
institutional legs: interest groups, congressional committee
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or subcommittee, and bureaucracy. . . .  If, through common 
needs, the three legs of a given triangle are closely aligned 
and if the group (or groups) represents a sufficiently power­
ful electoral or political force (as in agriculture or in 
military procurement), then a president's ability to enforce
his will upon that part of his own bureaucracy is consider- 
62ably reduced." It seems safe to assert that the American 
bureaucracy, like the administrative hierarchy in Canada, 
is a potent force in the governmental decision-making process. 
Presthus maintains that ". . .in structural terms, the 
Canadian bureaucracy occupies an equally crucial role in 
government policy making, compared with its American counter­
part. . . .
Before analyzing contemporary (1960-1977) fisheries 
policies and processes in the remaining sections of this 
chapter, it would be useful to assess the significance of 
several other national attributes that have impacted upon 
America's maritime policies through the years. The nation's 
geographic size, extensive natural resources, and degree of 
economic development have helped shape the nature of the 
United States fishing industry. As will be detailed later 
in this chapter, the United States has passed the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 to conserve, protect, 
and increase the vast quantities of marine life off the 
nation's Atlantic, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific coasts. The 
1976 Act establishes, " . . .  for the first time, a compre­
hensive system for managing fisheries in a fishery conservation
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zone [FCZl that extends seaward from three to 200 nautical
miles. The Act thus extend[s] the legal jurisdiction of the
United States from an area of about 545,000 square nautical
64miles to an area of over 2,000,000 square nautical miles."
It is especially relevant to note that according to 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Depart­
ment of Commerce, ". . .20 percent of all marine fisheries 
in the temperate and subarctic shelf areas of the world 
(where most of the fisheries are located) are found within 
200 miles of the U.S. coasts. Consequently, it can be said 
that the large stocks of fish inhabiting coastal waters con­
stitute one of the richest natural resources of the Nation.
The deputy director of the Office of Resource Conservation and 
Management, National Marine Fisheries Service, has pointed out 
that the 1977 " . . .  processed value of U.S. caught fish was 
. . . about 11 percent higher than in 1976. Total U.S. ex­
ports in 1977 was a record $52 0.5 million, up 35 percent from 
1976."^^ Preliminary NMFS information indicates that in 1978  ̂
United States " . . .  commercial fishermen landed six billion 
pounds of seafood with a dockside value of $1.9 billion. . . ." 
The NMFS also indicates that " . . .  the previous record for 
landings was established in 1962, when 5.4 billion pounds 
were landed. The previous record value of $1.5 billion was 
established in 1977. Most valuable to fishermen and vessel
goowners were shrimp, crab, salmon, and tuna."
While these figures hold out hope that America's 
fishing industry can be greatly revitalized in the years
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ahead, some basic facts about the absolute size and nature 
of the U.S. fishing industry will enable the reader to draw 
some comparisons between the American and Canadian fishing 
communities. Through most of the 1970s, the United States 
commercial fishing industry has been composed of ". . . approx­
imately 150,000 fishermen, 1,800 processors, 1,200 wholesalers, 
and 2,000 importers/exporters, plus frozen and canned food 
distributors, and chain store, restaurant, and institutional 
buyers. There are also approximately 85,000 people employed 
in processing and wholesaling fish p r o d u c t s . M o r e o v e r ,  
the various segments of the American fishing industry are 
largely made up of small, private enterprises. "An estimated 
80 percent of the [commercial] fishing craft in the United 
States is individually owned and 84 percent is under 5 tons. 
Small-unit operation also is characteristic of the process­
ing industry. Only a few large companies exist. About 
42 percent of the plants have sales of less than $100,000.
Only 17 percent have sales of over $1 million . . per
year.
There are a number of segments existent within the 
American fishing industry, giving it a more fragmented nature 
than its Canadian counterpart. The United States coastal/ 
groundfishermen take 82.5 percent of the nation's total catch 
in quantity and 68.2 percent in value. Fishermen/trollers 
interested in anadromous species, especially salmon, obtain 
4.4 percent of America's annual catch in quantity, 8.2 per 
cent in value. The United States also has distant water
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fishing fleets which can be divided into two general 
categories. American fleets in pursuit of highly migratory 
species of fish (such as tuna) harvest 10.7 percent of the 
total quantity, 15.8 percent of the total American catch in 
value. Finally, 2.4 percent in quantity, 7.8 percent in
value of America's annual landings are taken by the U.S.
71fishing fleets in coastal waters off foreign nations. It 
is safe to suggest that while the coastal/groundfishing 
occurs primarily in Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico waters, most 
of the anadromous and highly migratory U.S. fishing efforts 
take place in Pacific waters.
There are some striking differences between the nature 
of the American and Canadian fishing industries. American 
fishermen make up only a fraction of one percent of the total 
labor force, and even in the coastal states, rarely amount 
to more than one percent of the total working populace. More­
over, while the largest portion of America's fishing industry 
is coastal in nature, distant water fleets are also important, 
distinctive elements within the nation's fishing community. 
Similar distant water fishing fleets do not exist in Canada. 
Additionally, in terms of America's gross national product, 
the U.S. fishing industry accounts for less than one quarter 
of one percent of the GNP, while the Canadian fishing indus­
try produces over one percent of its country* s annual income.
In comparison to the unified nature of federal fish­
eries policy making in Canada, the remaining section of this
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chapter will detail how the small, relative size of the 
American fishing industry has relegated it to the periphery 
of America's economic priorities. There has never been a 
federal fisheries department, secretary of fisheries, or 
unified fisheries decision-making process in the United 
States.
It is also significant to point out that the legal
jurisdiction over America's oceanic fisheries has always
been divided between the federal and state governments.
Indeed, until recently, the ”. . .  Federal Government had no
role or authority in management of living marine resources,
72except under laws implementing international agreements."
There have been some exceptions, as exampled by the " . . .  
modest successes in management of halibut, some Pacific sal­
mon stocks and tentatively, at least, eastern Pacific tuna 
73stocks." The fact remains that even with the enactment of 
the 200-mile American fishery conservation zone, the ". . .Sec­
retary of Commerce has authority to enforce regulations only 
for stocks of fish harvested outside three miles. . . .
The 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act " . . .  left 
essentially unchanged the authority of the coastal States 
to regulate fisheries within the territorial sea. Inland
waters, such as Chesapeake Bay and Puget Sound, are not
75covered by the Act."
Before assessing the fisheries policies and processes 
occurring in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s,
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several comments about America and its people might act as a 
conclusion for the FiNS second level of analysis. At the 
center of America's drive toward post-industrialism is the 
problem of economic productivity. Compared with other indus­
trial powers; the United States is ". . . now ranked extremely 
low in economic growth. And the continuation of this trend 
of meager economic growth into the future could threaten the 
nation's well-being quite fundamentally. It seems likely that 
only growth and the corresponding expansion of job opportun­
ities can over the long haul significantly enhance the earn­
ing power of women, as well as blacks and other minority 
76groups." Recently, it has been asserted that the major deci­
sions in the American " . . .  economy are now or will soon be­
come explicitly political; democracy, therefore, cannot stand 
still. If it is to survive, it must be extended to the 
economy.« 77
For America's fishing community and other groups in 
this pluralistic society, profound questions still remain.
"One of the great obstacles to democracy in America is the 
sheer size of the nation and of its government and corporate 
institutions. . . .  As the society grows larger, the indi­
vidual shrinks— in influence, power, liberty, and the capacity
for shaping the decisions which affect the life of the 
78individual." And yet, American questing for individualism 
continues. America, just as Hutchison’s Canada, is search­
ing for an identity full of doubts and hopes and dreams.
In order to avoid a sense of powerlessness, Americans,
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" . . .  whether leaders of followers, have much to work for
and great talents to bring to bear in coping with new 
79challenges." Amidst energy shortages, environmental con-
80cerns, the weakening of the dollar, social inequities, and 
rejection of United States initiatives in international 
affairs, Americans could throw up their hands in despair. 
Given their capacity to respond to crises, their sense of 
political efficacy, their ability to reach political com­
promises and maintain a stable polity, Americans will not 
keep their hands in the air for very long.
Changes in American Fisheries 
Policies (1960-1977)
It should be noted at the outset that significant 
changes in American fisheries policies were occurring during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Having chronicled United States UN Law 
of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) and regional fisheries 
commissions initiatives and activities in chapter 3, what 
unilateral fisheries actions were taken by the United States 
during that same time period? This section of the analysis 
will examine three pieces of major fisheries legislation that 
passed the United States Congress in 1964, 1966, and 1976. 
Once these three major fisheries policies have been examined, 
it will be possible to scrutinize the American fisheries 
decision-making process and note the important policy influ­
encera involved in pressuring for those policies.
When the Canadian Parliament passed the Territorial 
Sea and Fishing Zone Act in July of 1964, it was activating
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. a nine mile fishing zone beyond Canada's three mile
territorial sea and empowering the Government to draw straight
baselines in place of the sinuosities of the coast as the
starting point for measuring the breadth of the territorial
sea and fishing zones. The area landward of these baselines
81would become internal waters." The U.S. State Department
issued statements against the Canadian fisheries extension and
maintained support for the May 20, 1964 act of Congress which
clearly prohibited foreign fishing vessels from operating in
American territorial waters except as provided for in an
82international agreement or by special authorization. The 
Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels Act called for joint 
enforcement responsibilities by the Secretaries of Commerce, 
Treasury and " . . .  Department in which the Coast Guard is 
operating, and each other Federal department or agency to 
carry out such enforcement."^^ The 1964 Congressional enact­
ment even provided $5,000 maximum compensation as a "reward
to informers" who reported any violation of the Foreign Fish-
84ing Vessels Act.
Domestic American pressures to create a fishing zone 
beyond the territorial sea intensified after 1964, and two 
years later. Congress passed the Fisheries Zone Contiguous 
to Territorial Sea of United States Act. The Act provided 
a fisheries zone which had ". . .as its inner boundary the 
outer limits of the territorial sea and as its seaward bound­
ary a line drawn so that each point.on the line is nine
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nautical miles from the nearest point in the inner boundary.
Following the Canadian example, the breadth of the American
fishing zone was declared to be nine nautical miles beyond
the territorial sea; however, the congressional legislation
. . made no provision for replacing the contours of the
coast with straight baselines and this soon became a cause
of friction between the two governments. While reciprocal
fishing rights were provided for nationals of both nations
in [the] exclusive fishing zones, areas of internal waters
were quite different— taking on the status of full coastal
86state sovereignty."
Howard Nickerson, Executive Director of the New England 
Fisheries Steering Committee, suggested that ". . . 1970 
seemed to be a turning point when the House and Senate, as 
well as the U.S. public began to take interest in fisheries 
a f f a i r s . A s  noted in the previous chapter, Canada had 
detailed plans for the establishment of a 12-mile territor­
ial sea and creation of new fisheries closing lines in April 
of 1970. Reacting to the Canadian claims, President Richard 
Nixon, on May 23, 1970, ". , . called for coastal State 
renunciation of claims to seabed resources beyond the depth 
of 200 meters and for the establishment beyond this point of 
an international regime to govern seabed resource exploita­
tion. . . , The intent of this policy . . . was to forestall 
further unilateral extensions of jurisdiction."®®
While Nixon was trying to discourage further exten­
sions of contiguous zones. Congress was adding amendments to
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the 1964 Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in Territorial 
Waters of the United States Act. The October 27, 1970, 
amendments increased maximum fines for foreign fishing vessels 
from $10,000 to $100,000 and indicated that fish found aboard 
a seized vessel were presumed to be taken in violation of the 
1964 Act.99
As assessed in chapter 3, the decade of the 1970s 
was to become the time of numerous UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III) sessions and negotiations. While the Canadian and Amer­
ican governments were helping shape the 200-mile exclusive
90economic zone concept at UNCLOS III, the United States
Congress and fisheries interest groups were not sitting idly
by at home. Fishing had once been " . . .  the foremost indus-
91try of the United States," but by the 1970s, American had
slipped from first to fourth place among fishing nations of
the world. While the State Department argued for more time
92to finalize a multilateral treaty at UNCLOS III, a variety
of fisheries bills flooded the halls of Congress. U.S. 
coastal fishermen favored an immediate 200-mile fishing zone 
for the United States, while the salmon, tuna, and shrimp 
segments of the U.S. fishing industry opposed a 200-mile 
zone. Divided in their goals and policy stances, the Amer­
ican fishing industry collectively encouraged Congress to 
consider the plight of America's fishermen.
The United States Senate passed ". . . a 200-mile 
extension bill (S. 1988] on December 11, 1974 by a vote of
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68 to 27. This legislation was designed to extend the U.S. 
contiguous fisheries zone to 200 nautical miles (including 
the territorial sea) and give the U.S. management authority 
over salmon spawning in U.S. rivers throughout their migra-
0 - 3tory range." The Senate bill (S. 1988) did not pass the 
93rd Congress, and it was left to the next Congress to com­
bine numerous fisheries bills into an agreeable legislative 
enactment during 1975. Under the direction of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and with the strong 
support of Senator Warren Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate's 
Committee on Commerce, H.R. 200 became the vehicle for 
America's unilateral creation of a 200-mile fisheries zone.
On April 13, 1976, Congress passed the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (H.R. 200)— and the United States entered 
a new era of fisheries politics.
A member of the U.S. State Department's Ocean Affairs 
Advisory Committee set forth the thoughts of many fisheries 
experts. "I am convinced that the passage of the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 was one of the most 
significant pieces of legislation to be passed by our Congress 
in several decades. It has the potential to not only allow 
an orderly development of the U.S. coastal fishing industry 
to double its present size, but more importantly provides
the mechanism to conserve and manage these resources for
94future generations." While the fisheries decision-making 
process established by the 1976 Act will be clearly detailed
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in the next section of this chapter, it should be noted at 
this point that strong feelings existed on both sides of 
the 200-mile unilateral extension.
One way to sense the high emotions that went into 
the shaping of the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (FCMA) would be to cite the comments three U.S. Senators 
made during the "Senate Debate and Passage of H.R. 200 
(S. 961)." On January 28, 1976, Senator Ted Kennedy noted 
that
. . . the Senate today has the opportunity to act on 
the most important conservation bill affecting our 
coastal resources— the extension of our fishing zone 
to 200 miles. . . .  It is important . . . that we 
all understand what is at stake, both for the quan­
tities of fish off our shore and for our fishing 
industry, if we fail to find a way to manage and 
protect our fish resources. . . . While these stocks 
continue to be depleted, the number of foreign vessels 
off our coasts increases each year, and the American 
fishing industry continues to decline. . . . Time is 
running out for the 25 percent of the world's pro­
tein resources that lie within 200 miles of our 
coast. Technology has given us the means to fish 
these stocks to extinction.95
Senator Gravel of Alaska, a critic of H.R. 200,
asserted: "I am for the 200-mile zone that will not cost
billions of dollars in the defense budget to enforce. I am
for a 200-mile zone that will be a consensus agreement in the
world, where it will cost but a pittance to enforce, because
96it will be agreed to by consensus." Gravel concluded that 
proponents of the bill " . . .  want unilateral, total control
of the 200-mile ribbon around this Nation so that they can
exclude all foreign fishing. I submit that they will not be
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morally tolerated by this great Nation of ours, nor will it
97be tolerated in the world today," Replying to Gravel's 
assertion. Senator Muskie of Maine said: "I think the issues
have been laid out yesterday and this morning by the dis­
tinguished Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kennedy]. As I 
listened to the closing remarks of the Senator from Alaska 
I have not heard a more serious misdescription of the pur­
pose of the pending bill and the purposes of the sponsors of
98this bill than the Senator from Alaska has just stated."
Exactly what had been stipulated in the 1976 FCMA?
Among the major purposes cited in the Act, the first men­
tioned was that the legislation would provide for " . . .  
immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources 
found off the coasts of the United States, and the anadromous 
species and Continental Shelf fishery resources of the United 
States, by establishing (A) a fishery conservation zone within 
which the United States will assume exclusive fishery manage­
ment authority over all fish, except highly migratory species, 
and (B) exclusive fishery management authority beyond such
zone over such anadromous species and Continental Shelf fishery
99resources; . . . "  Another purpose of the Act was " . . .  to 
support and encourage the implementation and enforcement of 
international fishery agreements for the conservation and man­
agement of highly migratory species, and to encourage the 
negotiation and implementation of additional such agreements 
as necessary; . . .
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The Act also called for the preparation of fishery 
management plans that would achieve and maintain an optimum 
yield from each fishery. One of the most interesting pur­
poses of the Act was . .to establish Regional Fishery 
Management Councils to prepare, monitor, and revise such plans 
under circumstances (A) which will enable the States, the 
fishing industry, consumer and environmental organizations 
and other interested persons to participate in, and advise on, 
the establishment and administration of such plans, and 
(B) which take into account the social and economic needs of 
the States; . . . .
The FCMA clearly declared: "There is established a
zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States 
to be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner 
boundary of the fishery conservation zone is a line cotermi­
nous with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States, 
and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such
a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the
102baseline from which the territorial sea is measured." The 
Act listed standards for fishery conservation and management 
established regional fishery management councils, detailed pro­
hibited fishing acts, and cited penalties and enforcement 
measures for violation of any provisions in the Act.
Before detailing America's fisheries decision-making 
process and enumerating additional aspects of the 1976 FCMA 
in the next section of this chapter, several concluding thoughts
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on United States fisheries polices for the 1960-1977 period 
should be set forth. President Gerald Ford, upon signing 
H.R, 200 into law, mentioned both the hopes and concerns he 
had in unilaterally creating a 200-mile fishing zone, "The 
extension of our jurisdiction to 200 miles will enable us to 
protect and conserve the valuable fisheries off our coasts.
It is indeed unfortunate that the slow pace of the negotia­
tions of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has 
mandated our course of action here t o d a y , H e  continued: 
"The bill I sign today is generally consistent with the con­
sensus emerging at the Conference, It is increasingly appar­
ent that a failure to reach substantive agreement this year 
will move the world community inevitably toward disorder 
respecting competing use of the oceans,
It would appear that the United States, like Canada, 
helped justify their unilateral 200-mile extension on the basis 
of the "emerging consensus" at UNCLOS III. It might also be 
noted that throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many of the United 
States fisheries policies were emulative of those formulated 
in Canada. As will be detailed in the remainder of this 
chapter, a third powerful pressure which helped determine 
contemporary U.S. fisheries policies came from the swelling 
crescendo of interest groups and policy influencera primar­
ily located in the coastal regions of the United States.
Once the 200-mile U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone went 
into effect on March 1, 1977, the earlier fishery acts of
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May 20, 1964 and October 14,1966 were automatically repealed. 
America entered a new fisheries era, and the initial euphoria 
of American fishermen was to quickly turn to cries of anguish 
as both domestic regulations and international fishery agree­
ment problems limited the fishermen's expected benefits. 
Chapter 6 will explore the 1977-1979 period, and assess the 
specific fishery problems which the United States encountered 
with its northern neighbor, Canada. In a way. President Ford 
had warned of the potential problems that might occur when 
America's 200-mile zone went into effect.
The tasks of continuing our negotiating efforts at 
the Law of the Sea Conference and at the same time 
establishing new fishery plans, issuing hundreds 
of new fishing permits and negotiating specific 
fishery agreements with foreign governments will 
require substantial resources in excess of those 
presently allocated to international fisheries 
affairs. . . . Absent affirmative action, the sub­
ject bill [H.R. 200] could raise serious impediments 
for the United States in meeting its obligations 
under existing treaty and agreement obligations;
. . . ."107
The potential benefits of the new 200-mile fishery zone were 
to be great, but so, too, were the problems encountered in 
attempting to implement the unilateral zonal extension.
The Fisheries Decision-Making Process 
and Important American Fisheries 
Policy Influencers
It has been suggested that since ". . , 1970, law
of the sea policy in the United States has been the product
of intensive negotiations among evenly matched opposing
domestic and bureaucratic interests. Once agreed upon.
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portions of U.S. policy are reopened or altered with utmost 
d i f f i c u l t y . I t  would be useful to first detail the 
formal apparatus established to make American oceanic fish­
eries policies and then assess which pressures brought by 
specific public and private individuals and groups have sig­
nificantly influenced the direction of contemporary fisher­
ies enactments.
Several factors should be stressed at the outset. 
First, there has never been a U.S. Department of Fisheries 
although many in the fishing industry wish that such a depart­
ment did exist. Howard Nickerson recently pointed out: "The
United States will never be recognized as a world power in 
fisheries until there is a U.S. Department of Fisheries with 
a cabinet level secretary of its own. Other fishery nations 
cannot understand why fisheries is not at a cabinet level.
The problem is, therefore, that their top fishery and politi­
cal people do not and cannot as a matter of pride, face, or
on a political level, meet and negotiate with our lower level
109fishery State Department or government representatives."
In place of one centralized department, many national 
and regional groups, departments, and agencies have inputs 
into the making of U.S. national fisheries policy. Harold E. 
Lokken, Director of the Pacific Fisheries Foundation, 
believes that ". . . of the major ones, there are the legis­
latures and fisheries departments of the coastal states, the 
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, the
240
Marine Fishery Advisory Committee of the Department of 
Commerce, the regional councils, the regional commissions, 
the Advisory Committee [Fisheries Section] of the State 
Department, the Law of the Sea Advisory Committee as well 
as a number of o t h e r s . L o k k e n  adds, "The inputs of 
these groups are focused eventually on a central point which 
is the administration in Washington, D.C. where many of the 
final decisions are made. This is as it should be as the 
alternative would be a myriad of policies, many of them 
representing regional or local viewpoints, which would in 
many cases be conflicting with the overall national 
interest.
Since 1970, the locus of oceanic fisheries policy 
making has been in the Commerce Department, and, whenever 
international agreements and boundary disputes are being 
negotiated, in the Department of State. On July 9, 1970, 
President Richard Nixon transmitted to Congress his Reorgani­
zation Plan Number Four. Part of the Plan called for the 
establishment of a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis­
tration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. NOAA was to 
assume most of the oceanic fisheries activities that had 
previously been handled by the Department of the Interior. 
Nixon's message to Congress noted that all functions vested 
by law in the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Depart­
ment of the Interior should be transferred to the Department 
of Commerce. "Those fishery activités of the Department of
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the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which are ocean 
related and those which are directed toward commerical fish­
ing would be transferred. The Fish and Wildlife Service's 
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries has the dual function of 
strengthening the fishing industry and promoting conservation 
of fishery stocks. It conducts research on important marine 
species and on fundamental oceanography, and operates a fleet
of oceanographic vessels and a number of laboratories. Most
112of its activities would be transferred." Moreover, the 
marine sport fishing program from Interior's Bureau of Sport 
Fisheries as well as the National Science Foundation's Office 
of Sea Grant Programs had to be shifted to the Commerce Depart­
ment. The latter office, has, since 1966 been charged with 
assisting the academic and industrial communities in devel­
oping marine resources and technology.
Not all fisheries activities have been shifted to the 
Commerce Department. The Interior Department still maintains 
an important role in fisheries conservation and management 
in the internal waters of America and on all public lands.
While the Interior Department's internal fisheries activities 
are not within the scope of this dissertation, it is important 
to note the Department's involvement and interest in American 
fisheries. Through congressional enactments, the Secretary 
of the Interior is still charged " . . .  with such advice 
and assistance as he may require from the Assistant Secretary 
for Fish and Wildlife, [to] consider and determine the
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policies and procedures that are necessary and desirable 
in carrying out efficiently and in the public interest the 
laws relating to fish and w i l d l i f e , M o r e o v e r ,  there is 
to be a law enforcement cooperative agreement under which 
both
. . . the Secretary of the Interior and the Secre­
tary of Commerce may each utilize by agreement, with 
or without reimbursement, the personnel, services 
and facilities of any other Federal or State agency 
to the extent he deems it necessary and appropriate 
for effective enforcement of any Federal or States 
laws on lands, waters or interests therein under 
the jurisdiction which are administered or managed 
for fish and wildlife purposes and for enforcement 
of any laws administered by him relating to fish and wildlife.114
Regarding oceanic fisheries, it is the Commerce and 
State Departments which should receive most of the attention 
as policy decision makers. Within the Commerce Department's 
NOAA, one will find the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), the Office of Sea Grant, and a number of influential 
regional councils, commissions, and development foundations. 
In particular, it is accurate to point out that the " . . .  
NMFS role in fisheries development is catalytic in nature. 
NMFS brings together people from industry, the States, and 
other Federal agencies so that a broad range of resources 
and talents can be brought to bear on developing our fisher­
ies potential. Importantly, the NMFS is
. . .  to monitor and assess the abundance and geo­
graphic distribution of fishery resources, to under­
stand and predict fluctuations in the quantity and 
distribution of these resources, and to establish 
levels for optimum use of the resources. NMFS is 
also charged with the development and implementation
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of policies for managing national fishing grounds, 
development and enforcement of domestic fisheries 
regulations, surveillance of foreign fishing off 
United States coastal waters, and the development 
and enforcement of international fishery agreements and policies.116
While agencies of the Commerce Department are now involved 
in international fisheries agreements, it should not be for­
gotten that the U.S. Department of State has logically con­
ducted most American fisheries diplomacy— as documented in 
the second chapter of this dissertation.
No clearer example of the linkage between the Commerce 
and State Departments' fisheries jurisdictions can be provided 
than to assess the decision-making apparatus established in 
the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act. In Title II 
of the Act, jurisdictional provisions were established for 
the making of foreign fishing and international fishery agree­
ments while Title III stipulated who the primary actors should 
be in developing a national fishery management program for 
oceanic fisheries in America's new 200-mile fishing zone. 
Analyzing Title II of the 1976 Act, one discovers that the 
Secretary of State ". . . i n  cooperation with the Secretary 
[of Commerce], shall initiate, promptly after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the renegotiation of any treaty which 
pertains to fishing within the fishery conservation zone, or
for anadromous species of Continental Shelf fishery resources
117beyond such zone or area, . . . ." Very importantly for 
Canadian-American relations, the Act stipulates that: "The
Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary [of
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Commerce], may initiate and conduct negotiations with any 
adjacent or opposite foreign nation to establish the bound­
aries of the fishery conservation zone of the United States
118in relation to any such nation."
Regarding foreign fishing in the 200-mile American 
fishery zone, permits to fish in the area are to be issued 
by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secre­
tary of State and " . . .  the Secretary of the department in
119which the Coast Guard is operating . . .  on a yearly 
basis. Moreover, the total allowable level of foreign fish­
ing, if any, " . . .  with respect to any fishery subject to 
the exclusive fishery management authority of the United 
States, shall be that portion of the optimum yield of such
fishery which will not be harvested by vessels of the United 
120States. . . . "  It is up to the Secretary of State, in 
cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce, to ". . . deter­
mine the allocation among foreign nations of the total allow­
able level of foreign fishing which is permitted with respect
to any fishery subject to the exclusive fishery management
121authority of the United States." Finally, foreign nations
and the owners or operators of any foreign fishing vessels
operating in the 200-mile American fishery zone must permit
authorized United States observers to board their vessels
122and search or inspect them for fishing violations. Fines 
of up to $100,000 or imprisonment for one year or both can 
be given to owners or operators of vessels which do not have 
valid fishing permits. Individual vessels can be fined up
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to $25,000 a day for any violation of the 1976 Act— especially 
for attempts ". . . t o  ship, transport, offer for sale, sell, 
purchase, import, export, or have custody, control, or pos­
session of, any fish taken or retained in violation of the 
123Act. . . ." All of the provisions of the Act are to be 
enforced by the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Coast 
Guard.
How have all these fishery policy-making provisions 
been perceived by fishery experts? Howard Nickerson, who for 
almost two decades acted as America's industry advisors com­
mittee chairman for the International Commission for the North­
west Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) has detailed this insightful 
perspective of American fisheries relations with Canada.
The State Department makes the administration policy 
regardless of whether the President is a Democrat 
or Republican. I have seen no difference since I 
got involved in 1958 regardless of which party is 
sitting in the White House. Likewise, until lately,
I have seen little interest in the U.S. House or 
Senate as it regarded fisheries negotiations and 
treaties. . . . Because of the Fisheries Conserva­
tion and Management Act of 1976 I look forward to 
an increased interest on the part of all concerned in [American] fisheries.124
Nickerson concludes: "I am very optimistic for the fisheries 
future of the United States because of the FCMA and the 
Regional Management Councils. There are going to be problems, 
disappointments and, worse, there are going to be many dif­
ferences of opinion and some could be quite serious, but that
is the only way we are going to get our act together and con-
125serve and manage a public resource."
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In part, Nickerson's optimism appears to be based on
Title III of the FCMA, which encourages the development of
fishery management plans by the Secretary of Commerce and
regional fishery management councils. Eight Regional Fish-
126ery Management Councils have been established. Three of
these Councils are most directly involved with U.S.-Canada
fisheries concerns. The New England Council, consisting of
the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut, has authority over the fisheries in
the Atlantic Ocean seaward of those states and consists of
seventeen voting members. The Pacific Council, composed of
thirteen voting members from California, Oregon, Washington,
and Idaho, has authority over the fisheries in the Pacific
Ocean seaward of such states; the North Pacific Council,
composed of the states of Alaska, Washington, and Oregon,
has authority over the fisheries in the Arctic Océan, Bering
127Sea, and Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska. Voting member­
ship on each of these councils is composed of the principal 
state official with marine fishery management responsibility 
in each constituent state, the regional director of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service, and individuals appointed 
by the Secretary of Commerce from lists (of qualified fish­
ery experts) submitted by the Governor of each constituent 
state. All Council members serve a three-year term. Among 
the nonvoting Council members are the regional directors of 
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, commanders of
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Coast Guard districts, and one representative of the Department 
of State.
As previously indicated, the Regional Councils are
to prepare, monitor, and revise fishery management plans for
their area which will promote an optimum yield from each 
128fishery. When the Secretary of Commerce receives the 
management plans or amendments to any such plans, the Council 
must be notified in writing of the Secretary's approval, dis­
approval, or partial disapproval of such a plan or amendment.
If the Secretary of Commerce disapproves in any way with a 
regional fishery management plan or amendment, and the Coun­
cil involved fails to satisfactorily change such plan, then 
the Secretary of Commerce may prepare another fishery manage­
ment plan. In ". . . preparing any such plan, the Secretary 
[of Commerce] shall consult with the Secretary of State with 
respect to foreign fishing and with the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating with respect
129to enforcement at sea." It should also be noted that 
neither the regional fishery management plans nor any other 
provisions of the FCMA " . . .  shall be construed as extending 
or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State 
within its boundaries. No State may directly or indirectly 
regulate any fishing which is engaged in by any fishing 
vessel outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is registered 
under the laws of such State.
While the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act (FCMA) did attempt to "open up" and strengthen the oceanic
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fishery decision-making process, some fisheries experts 
believe that the decision-making apparatus is too highly 
centralized. Expressing a personal opinion, Jim Branson, 
Executive Director of the North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council (one of the Commerce Department's eight new regional 
bodies), suggests that ". . . U.S. fisheries policy has been 
too highly centralized and to a certain extent, still is, 
although inputs from groups and individuals are increasing 
and the processing has improved considerably in the last two 
or three years. The Marine Fisheries Commissions, Fishery 
Management Councils, and various organized industry groups, 
both catching and processing, are having an increasing im­
pact upon national fisheries policy, although there is still 
a tendency to develop policy in a closed system and then put
it out for acceptance by the fishing public. Comment at that
131stage is not always utilized in the best fashion possible."
Third Level of Analysis 
Just who is the "fishing public" and which policy 
influencers are the most involved in pressuring for new Amer­
ican fisheries policies and programs? Following the FiNS 
third or decision-making level of analysis, the policy influ­
encers of an open polity might be divided into different cate­
gories: partisan, mass, bureaucratic, and interest. If
partisan influencers are activists in political parties who 
seek to influence policy by pressuring those in power and 
supplying personnel for decision-making roles, what can be
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said about their impact on fisheries policies during the 
1960s and 1970s? In concise fashion, it could be asserted 
that partisan fishery influence has not been very great.
There are a variety of reasons why American political party 
activists have had a limited pressuring role. Keeping in 
mind the FiNS second level assessment of the American polity, 
it should be noted that political parties have remained un­
disciplined, mass-based, nonideological entities. The 
national party spokesmen and organizations have not taken 
any meaningful stands on American fisheries policies; it is 
a case of every party activist and local group for themselves. 
Moreover, in economic and social terms, the plight of Ameri­
can fishermen and the fishing industry is not considered a 
major national concern. It is a coastal issue, a regional 
dilemma which the Republicans and Democrats have given little 
attention to in national party meetings, debates, and elec­
tion campaigns.
The greatest partisan input for new fisheries policies 
has been in Congress. Viewing members of Congress as those 
partisans who have carried the electoral banner of the party 
into public office, individual Democrats and Republicans have 
been able to advance fisheries concerns— especially the desire 
for a 200-mile coastal fishing zone. Almost cynically, it 
has been pointed out that the " . . .  foreign fisherman has 
no votes and has served, therefore, as a convenient stimulus 
for congressional action to extend U.S. fisheries 
jurisdiction.
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During the 1970s, as previously detailed. Congress
did become more actively interested in oceanic fisheries
legislation. Special credit should be given to partisans
in the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and
Senate Committee on Commerce for strongly supporting the
demands of the American fishermen. If one had to choose a
person that acted as an efficient leader of partisan support
for a 200-mile fishery zone, it would be the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Commerce— Warren Magnuson. Moreover,
in terms of the coordination of U.S.-Canada fisheries policies,
especially on the west coast. Pacific Fisheries Foundation
Director Harold Lokken cites the importance of ". . . Senator
Warren Magnuson in particular and other coastal senators and
133congressmen in general." Overall, as the Lokken comment 
suggests, partisan policy influencers reside almost entirely 
in the coastal states.
What has been noted about partisan influencers could 
also be applied to the mass influencer or public opinion in 
general. Recalling the William Coplin comment that the mass 
influencer refers to ". , . the climate of opinion shared by 
a population that decision makers consider in making foreign 
p o l i c y , o n e  must admit that the American public has 
demonstrated little interest or concern in its oceanic fish­
ing industry. In the public's view, "... , the fisherman 
continues to occupy a special social and cultural role in 
this country. The lone fisherman exemplifies a way of life.
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much as the small farmer once did, in American history.
While the nation's farming has become a large-scale opera­
tion, the same transition has not occurred in most segments
135of the U.S. fishing industry." Thus, while the American
public is supportive of the lone fisherman against the sea, 
it rarely considers the problems and plight of the overall 
fishing industry.
Certainly there are important mass policy influencers; 
the coastal newspapers and local journalists have acted as 
opinion leaders in their geographic areas. Still, the 
national media rarely assesses the American fishermen and 
their needs. When the fisheries conflicts occurred be­
tween the United States and Canada (during 1977-78), the
national media treated the episode as a curiosity, rather
137than a matter of national concern. Commercial fishing
was and is a peripheral issue for most of the American public.
Mass influencers, just as partisan influencers,are thus
located in the coastal regions of the United States. Perhaps
only the increasing cost of sea food, and expanding American
138appetite for crustaceans, mollusks, and fish will even­
tually encourage the populace at large to take a greater 
interest in U.S. fisheries concerns; the consumer, as mass 
influencer, can yet become a potent force in the cry for 
greater protection and support for the domestic fishing 
industry.
As indicated at the outset of this section, law of 
the sea policies in the United States bear the heavy imprint
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of pressuring efforts by often competing bureaucratic and
139interest policy influencers. Viewing bureaucratic policy 
influencers as those individuals and organizations within 
the executive branch of government that aid the decision 
maker in making and executing policies, there has been much 
struggling among bureaucrats in the Departments of Commerce, 
State, Defense, and, to a lesser extent. Interior, Agricul­
ture, and Treasury over fisheries policies and related 
oceanic problems. Within the State, Defense, and Interior 
Departments, " . . .  separate staffs for continental shelf 
and seabed issues on the one hand, and straits, territorial 
seas, and fisheries on the other, were merged. A central 
policy body, the Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force, was 
officially established in February, 1970. . . The
Inter-Agency LOS Task Force, in addition to the major de­
partments cited, includes other interested federal agencies 
and bureaus: " . . .  the National Security Council; the
National Science Foundation, the Central Intelligence Agency; 
the Office of Management and Budget; the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the 
Council on Environmental Quality.
While international fisheries concerns are thus 
coordinated with other law of the sea issues by bureaucrats 
within the Inter-Agency Task Force, major fisheries policies 
are still shaped primarily by civil servants in the Commerce 
and State Departments. It is important to recall that the
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, . creation of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration in the Commerce Department in 1970 has seen 
the transfer of Interior's Bureau of Commercial Fisheries 
to NCAA's National Marine Fisheries Service. No longer hav­
ing to compete with petroleum interests for the attention 
of top officials in Interior, fisheries interests were able
to play a larger role in LOS fisheries policy with the help
1 à?
of NOAA officials."
There are some experts, such as Lucy Sloan, Executive 
Director of the National Federation of Fishermen, who do not 
think that bureaucratic interests in NOAA are capable of per­
ceiving or supporting the needs of American fishermen. "We're 
food producers, . . . .Putting us under Oceanic (NOAA), a 
science dominated agency where the fish is an object of 
scientific curiosity and fishermen unwanted perturbators, is 
like putting farmers under the Department of Interior because 
wheat is grown on land. We're the only major fishing country 
in the world that has no ministry for agriculture and fish­
eries or one just for fisheries.
To calm the concerns expressed by Lucy Sloan and other 
fishermen's representatives, Terry Leitzell, a young State 
Department attorney, has been selected by the Commerce De­
partment to help coordinate the new fisheries policies spawned 
by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. As 
the ". . . czar of U.S. fisheries . . ., Leitzell candidly 
admits that the problems created by the law are extremely com­
plex, and in some cases, nowhere near solution. . . .  He says
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he knows that the scientists in Commerce are not believed
144by the fishermen." It will be up to Leitzell and other
Commerce Department administrators to bring together all the 
bureaucratic policy influencers in the National Marine Fish­
eries Service, the Office of Sea Grant, and related agencies, 
so that unified fisheries policies can be formulated for the 
fishermen interested in utilizing America's 200-mile fishing 
zone. Leitzell contends he is doing what fishermen have been 
pleading for since " . . .  the 200-mile law took effect—  
sending government biologists out on actual fishing boats
to check stocks and 'to spend more time on the docks' with
145the fishermen."
The eight Regional Fishery Management Councils have 
definitely become vital bureaucratic policy influencers with­
in the Commerce Department. Actually the Councils combine 
the perspectives of bureaucratic and interest policy influ­
encers, since the voting membership of each Council is com­
posed of civil servants and private citizens representing all 
facets of the American fishery public. Harold Lokken, an 
important fisheries policy influencer as director of the 
Pacific Fisheries Foundation, believes that;
Problems in the 200 mile zone will depend on how well 
our political system works, primarily from the stand­
point of the competence and qualifications of those 
appointed to the regional councils. The councils 
need knowledgeable and dedicated individuals who 
will place the national interest above those of a 
region or industry. It will depend also on the ex­
tent to which the administration in Washington,
D.C. will accept the judgments of the regional coun­
cils given the assumption, of course, that the
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judgments conform to the standards in the 200 mile 
law. The present mechanism is adequate but it takes 
competent people from bottom to top to see that 
it operates properly and achieves as far as pos­
sible the goal of assuring permanence of themarine resources.146
As detailed in the 1976 FCMA, whenever new fisheries 
agreements or boundary disputes need to be negotiated, the 
Department of State supplies the primary decision makers for 
the deliberations. Chapter 6 will demonstrate how officials 
in the State Department have been actively involved in working 
on new east and west coast fisheries/boundary agreements with 
Canada. At this point, it should be noted that policy influ­
encers in the State Department are located in many different 
bureaus and offices; however, for the recent U.S.-Canada 
fisheries negotiations. Foreign Service Officer Douglas Mar­
shall has acted as the Department of State staff coordinator. 
Many of the bureaucratic influencers in the Department of 
State have funneled their inputs through his office. Addi­
tionally, the Office of Canadian Affairs as well as the Office 
of Fisheries within the Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs are two key sources of 
bureaucratic influencers in the State Department, Special 
mention should be made of the policy influence exerted by 
Dr, James Storer, the Director of the State Department's 
Office of Fisheries Affairs, Dr, Storer has acted as a cen­
tral figure in the renegotiation of many United States fish­
eries agreements since the 200-mile American fishing zone
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became a reality. One final point should be made about State 
Department fisheries decision makers. Since there are no 
Assistant Secretaries or many high-ranking administrators in­
volved in fisheries matters, it has often been necessary to 
select "special negotiators" such as Lloyd Cutler when fish­
eries agreements are to be finalized with Canada or other 
fishing nations. This aspect of the fisheries decision-making 
process will be amply demonstrated in the next chapter.
What about the fourth type of policy influencer in­
volved in the shaping of U.S. fisheries policies— the interest 
influencer? Viewing interest influencers as those individuals 
tied together by a common set of interests, most of the pres­
suring activities involved in the shaping of new American 
fisheries policies are logically coming from the U.S. fishing 
industry. It is very important to understand that the U.S. 
fishing industry is.not a singular, cohesive pressuring force. 
Apart from a common goal of producing and marketing seafood, 
the American fishing " . . .  industry is highly fragmented.
It is divided into producing and processing segments, but 
more important from a law of the sea point of view is the 
division of industry according to location of fishing effort 
and species h a r v e s t e d . J a c o b  Dykstra of the Point Judith 
Fishermen's Cooperative Association has provided a short 
satiric primer on the legal and political problems of the 
U.S. fishing industry.
What are the issues in fisheries? Five issues: full
utilization, migratory species, anadromous species, 
enforcement, and dispute settlement. Let me translate
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those for you. Full utilization means let's try 
to do something for the shrimp people. Migratory 
means let's try to do something for the tuna people. 
Anadromous means let's try to do something for the 
salmon people. Enforcement means let's get some 
rules so that we can really clobber the distant 
water people if they give us a hard time on our 
shelf. And dispute settlement means let's have 
some rules so that if they clobber our boys on 
somebody else's shelf, we can stop it.148
As this dissertation pertains to Canadian-American 
fisheries relations, the interest influencers cited in the 
next chapter will be groups primarily interested in the East 
and West coast fisheries. Arthur Frohman, a major American 
broker and importer of seafoods, as well as a member of the 
State Department's Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, reiter­
ates the fact that after implementation of the 1976 Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, " . . .  more individuals and 
groups have become integrated into the [fisheries decision­
making] process. The [regional] mapagement councils are not 
yet functioning efficiently, and it is primarily because of 
the many conflicting interests. The fisheries of the United 
States are just that— plural. We do not have a fishery 
but many fisheries, such as the Pacific Coast with its range 
of species, the Gulf Coast with its finfish and shellfish,
and the East Coast with its industrial fish production for
149oil and meal as well as finfish."
Even though the U.S. fishing industry is divided into 
often conflicting interests, the lobbying efforts of all Amer­
ican fishing groups are very active. A number of fisheries
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scholars and oceanic researchers suggest that " . . .  
politically, the fishing interest is p o w e r f u l . L o b b y ­
ing efforts with state legislators, members of Congress, 
administrators in the Commerce and State Departments and 
other executive agencies are being conducted by dozens of 
regional and national fishermen's associations, unions, and 
cooperatives. Food processors associations, fisheries insti­
tutes, fishing vessel owners associations and a multitude of 
other voices within the U.S. fishing industry^^^ are direct­
ing their concerns toward Washington, D.C.
The vociferous lobbying efforts of all of these U.S. 
fishing groups should act as striking examples of American 
pluralism in action. Many who are involved in the process 
as interest policy influencers suspect that a bit of the 
power elite philosophy is also at work. Howard Nickerson 
represents the attitude of many in the U.S. fishing industry 
when he asserts that
. . .  the making of U.S. fisheries policies is too 
highly centralized. It is at present and most always 
has been in the hands of too few who have used fish­
eries as a U.S. tradeoff to stimulate or make pos-. 
sible benefits having nothing to do with fisheries 
or its economics and benefits to the fishing indus­
try itself. People knowledgeable of the fishing 
industry and its economics through actual fishing 
industry expertise acquired by actual employment or 
financial participation as operators never, in my 
opinion, sit in a decision-making role. Advisors, 
yes, as participants, but if the adviOe is not 
acceptable to the policy makers or negotiators, of 
what value or substance is_it to the negotiations 
or the policy developed?"
Nickerson's views are supported by National Science 
Foundation research which assessed U.S. fisheries policy
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statements of the early 1970s. "In effect, the U.S. fisheries 
position in 1970 was designed to meet the concerns of other 
nations for the purpose of facilitating an international 
agreement on straits. The reasons for the lack of any indus­
try input into fisheries policy were twofold. In the first 
place, fishing interests were simply not aware that discus­
sions affecting their interests had been underway within the 
U.S. Government and with other governments. Secondly, the 
differences between various segments of the industry made a 
policy input difficult."
An additional comment should be made about fisheries 
interest policy influencers. The interest groups involved in 
fisheries pressuring activities, in size, number, and finan- 
ial support, have come primarily from the U.S. fishing indus­
try. However, other interest groups have been active in 
certain geographic areas and in relation to certain species 
of marine mammals and fish. In the Pacific Northwest, for 
example, a number of Indian groups have argued for restoration 
of their traditional fishing rights regarding anadromous 
stocks of fish. In 1974, U.S. District Judge George H. Boldt 
issued an order " . . .  that certain Indian groups must be 
allowed to take 50 percent of Washington's allowable salmon 
harvest. That dispute— the white man vs. the Indians all 
over again--has yet to be r e s o l v e d . M o r e o v e r ,  a number 
of conservation groups, such as the Sierra Club, National 
Coalition for Marine C o n s e r v a t i o n , t h e  Orca Society, the
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Oceanic Society, and Save the Whales are active in their 
attempts to encourage the formulation of governmental poli­
cies that will effectively manage and conserve the living 
resources in America's new 200-mile fishing zone; such groups 
are also interested in the protection of coastal environments.
In all, there are greatly expanding numbers of 
interest policy influencers involved in pressuring for equit­
able American fisheries policies. How open fisheries decision 
makers are to this "pluralistic school" of fisheries pressure 
groups remains to be seen. Chapter 6 will detail the vigor­
ous tug of war now underway between bureaucratic and interest 
policy influencers over the ratification of new Canadian- 
American fisheries agreements.
Conclusions
Several summary observations about American fisheries 
policies, processes, and policy influencers might be helpful 
at this point. It would appear that throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, American fisheries decision-makers have been reactive 
to the fisheries initiatives of other nations. Certainly in 
the realm of unilateral fishingzone extensions, the last fif­
teen years have been ones in which the United States has 
followed in the footsteps of its northern neighbor, Canada. 
Since the American fishing industry is highly fragmented 
into coastal and distant water fishing groups, it has been 
more difficult for the federal government to develop a national 
fishing program pleasing to the various constituents.
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Within the American fishing industry, there has always 
been the feeling that the governmental decision makers in 
Washington have given in too easily to foreign fisheries in­
terests operating in North American waters.
The U.S. fisherman would probably under normal cir­
cumstances never fish out the resource alone. For 
over 200 years, he never did before. However, when 
unlimited foreign effort is allowed, no resource 
can stand up. I would hate to think that after 20 
years of political effort, finally, there is a 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
and we have not learned by our previous errors.
Because today we are still allowing much too much 
foreign fishing, we continue to allow them to have 
an incidental or bycatch which in too many cases 
is made into fertilizer, fish oil, and other non­
edible food products to the detriment of our own future supply.156
Many fishery experts think that the United States 
needs one fisheries department instead of a myriad of agencies 
and middle level policy-making officials in a variety of 
departments and offices. There is a hope, too, that the 
sizable number of interest policy influencers in the fish­
ing community can have more genuine inputs into the decision­
making process. It is a desire to see the pretense of 
pluralistic involvement replaced with a genuine partnership 
between industry and government. Certainly the coastal inter­
est groups who called for America's enactment of a 200-mile 
fishing zone have been influential— especially in the halls 
of Congress. Moreover, the pressuring efforts of FiNS third 
level interest influencers continue to improve. Lee J.
Weddig, Executive Vice President of the National Fisheries 
Institute, provides this recent perspective:
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Fisheries policies development quite satisfactorily 
allows diverse individuals and groups to contribute 
to the process. The various segments of the industry 
are organizedinto many regional and national associa­
tions and with each having an opportunity to comment. 
In Washington, D.C., we have a National Fisheries 
Policy Steering Committee which consists of repre­
sentatives of seven major groups who have full time 
personnel stationed in Washington. One of these 
groups is the National Federation of Fishermen which 
is made up of more than 50 individual cooperativesthat are regional associations.157
Finally, American fisheries decision-makers should 
be credited with developing some interesting fishery conser­
vation and management programs and mechanisms as a part of 
the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act. If given 
the latitude allowed in that 1976 legislation, the eight 
Regional Fishery Management Councils should provide new, 
valuable interest and local bureaucratic inputs into the 
fisheries management policies of the United States, Howard 
Nickerson provides the essential questions that must be ans­
wered if members of America's fishing community are to have 
a productive future. The Executive Director of the New Eng­
land Steering Committee suggests that ", . .if there is no 
change in the attitude and perceptions of the U.S. State 
Department and Commerce Department through its National 
Marine Fisheries Service, will there be a new era of fish­
eries policies? Will it be business as usual with the U.S. 
fishing industry having to carry on alone and its resources 
traded off to the foreign nations? Will the intended conser­
vation and management policies apply only to the U.S. pro­
ducer and processor? . . . [W]hat will be the administration
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policy toward fisheries and those within the industry? 
Settle that and we can plan the future.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERIM NEGOTIATIONS, IMPASSE, AND 
INNOVATIONS: THE FORMULATION OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN-CANADIAN 
FISHERIES AGREEMENTS
Having implemented their 200-mile fishing zones in 
1977, Canada and the United States are now the owners and 
managers of many of the richest fisheries of the sea.
Canada's 200-mile fishing zones encompass an ocean area of 
over 857,000 square miles. "We are acquiring jurisdiction 
over an actively fished area which approximately doubles 
our present total maritime territorial responsibility,"^ 
notes Dr. Lloyd Dickie, Director of the Institute of Ocean­
ography at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. What 
is particularly important is the fact that on ". . . Canada's 
Atlantic Coast, 90 per cent of all significant fish stocks 
are concentrated over prolific fishing 'banks' within the 
200-mile zone. On the Pacific coast, practically all impor­
tant fish stocks are contained within the zone, except sal- 
mon which range well beyond its boundaries." Regarding
273
274
America's new 200-mile fisheries conservation and management 
zone, it is interesting to realize that the United States 
has become the manager of over 2,000,000 square nautical 
miles of oceanic fisheries.^ One scholar points out that 
the unilateral zonal extension has given " . . .  the United 
States control over most of the world's greatest fisheries.
. . . The annual potential [of fish] is about 9 million tons, 
or 10 percent of the world potential."^
What has happened since Canada and the United States 
implemented their new fishing zones? This chapter, in chron­
ological fashion, will (1) analyze the bilateral Canadian- 
American fisheries negotiations and interim agreements set 
forth when the 1977 zones became functioning entities,
(2) detail the fisheries problems and negotiating impasse 
which occurred between the two nations in June of 1978,
(3) explore the continuing diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
fisheries and boundary disputes, and (4) assess the tentative 
outcome of the last two years of intensive Canadian-American 
fisheries deliberations. While this chapter will provide a 
first level assessment of the bilateral fisheries negotia­
tions, it will also determine the extent of third level pres­
suring efforts that have either favored or opposed the 1979 
East Coast agreements and West Coast diplomatic initiatives. 
In reality, all facets of the Fisheries Negotiations Schema 
for Open Polities (FiNS) will be employed in this chapter.
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Fisheries Negotiating Efforts 
and Interim Agreements
A day before America's 200-mile fishery conservation 
zone was to go into effect, President Jimmy Carter, in a 
letter of transmittal to Congress, indicated he was provid­
ing for their consideration a "Reciprocal Fisheries Agree­
ment Between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Canada," signed in Washington, February 24, 
1977. "The Agreement, which is for 1977 only, satisfies 
important United States interests both in United States 
fisheries off Canada and in overall cooperative relations
5between the United States and Canada." Carter thought Con­
gress should give favorable consideration to the interim 
arrangement by ". . . bringing the Agreement into force by 
Joint Resolution, such Resolution having the effect of estab­
lishing the legal basis in which the reciprocal fisheries of 
the two countries would go forward in 1977."^
The 1977 Agreement was designed to supplant a 1973 
reciprocal fishing agreement which granted fishing privileges 
to the nationals of both countries "in certain areas off the
7coasts of the United States and Canada." It was apparent 
that even though consultations between the two governments
n p. had been in progress since early 1976 . . a
comprehensive framework for Canadian-American fisheries rela­
tions had not been agreed upon by the time that their 200- 
mile fishing zones were to go into effect. On the "Pacific 
front," protracted discussions over the sharing of West 
Coast salmon fisheries had delayed the formulation of a long
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term bilateral fisheries accord. On the East Coast, as the
U.S. State Department explained the situation, when
". . . Canada and the United States published the limits
of their newly declared 200-mile fishery zones later in
1976, the claims overlapped in the Gulf of Maine/Georges 
gBank area. The area of Georges Bank claimed by both sides 
is one of the richest fishing grounds on the Bank. An in­
terim regime was created for 1977 while the two governments 
continued efforts to resolve the dispute through negotia­
tions.
Thus, because of boundary disputes, management pol­
icies, and levels of fishing effort, all of which will be 
examined more fully later in this chapter, the 1977 Recip­
rocal Fisheries Agreement between Canada and the United States 
became a practical necessity. Although parts of the agree­
ment were very detailed as to fishery jurisdictions and the 
types of fishing efforts permitted, the broad provisions of 
the pact can be succinctly pointed out. In general, both 
Canada and the United States agreed to permit nationals of 
the other nation to continue fishing in the new 200-mile 
fisheries zones. "Fishing by nationals and vessels of each 
party in the zone of the other shall continue in accordance 
with existing patterns, with no expansion of effort nor 
initiation of new fisheries.
On the Atlantic Coast, both nations agreed to abide 
by the 1977 ICNAF stock allocations, even though the United
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States had officially withdrawn from that regional fisheries 
commission at the end of 1976. There was, however, a spe­
cific provision that fishing for " . . .  herring by nationals 
and vessels of one party in the zone of the other shall be
conducted only in the area beyond 12 nautical miles from 
12the coast." On the Pacific Coast, specific aggregate 
catch limits for United States and Canadian fishermen were 
established for rockfishes including Pacific ocean perch, 
black cod, and shrimp. Moreover, fishing by longline for 
" . . .  halibut by fishermen of each party shall continue in 
the zone of the other in accordance with approved recommenda­
tions and regulations of the International Pacific Halibut 
13Commission." This latter provision intriguingly demon­
strated the longevity of U.S.-Canada joint fishery manage­
ment efforts. While modifications had been made in the Hali­
but Commission since it was created by treaty in 1923,^^ the 
Commission had remained throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
". . . a n  expert body, experienced in both stock assessment 
and management.
The continuing struggle to regulate Pacific Coast 
salmon fisheries intensified as the two neighbors extended 
their fishing zones during the 1 9 7 0 s . T h e  1977 Recipro­
cal Fisheries Agreement encouraged the appropriate fishery 
management authorities of the two countries to "consult 
frequently," coordinate regulatory measures, and designate 
the " . . .  same open [salmon] fishing days for the specific 
United States area as are set for the specified Canadian
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area."^^ Moreover, there was to be . . n o  fishing for
salpon by nationals and vessels of either party in the zone
of the other, except salmon taken by trolling beyond 12
nautical miles of the coast and salmon taken by trolling
between 3 and 12 nautical miles . . in a specific area
18from Bonilla Point and Tatoosh Island to Carroll Island."
It was also stipulated that each " . . .  party shall have
the right to limit such fishing for salmon in its zone by
nationals and vessels of the other to the same time periods
as its nationals and vessels are permitted such fishing for
19salmon in the zone of.the other." In sum, all of the sal­
mon fisheries articles in the Agreement were designed to 
placate vociferous salmon fishermen and processors in both 
countries; they were temporary measures designed to provide 
more time for Canadian and American diplomats and fishery 
experts who were working on a more comprehensive salmon 
enhancement convention.
The 1977 Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement contained 
other important fishing provisions. Regulations " . . .  
affecting the size limits, seasons, areas, gear and by-catch 
of existing fisheries established by the management entities 
of either party and pertaining to the taking or possession
of fish in its zone shall apply equally to the nationals and
20vessels of both parties in the zone." Moreover, Canada 
and the United States agreed ". . . to waive for nationals 
and vessels of the other party fishing in its zone pursuant
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to this Agreement, permit and licensing requirements set
forth in the respective domestic fishery laws of each country
21as applicable to foreign fishermen. . . ." The interim
agreement also noted that recreational fishing ". . .by
vessels of each party in all waters of the other shall 
22continue." Finally, the bilateral pact encouraged the
two nations to exchange appropriate fishery statistics and
biological data, to grant access ". . . t o  [their] customs
ports for nationals and vessels of the other party for the
purposes of purchasing bait, supplies, outfits, fuel, and
23effecting repairs," and to continue cooperative fishery 
research.
In concluding the 1977 interim agreement, it was 
reiterated that; "Nothing in this Agreement shall be con­
strued to prejudice any current or future fisheries nego­
tiations between the two parties. Nothing in the present 
Agreement shall affect either bilateral or multilateral 
agreements to which either government is a p a r t y . A n d  
so the more comprehensive fisheries negotiations continued 
on a regular basis. "On August 1, 1977, the Governments 
of Canada and the United States appointed Special Negotiators 
in an effort to reach a comprehensive agreement covering 
their maritime boundaries and related marine resource issues. 
In October, 1977, the two Governments approved the basic 
principles of a comprehensive settlement recommended by the 
Special Negotiators and directed the Negotiators to continue
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their discussions with a view to recommending detailed 
25terms." As might be expected, developing "detailed terms" 
was more difficult than outlining the general principles 
of a comprehensive fisheries treaty. "We have agreed in 
principle on how to deal with our mutual problems," said 
L om e  S. Clark, deputy negotiator for Canada. "Now we
2 6have to get down to drawing of the lines and other details." 
The talks dragged on; by the end of 1977, Marcel Cadieux, 
Special Negotiator for Canada and Lloyd Cutler, Special 
Maritime Negotiator for the United States, and their aides, 
were still unable to conclude the complex negotiations.
The bilateral fisheries and boundary negotiations 
did not cease, however. Further meetings were held during 
the first three months of 1978. On April 10, 1978, Ambas­
sador Cadieux informed his counterpart, Lloyd Cutler, that 
while " . . .  significant progress has been achieved toward 
conclusion of a long-term agreement, a number of issues re­
main to be solved. As you are aware, the 1977 Reciprocal 
Agreement expired December 31, 1977. Pending conclusion
of the long-term agreement, it is necessary to establish
27further agreed interim measures." Cadieux added; "I 
therefore further propose that each party continue on a 
reciprocal basis to observe the terms and conditions of 
the 1977 Reciprocal Agreement, as amended by the understand­
ings set forth in the Annex of this Note. These understand­
ings are designed to maintain existing fishing patterns with
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no initiation of new fisheries and no expansion of effort,
and reflect experience gained under the 1977 Reciprocal
agreement and the mutual expectation of an early conclusion
28for a long-term agreement."
On April 11, 1978, Lloyd Cutler replied to Ambassa­
dor Cadieux. "I have the honour to inform you that the pro­
posals contained in your note are acceptable to the Govern­
ment of the United States of America and to confirm that your 
note and the annex thereto, which are authentic in English
and French, together with this reply shall constitute an
29Agreement between our two Governments." The Interim Recip­
rocal Fisheries Agreement for 1978 that the two Special Nego­
tiators formalized contained significant additions to the 
1977 Agreement's provisions related to the fishing for sal­
mon on the Pacific Coast. The new pact also noted that 
Canada and the United States recognized " . . .  that their 
domestic management decisions regarding stocks of mutual 
interest may have conservation impacts of joint concern and 
therefore agree to consult quarterly, and at such other times 
as either may request, regarding appropriate action each may 
take to limit catches from these s t o c k s . T o  conduct 
such regular consultations, two Consultative Committees, one 
for the Atlantic Coast and one for the Pacific Coast, were 
established. The Consultative Committees composed of 
government-selected members as well as fishery advisors from 
each country were to consult on all matters concerning the 
implementation of the 1978 interim agreement. Moreover, when
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" . . .  one party believes that urgent conservation concerns 
require immediate action, the [consultative] Committee shall 
consider the matter within 48 hours of notification to the 
other Party during which time the proposed regulatory mea­
sure shall not be implemented,”^^
While the Consultative Committees were important addi­
tions to the interim fisheries relations between the two 
nations, over half of the text of the new provisions of the 
1978 Agreement dealt specifically with West Coast salmon 
fishing. Because Canada and the United States differed as 
to the size of chinook salmon that could be caught (minimum 
length in Canada was twenty-six inches compared with twenty- 
eight inches in the United States), part of the 1978 pact 
stipulated that " . . .  the United States agrees that Canadian 
salmon troll vessels, in the U.S. fishery conservation zone 
off the coast of the State of Washington, north of a line 
drawn due west from La Push (47 degrees 55 minutes North
latitude) may have chinook salmon between 26 and 28 inches
32on board, . . . ." That stipulation was qualified by the
understanding that all such chinook salmon had to be caught
in the Canadian zone, and that upon " . . .  entering the U.S.
fishery conservation zone, all vessels shall report by radio
to U.S. authorities on designated frequencies the number of
chinook salmon on board the vessel between 26 and 28 inches
33in length, . . . ." United States and Canadian enforce­
ment authorities were given the right to board salmon troll
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vessels to inspect the salmon catch, which was to be
"segregated or grouped” by size for identification.
In addition to fish size, the 1978 agreement contained
a further conservation measure.
In light of the number of immature salmon originating 
in the rivers of the United States found in the 
Swiftsure Bank area of British Columbia Statistical 
Area 21, Canada agrees to consult with the United 
States about the conservation need to close this 
area to all salmon fishing from April 15, 1978 
through June 14, 1978. If the United States con­
cludes that there is a conservation need to close 
the fishery during such period but Canada does not 
do so, the United States shall have no obligation 
to permit salmon fishing in its Pacific Coast 
waters by nationals and vessels of Canada on more 
favorable terms than the terms of the 1977 Recipro­cal Agreement.34
Finally, the new interim arrangements enlarged the fishing
area in the U.S. fishery conservation zone in which Canadian
35salmon troll vessels could fish.
As soon as the 1978 interim fisheries agreement was 
initialed by the Canadian and American diplomats, the United 
States requested that Canada close the Swiftsure Bank to all 
salmon fishing after April 14. Canada, however, did not 
close the Bank until May 15; due to this Canadian delay, 
the United States did not grant Canadian salmon fishermen 
access to the enlarged fishing area of the U.S. zone pro­
vided for in the 1978 pact. To complicate matters, the 
Washington State Trollers Association and the Quileute 
Indian Tribe obtained ". . . a temporary injunction on May 5 
(which was stayed a few days later) barring all Canadian 
boats from trolling in U.S. waters, on the grounds that the
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Canadians did not close the Swiftsure Bank when requested.
In this court decision, the 1978 interim agreement was de-
3 6dared invalid because it lacked congressional approval."
With salmon problems growing on the West Coast and 
fish stock disagreements occurring on the East Coast between 
Canada and the United States, legislation was introduced in 
the U.S. Congress to help quiet the troubled oceanic waters. 
The legislation, designed to approve the Interim Reciprocal 
Fisheries Agreement for 1978, passed the House (H.R. 12571) 
on May 25, 1978. Hearings on the Senate's response to the 
interim pact (S. 3098) were held by the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee on June 13, 1978. By that time, however, 
a dramatic impasse had occurred in Canada-United States fish­
eries relations. Both nations had closed their coastal and 
zonal waters to each others' fishermen on June 4, 1978.
Diplomats, Fisheries Dilemmas, and 
the Bilateral Impasse
The U.S. Department of State provided a brief over­
view of the factors which led to the rejection of the 1978 
Interim Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement and the fishing impasse 
that ensued between Canada and the United States. "A pro­
posed renewal of that interim regime for 1978 broke down 
over a number of disagreements as to management policies and 
levels of effort in the Georges Bank groundfish and scallop 
fisheries, as well as over the West Coast salmon fisheries." 
The result was that " . . .  fishing by each side in the
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undisputed fisheries zone of the other ended in June 1978. 
Vessels of both countries have continued to fish in the 
disputed area where each side has applied its own manage­
ment regime, with the result that uncoordinated and conflict­
ing policies are in effect. In the absence of overall regu­
lation, the fishermen of the two countries exchange accusa­
tions of attempting to outfish one another and each side
38claims the other is inflicting injury on the stocks."
While some of the substantive issues that led to the 
June, 1978, fisheries impasse have already been cited, it 
would be wise to reflect on the complexity of the fisheries 
negotiations that occurred during the two years before that 
startling event. Canadian writer Geoffrey Stevens detailed 
some interesting aspects of the fisheries diplomacy that 
occurred from the proposed creation of 200-mile fishery 
zones in 1976 to the June 1978 impasse. At the start of 
the American-Canadian negotiating talks in the fall of 1976, 
there were actually three separate goals to be accomplished 
by the diplomatic teams— resolution of the maritime boundary 
disputes on both coasts, formulation of an interim fisheries 
arrangement, and development of a long-term reciprocal fish­
eries agreement. According to Geoffrey Stevens, External 
Affairs Minister, Allan MacEachen, selected international 
sea law expert J . Alan Beesley to head the Canadian negotiat­
ing team. "Although Mr. Beesley had been Canada's ambassador 
in.Vienna for only a year when Mr. MacEachen's summons
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arrived, back to Ottawa he came. He was to wear three hats: 
chief negotiator on Canada-U.S. maritime boundaries; head of 
the Law of the Sea delegation; and legal advisor to the min­
ister."^* Beesley was certainly a person with many maritime 
decision-making "linkages."
Then, in an abrupt move on September 14, 1976, Prime 
Minister Trudeau made changes in his Cabinet. MacEachen was 
removed from his External Affairs post and replaced by Don 
Jamieson. Insiders in the Department of External Affairs 
" . . .  trace the trouble in the Canada-U.S. negotiations to 
this shift of ministers. They say Mr. Jamieson distrusted
experts, enjoyed high-level diplomatic manoeuvring, and wanted
40to take charge of the negotiations with Washington."
Stevens concluded: "The 1977 interim agreement, negotiated
in 1976, which permitted Canadian and U.S. fishermen access
to the waters of the other country, was largely the work of
Mr. Jamieson and his opposite number in Washington, the then
41Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger." The problem was that 
" . . .  Mr. Jamieson did not understand the issues, principles 
and problems in the maritime boundaries question and made a 
botch of the Canadian case. 'At one point, it looked as 
though the minister had given away the Georges Bank, . . . .
J. Alan Beesley resigned as assistant undersecretary 
and went as Canadian High Commissioner to Australia— as far 
away from Don Jamieson as possible. While the Canadians 
were shifting their diplomatic gears, Americans were also
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making adjustments in their foreign policy leadership. As 
a result of the election of Jimmy Carter, Cyrus Vance re­
placed Henry Kissinger in the State Department. With Jamie­
son and Vance at the helm, both Canada and the United States 
began anew in 1977 to rectify their shared fishing problems. 
The 200-mile fishing zones and the 1977 American-Canadian 
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement became functioning realities^ 
Still, it was apparent to both sides that special teams of 
negotiators would be needed to complete the long-term fish­
eries and boundary agreements between the two nations.
On August 1, 1977, in an effort to hasten the devel­
opment of the desired agreements, Jamieson selected former 
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Marcel Cadieux, to 
act as his special negotiator; Vance chose Washington attorney 
Lloyd Cutler as the chief American negotiator. As indicated 
earlier, Cadieux and Cutler regularly met in Washington and 
Ottawa throughout the remainder of 1977 and into 1978. When 
the long-term fisheries and boundary agreements could not be 
completed by the spring of 1978, the two special negotiators 
exchanged their notes formalizing a 1978 interim fishing 
agreement.
While all of the diplomatic initiatives were being 
conducted, American and Canadian fishermen were not sitting 
quietly in their coastal harbors. During the year following 
the implementation of the 200-mile fishing zones, many 
Canadian fishermen and processors had made substantial gains.
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The number of foreign fishing vessels off Canada's Atlantic
coast had declined in that time period from about 1,500 to
500 vessels. W. 0. Morrow, president of Canada's largest
fish company, National Sea Products Ltd., noted; "We ended
with a year of good catches, good markets, strong demand, and
43higher prices." In fact. National Sea Products' " . . .  sales 
for the first nine months of 1977 were $119 million, up 25% 
from the previous year; profits were $2.5 million, up a stag­
gering 217%."^^
Kenneth Campbell, a general manager of the Fisheries 
Council of Canada, hastened to point out, however, that; "Our 
total catch is still less than our fleet can h a n d l e . I n d e e d ,  
the biggest, most efficient Canadian trawlers were bringing in 
only 50 to 60 percent of their capacity. Moreover, as will 
be detailed in the final portions of this chapter, smaller 
Canadian vessel operators. East Coast scallop fishermen, and 
West Coast salmon trollers were having to contend with the 
unresolved fishing and boundary disputes over some of their 
most productive and accessible fishing grounds.
South of the border, America's East and West Coast 
fishermen were not exactly exuberant over their 1977 catch 
in the U.S. 200-mile fishery zone. While foreign vessels 
had caught only 1.7 million metric tons of fish in the Ameri­
can zone during 1977, some one million tons less than their 
1976 take, American fishermen had harvested a constant 2.5 
million metric tons of fish off America's shores in both 1976
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and 1977. U.S. fishing vessels were " . . .  being kept from 
expanding their catch by provisions in the law designed to 
prevent overfishing by either Americans or foreigners.
Indeed, the new U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils 
had been setting strict quotas on many marine-life species.
By 1978, limits had been set for ". . . cod, haddock, and 
yellowtail flounder in New England; salmon on the Pacific 
Northwest Coast, and clams along the New York and New Jersey 
shores. The quotas [were] so low that in two cases— haddock 
and cod in the North Atlantic— fishermen reached their limit 
for the first quarter of 1978 in early March, and the taking 
of those species was banned for the rest of the month.
Such temporary fishing bans in the 200-mile Ameri­
can fishing zone were especially hard on small boat operators. 
A chairman of the New England Fishery Management Council,
Ed McCloud, noted: "The larger boats are able to go into
Canadian waters or beyond the 200-mile limit. But the smaller
ones have to stay within the zone. They can't afford to
4 8stop fishing for weeks at a time." On the Pacific Coast, 
fishing frustrations were equally intense. American troll 
fishermen ". . . staged a fish-in to protest against new 
regulations barring them from prime salmon-fishing grounds 
near the mouth of the Columbia River. Behind the ban: a
finding by biologists that so many salmon were being taken 
before swimming upstream to spawn that the species' sur­
vival in the region was in jeopardy.
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Thus, by April of 1978, concerned over the strict 
limits placed upon their fishing efforts, the unsettled U.S.- 
Canada fisheries and boundary disputes on both the East and 
West Coasts, and the lack of a new interim fisheries pact 
between their two nations, many American and Canadian coastal 
fishermen were frustrated and angry. When Cadieux and Cutler 
published their exchange of notes on April 11, 1973, the 
Interim Agreement they formalized did not receive great 
accolades from the fishing communities in either country.
It was a patchwork quilt of provisions, an admission that 
major differences had not yet been resolved, and an indica­
tion that fishery relations between Canada and the United 
States would be unpredictable for many months to come.
Many close observers were not surprised, therefore, 
when Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, 
appeared before the House of Commons on June 2, 1978, to 
make a dramatic announcement. Jamieson stated; "In the past 
few weeks, the Government has encountered several difficulties 
with respect to the implementation of the 1978 Canada/USA 
Interim Fisheries Agreement on both the Pacific and Atlantic 
coasts. On the Pacific coast, the problem relates to the 
terms under which Canadian fishermen would be allowed access 
to waters off Washington State to troll for salmon. On the 
Atlantic coast, the problems relate to unrestricted U.S. 
scallop and pollock fisheries in the Gulf of Maine/Georges 
Bank area and what we view as excessive allowable U.S. catch 
levels for cod and haddock.
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Jamieson indicated that while meetings had been held 
in Washington on April 28, 1978, and in Ottawa on May 11-12 
between Canadian and American special negotiators, the spe­
cific differences had not been settled. Thus, at a May 26, 
1978, meeting in Washington, D.C., and during subsequent 
conversations, . .it has become clear that these special 
problems cannot be resolved in a way that would protect 
Canadian interests.Accordingly, Jamieson announced that 
" . . .  the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs has 
called in the U.S. Ambassador and given him a Diplomatic Note 
stating that the Government of Canada is not prepared at this 
time to continue provisional implementation of the Agreement. 
The Note states that, consequently, U.S. fishing vessels will 
not be permitted to continue fishing operations in Canadian 
fisheries waters after 12 noon June 4. This means, of course,
that the U.S. will take corresponding action against Canadian
52fishing vessels in U.S. waters."
Jamieson concluded: "My colleagues and I continue
to believe that a comprehensive maritime boundaries/resources
agreement, arrived at by negotiation, is the preferred means
of providing for effective and mutually beneficial manage-
53ment of maritime resources in Canada/USA boundary areas."
In negotiating such a comprehensive, long-term agreement,
. . . difficult problems remain for both sides in 
reconciling the various regional and industry 
interests. At the same time, it has become clear 
that a balanced and equitable agreement cannot be 
constructed on the basis of continued insistence 
by all concerned on their maximum demands. The
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difficulties which led to the Governments' present 
decision are the best evidence of the need to 
replace a generalized interim agreement without 
institutional arrangements by a permanent, compre­
hensive agreement that places all issues in an 
inter-related framework and includes effective 
mechanisms for interpreting the agreement and for the settlement of differences.54
On June 2, 1978, while Jamieson was delivering his
remarks in the House of Commons, Cadieux and Cutler exchanged
letters detailing their thoughts on the fisheries impasse.
Cadieux, writing to his "dear colleague," said that in
" . . .  the course of the past eight months, I have found that
we have worked effectively together and I believe your future
availability augers well for the success of our endeavours.
I look forward to resuming our negotiations on a long term
agreement in the very near future and to submitting a final
55joint report to our governments shortly thereafter."
Lloyd Cutler replied: "I deeply regret that the Government
of Canada has found it necessary not to give provisional 
effect to the 1978 Reciprocal Interim Fisheries Agreement 
any longer. . . . As is evident, interim agreements based 
on generalized references to the status quo are clearly insuf­
ficient to meet the maritime concerns of importance to us 
both. I fully agree that we must now urgently and forcefully 
pursue the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement on mari­
time boundary and resource i s s u e s . M a n y  months of fur­
ther meetings and deliberations were ahead for the two special 
negotiators and their colleagues.
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Continued Negotiations for Comprehensive 
Maritime Boundary and Fisheries 
Agreement
Little time was wasted in renewing the negotiations 
between Canadian and American negotiators after the June 2, 
1978, fisheries impasse. The U.S. State Department announced 
that both " . . .  Canada and the United States, in light of 
recent events, have agreed to redouble their efforts to con­
clude a long-term agreement; and the special negotiators. 
Ambassador Marcel Cadieux of Canada and Lloyd Cutler of the 
United States, have agreed to meet in mid-June and again
57shortly thereafter to pursue the negotiations intensively."
On June 19, 1978, Cutler and Cadieux met in Ottawa with their 
aides. Cadieux, in his opening statement, outlined the goals 
and directions of the renewed deliberations. "In this new 
phase following the suspension of the Interim Agreement, we 
must now move forward as rapidly as possible on three fronts;
(1) Firstly, we must agree on percentage allocations 
for a number of important fish stocks on the 
east coast, and on the west coast we must de­
velop the terms and conditions relating to the 
conduct of reciprocal fishing;
(2) We must close the gap between our respective 
maritime boundary positions in the Gulf of Maine/ 
Georges Bank area, off Juan de Fuca, in the Dixon 
Entrance area, and in the Beaufort Sea; and
(3) While we pursue our efforts towards a compre­
hensive agreement, we must find the best means 
of promoting cooperation in our fisheries rela­
tions until such time as a permanent agreement 
can come into force.58
Regarding the "first front," it was suggested that 
it would be useful to have separate Atlantic and Pacific 
working groups meet to review where the two sides stood on
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specific fisheries stock allocations in the 200-mile zones. 
Cadieux recalled:
I believe that we have reached agreement regimes 
that would apply to all stocks with the exception 
of Georges Bank lobster and herring. As to entitle­
ments [percentages of the catch for both parties], 
the most important differences concern Georges Bank 
scallops [particularly in the middle area], herring, 
cod and haddock, Canadian entitlements for Gulf of 
Maine herring and lolligo squid off New England,
U.S. entitlements for Nova Scotia groundfish, includ­
ing redfish, and the access and sharing questions 
with respect to transboundary stocks of mackeral 
and pollock. On the Pacific, we should review again 
where we stand with respect to halibut and ground- 
fish and the question of herring off Juan de F u c a . 59
As could be observed from this review list, further
specific entitlements had to be worked out, primarily by
officials and fishery experts in the U.S. Commerce and State
Departments and Canadian Departments of Fisheries and Oceans,
and External Affairs. While the fisheries working groups
were conducting their review, ". . . a drafting team could
get together to discuss the structure and outline of the
comprehensive treaty we hope to conclude. Later I would hope
that this drafting group could also have the benefits of
input from advisors on some of the outstanding issues such
as management standards and the treatment of surplus.
This concluding comment made by Cadieux suggested something
quite interesting about the nature of the fisheries/boundary
deliberations. Before and after the June 1978 impasse, only
diplomats and official representatives of the American and
Canadian governments were actively involved in the drafting
of the agreements.
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The Special Negotiators were not starting from 
scratch on June 19, 1978, in their efforts to develop a 
comprehensive agreement covering maritime boundaries and 
related fisheries matters. As noted earlier in this chap­
ter, in October of 1977, the Governments of Canada and the 
United States had approved a joint Report by ". . , Chief 
Negotiators on Canada-United States Boundaries and Related 
Resource Issues. The report recommends principles for resolu­
tion of maritime resource issues with a view to facilitating
settlement of the maritime boundaries between the two 
61countries." The document specifically recommended the 
establishment of a Joint Fisheries Commission by Convention 
between Canada and the United S t a t e s . T h e  Fisheries Com­
mission, proposed by Cadieux and Cutler in the joint October, 
1977, report
. . . would comprise separate Atlantic and Pacific 
Coast panels composed of members appointed by the 
two governments. Fish stocks off the two coasts 
would be divided into three management categories, 
depending upon stock patterns and the relative 
interests of the two countries. The categories 
would provide, respectively, for joint management 
of some stocks; for jointly agreed management for 
other stocks based on proposals submitted by the 
country with the primary interest; and for inde­
pendent national management of stocks in the third 
category subject only to consultation.63
The joint report also discussed the necessity of
sharing hydrocarbon resources in the maritime boundary areas
and indicated " . . .  there should be at least two shared-
access zones, in the Gulf of Maine and Beaufort Sea regions.
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and the Canadian side is of the view that it would probably 
be desirable to have such a zone for the region off Juan de 
Fuca Strait as well."^* The Cadieux and Cutler report lastly 
pointed out " . . .  that separate negotiations were underway 
towards a long-term agreement regarding interceptions of 
Pacific salmon.
Since all of these general topics had been inten­
sively negotiated during 1977 and the spring of 1978, Cadieux 
and Cutler hoped that rapid progress could be made on the 
resource-related issues after the June 1978 bilateral impasse. 
In the area of the four disputed maritime boundaries, how­
ever, many difficult problems still existed. It would be 
helpful at this point to provide some background comments 
on the disputed boundary areas. Referred to as "unsettled 
maritime boundaries," three areas on the Pacific Coast were 
being disputed. The two governments were concerned about 
boundary lines in the Strait of Juan de Fuca between Wash­
ington State and British Columbia, the Dixon Entrance between 
British Columbia and Alaska, and the Beaufort Sea area be 
tween Alaska and the Y u k o n . T h e  boundary line inside the 
Strait of Juan de Fuca " . . .  was settled in an 1846 treaty. 
Both countries agree that the boundary extension should be
determined by equidistance but there is some technical dis-
6 7agreement on how the line should be drawn . . .," and the 
two governments have proposed boundaries that overlap.
Regarding the Dixon Entrance between British Columbia 
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of equidistance in drawing the boundary— but that was all 
they agreed upon. "The 1908 Alaskan Boundary arbitration 
gave the U.S. the large panhandle along the Northern British 
Columbia coast and was a major political issue of the day 
because Canada considered Britain sacrificed Canadian inter­
ests for good relations with the Americans. . . . The arbi­
tration drew a line at the top of the Dixon Entrance which 
Canada immediately said was the boundary line. The U.S. said 
it gave the U.S. the land north of the line and Canada the
g  qland to the south but made no provision for the water."
The final Pacific dispute was in the Beaufort Sea area.
"An 1825 treaty between Britain and Russia established the 
boundary between the Yukon and Alaska including the ‘water 
boundary up to the frozen sea.' While Canadian officials 
admit that the term 'frozen sea' is vague, they support the 
treaty's boundary definition. The U.S. wants an equidistant 
line starting from the head land which would cost Canada 
a hefty section.
On the Atlantic Coast, when the U.S. and Canada 
" . . .  published the limits of their newly declared 200- 
mile fishery zones later in 1976, the claims overlapped in 
the Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank area."^^ Canada drew a 
boundary line equidistant from the U.S. and Canadian coasts 
that gave Canada the northeastern section of the Bank. The 
U.S. drew a boundary line along the Fundian Channel from 
the Bay of Fundy— giving America the entire Georges Bank
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area. By the time of the bilateral impasse in June of 1978, 
little progress had been made on the Gulf of Maine/Georges 
Bank boundary dispute. In fact, none of the maritime bound­
ary disagreements were close to resolution.
After their June 19, 1978, meeting in Ottawa, Cadieux 
and Cutler planned meetings for July and August. In July 
the two Special Negotiators met in Brussels where Cadieux 
was also acting as Canada's Ambassador to the European 
Communities. Little progress was evidenced in the talks, 
although the Canadian Government announced that: "Progress
was achieved on elements of a long term agreement and on
71issues related to the resumption of reciprocal fishing."
The discussions continued through the summer and into the 
fall with the Special Negotiators meeting occasionally and 
their negotiating teams continuing the discussions on both 
coasts on a more regular basis.
On November 23, 1978, Geoffrey Stevens, maritime 
writer for Toronto's Globe and Mail, wrote that about 
". . . five meetings have been held since June. There's 
been no progress, not a scintilla, on the four maritime 
boundary disputes— Georges Bank off the Atlantic Coast; 
the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Dixon Entrance, in the 
Pacific; and the Beaufort Sea, in the Arctic. On the fish­
eries side, there is no agreement yet that would allow fish­
ermen to go about their business until the boundaries are 
settled. Meanwhile, Canadian fishermen are barred from U.S.
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72waters, and vice versa." Stevens suggested that if
. . anything, the dispute has widened since June, as the 
result of an expanded claim to Georges Bank advanced by 
Canada on September 15. In a recent decision involving a 
maritime boundary between Britain and France, the Interna­
tional Court of Justice ruled that certain promontories could 
be ignored in drawing a boundary. Aha, said Ottawa. Cape 
Cod is a promontory, isn't it? By ignoring Cape Cod, Canada
was able to draw a new line which extended its claim roughly
7325 miles further west into waters the U.S. says it owns."
The U.S. State Department had some interesting com­
ments to make about the "new Canadian claim" in the Gulf of 
Maine. The author of this dissertation happened to be at 
the U.S. State Department on September 15 when the Canadians 
made their expanded boundary assertions. One informed State 
Department official expressed frustration and shock over
Canada's new claim, and indicated that the Canadian negotia-
74tors were great "risk-takers." The official thought it was
quite a gamble to make a new boundary claim in the middle of
negotiations over the territory in the Gulf of Maine. Offi-r
cially the U.S. Government made a diplomatic response to the
new boundary claim.
The United States intends to maintain the full exer­
cise of its fisheries jurisdiction over the area 
of the new Canadian claim in accordance with United 
States law. While both Canadian and U.S. vessels 
have historically fished off the coasts of both 
countries, Canada elected to terminate reciprocal 
fishing last June. Under these circumstances, the
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United States cannot permit Canadian vessels to 
fish in an important part of the U.S. fishing zone, 
while Canada denies U.S. fishermen access to 
Canadian waters.
The State Department wanted to make certain that 
no international misunderstanding resulted from the "new 
Canadian claim"; thus, the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, 
Peter Towe, was promptly contacted on September 15, 1978, 
and informed of America's response to the new Georges Bank 
declaration. The State Department announced that the 
" . . .  United States is prepared to continue negotiations 
toward a settlement of the boundary issues or an agreement 
to submit unresolved maritime boundary issues to interna­
tional arbitration and to provide arrangements for recipro­
cal fishing under the auspices of a new Canadian-American 
Joint Fisheries Commission, either on a permanent basis or 
at least for the interim period until the boundaries are 
finally determined.
While it was apparent that little headway was being 
made on disputed boundary areas, some progress was being 
made on fisheries concerns. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 
went to Ottawa on November 21-22, 1978, to meet with Secre­
tary of State for External Affairs Don Jamieson. Among the 
topics discussed between the two foreign policy leaders were 
the fishing and boundary disputes between Canada and the United 
States. In a joint news conference on November 22, Jamieson 
responded:
I said in the House some weeks ago and I repeat now 
that the prospect of one or more of the boundary 
questions being referred to a third party has always
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been there. . . . [B]asically what we are now 
concentrating on is a comprehensive fisheries 
agreement. We believe that if the fishermen and 
fishing interests on both coasts are in a situa­
tion where they are satisifed with the arrange­
ments that have been worked out to insure that 
their livelihoods are preserved— and that applies 
to fishermen in both countries— then the boundary 
question as such, while not diminished in impor­
tance, certainly is diminished in urgency.??
Secretary Vance said he subscribed to Jamieson's comments.
The two men also indicated that no "tradeoffs" of the Beau­
fort Sea issue or east coast/west coast concerns were con­
sidered; Jamieson noted that " . . .  those were not the 
sorts of things that v;e spent our time discussing.
Even with all of this high level diplomacy, 1978 
ended without the culmination of any boundary or fisheries 
agreements. In early January 1979, U.S. Special Negotiator 
Lloyd Cutler indicated he wanted to resign his post because 
no agreements had been reached during 1978. When Cyrus Vance
and Don Jamieson issued a statement on January 5, 1979, call-
79xng for a "fresh effort" to resolve the disputes. Cutler 
was persuaded to continue his diplomatic efforts for an 
additional round of talks. The efforts of Cadieux and Cut- 
Iter and their colleagues would shortly be rewarded with 
the completion of major maritime agreements.
The Outcome of Intensive American- 
Canadian Fisheries and Maritime 
Boundary Deliberations
In the final portion of this chapter, several impor­
tant objectives need to be accomplished. Since over two 
years of intensive negotiations occurred, it would be helpful
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to indicate the individuals who had the most significant 
roles in shaping the new maritime agreements. Moreover, 
the 1979 diplomatic activities and tentative agreements need 
to be concisely documented. Finally it should be interest­
ing to assess the stances of third-level policy influencers 
as they continue to react to the negotiated settlements and 
long-range maritime policy initiatives.
Writing so closely, in time, to the fisheries and 
boundaries negotiations, it was difficult to obtain the names 
and roles of all the individuals importantly involved in 
the East and West Coast deliberations. Secretary of State 
Vance and Secretary of State for External Affairs Jamieson, 
as the top level diplomats, did provide the impetus for 
cooperative efforts to resolve the pressing maritime issues 
between Canada and the United States as quickly as possible. 
Their efforts, coupled with those of Special Negotiators 
Cadieux and Cutler, provided the top level cement needed to 
meld all of the East and West Coasts negotiating efforts 
into comprehensive agreements.
From the beginning of their efforts in August of 1977, 
Cadieux and Cutler indicated their desire to receive advice 
from as many public and private fishing industry representa­
tives as possible. The two Negotiators consulted with their 
respective fishing communities on both coasts. In addition, 
representatives of the fishing communities served as advisors 
to the Negotiators and participated in that capacity in the
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discussion of fisheries-related issues. "On the USA side, 
members of the Mid-Atlantic, New England, Pacific and North 
Pacific Fisheries Management Councils were represented.
On the Canadian side, officials from the Governments of 
the Province of British Columbia, New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, representatives of fishermen's organizations from 
both coasts, and representatives of fish processors 
participated.
Regarding the East and West Coast deliberations, 
this much could be stated about the American teams of diplo­
mats and experts. "The most significant input as far as I'm 
concerned was made by representatives of the New England 
Fishery Council and the [two] Pacific Fisheries Councils.
Most of these groups, with their advisors, were extremely
81active in the lengthy negotiations." Moreover, from the 
viewpoint of the West Coast discussions, "the most important 
inputs have come from the Pacific and North Pacific Fishery 
Management Councils, the State of Alaska, the State of Wash­
ington, and to a lesser extent, from the Pacific Halibut 
Commission. The individuals involved on the American side 
who have had the most influence have been Mr. Harold Lokken, 
Professor Donald McKernan, Mr. Ed Huizer, Mr. Clem Tillion 
and Mr. Gordon Jensen. Full credit should also be given to 
Ambassador John Negroponte for his work in the final stages
of negotiations between the U.S. and Canada on west coast 
82matters." Negroponte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
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for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, was aided by such State 
Department officials as Douglas Marshall and David Colson.
On the East Coast, American discussions were more 
actively handled by Lloyd Cutler, with backing and advice 
from Douglas Marshall, Tucker Scully, Dr. James Storer, and 
other State Department fisheries experts. On the East Coast, 
particularly regarding the boundary dispute, private indi­
viduals representing Atlantic fishermen and processors were 
invited to have an input into the discussions. Howard 
Nickerson noted; "At an initial meeting held by Ambassador 
Cutler to lay ground rules for U.S. negotiations with the 
Canadians relative to a boundary between our two countries 
because of the 200-mile area overlap, I brought to his atten­
tion that out of 13 participants invited and present, 11
8 3were members of the New England Fisheries Steering Committee." 
Nickerson concluded that: "Jake Dykstra, Jim Warren, Thomas
Norris, and Howard Nickerson probably, timewise, have been 
the ones principally concerned in developing a position on 
the U.S./Canadian seaward boundary dispute. There have been 
about ten others at least who have contributed generously of 
their time and their opinions. However, I believe all would 
agree we have had little effect on the decision-making 
process. It has been a continual frustrating experience 
for most, if not all of the industry representatives 
involved.
After numerous efforts to obtain the names of 
Canadian officials involved in the American-Canadian
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bilateral negotiations, this much could be detailed with 
certainty, in addition to the efforts of Secretary of State 
Jamieson and Special Negotiator Cadieux, East Coast deliber­
ations were influenced by Dr. A. W. May, Assistant Deputy 
Minister, Atlantic Fisheries. On the West Coast, Cadieux 
was the prime negotiator, with H. D. Johnson coordinating 
policy discussions through his post as Assistant Deputy 
Minister, Pacific and Inland Fisheries. Dr. M. P. Shepard, 
former Director of the International Fisheries Policy Branch, 
Department of Fisheries and the Environment, also had sig­
nificant policy inputs. Overseeing all of the discussions 
through 1978 and into 1979 was Canada's Minister of Fish­
eries, Romeo LeBlanc.
Additionally, Mr. Bernard Applebaum of the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans provided the dissertation's author
with two separate lists of East Coast and West Coast Canadian
officials and fisheries advisors that had inputs into the
8 Rbilateral negotiations. The East Coast list of seventeen 
names included John Mullally, Deputy Minister of Nova 
Scotia's Department of Fisheries, and Pierre Vagneux, Direc­
tor of Planning and Coordination, New Brunswick Department 
of Fisheries. Private industry spokesmen such as Roger 
Stirling, manager of the Nova Scotia Fish Packers Associa­
tion and Noble Smith, a fishing captain from Cape Sable 
Island, Nova Scotia, were a part of the East Coast advisory 
group; both Stirling and Smith were also members of Canada's
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Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee. Among the twelve 
mentioned West Coast officials and fisheries advisors were 
J. Spitz of the Fishermen’s Association of British Columbia, 
W. Kitzul of the British Columbia Fishermen’s Independent 
Co-op Association, and S. Dickens of the Cooperative Fish­
ermen’s Guild; all three of these men were also "invitees" 
to the new Canadian Pacific Region Fisheries Management 
Advisory Council.
It must be noted that both American and Canadian 
officials were reluctant to provide data on diplomats and 
private advisors involved in the negotiations. There were 
several understandable reasons for their concern. Negotia­
tions are still continuing or pending approval regarding 
both the East and West Coast agreements and neither side 
wanted to upset the outcome of those pacts. Both governments 
were also glad to provide lists of private individuals in­
volved in the negotiations, in order to suggest that the 
negotiations had indeed encouraged consultative inputs from 
fishing industry spokesmen in Canada and the United States. 
While there was some evidence that advisory opinions were 
welcomed by government officials, there was also concern on 
the part of a majority of the private advisors that their 
viewpoints were having only minimal impact upon the proceed­
ings. Charles Stinson, President of Stinson Canning Com­
pany of Maine, and a member of the U.S. Department of State’s 
Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, made an interesting
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observation about the East Coast Agreements. "A small group 
was selected from different segments of the fishing industry 
from New England and from the Mid-Atlantic Council. When 
the negotiations first began, this group was involved with 
the Canadians in direct negotiations. After two meetings, 
there were only the federal people from each country that
p pdid the negotiating."
At long last, on February 14, 1979, all parties con­
cerned were informed that some agreements had been reached 
between Canada and the United States. Cyrus Vance and Don 
Jamieson " . . .  announced today the approval by the Govern­
ments of the United States and Canada of the recommendations 
of Special Negotiators Lloyd Cutler and Marcel Cadieux for 
an Atlantic coast fisheries agreement and an agreement to
resolve the boundary delimitation issue in the Gulf of Maine
87area by binding third party procedures." It was indicated
that the agreements reached " . . .  will be set out in two
separate but related treaties, one on fisheries and the other
on third party resolution of the boundary delimitation issue,
8 8which would enter into force simultaneously." Vance and 
Jamieson expressed " . . .  the hope that these agreements 
would provide momentum for the continuation of negotiations 
directed toward the resolution of the Pacific and Arctic
p  Qcoast issues in an equally amicable fashion,"
Two days later, on February 16, 197 9, John Negro­
ponte, chief U.S. fisheries negotiators on the West Coast,
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announced that tentative agreement had been reached on a 
bilateral fisheries pact for Pacific halibut and groundfish. 
The agreement was designed to phase Canadians out of hali­
but fishing in U.S. waters over a two-year period while 
United States fishermen were gradually excluded from fish­
ing for British Columbia groundfish stocks. The Canadian 
negotiators refused comment on the tentative agreement at 
that time; however, it was privately indicated that the two 
governments agreed to the continuation of the historic Inter­
national Pacific Halibut Commission. Since the International 
Pacific Halibut Convention was to expire on April 1, 1979, 
Negroponte indicated that the survival of the Halibut Commis­
sion was ". . . a welcome development because it will retain
international control and conservation of the migrating hal- 
90ibut stocks." Negroponte concluded that while West Coast
maritime boundary and salmon disputes remained unresolved,
he was hoping for the finalization of a salmon agreement 
91later in 1979. Resolution of the boundary disputes did 
not appear to be that imminent.
Since February of 1979, most of the attention has 
been directed toward the two East Coast Agreements. It would 
be best to examine them in detail, and then note the Canadian 
and American fishing industries' reactions to the long awaited 
East Coast accords. The two pacts, formally signed in 
Washington, D.C., on March 29, 1979, have lengthy titles 
and complex content items to match. It would be helpful 
to first comment on the Treaty between the Government of the
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United States of America and the Government of Canada to
Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area and then
detail the Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada on East
92Coast Fishery Resources.
On April 18, 1979, the U.S. State Department sent
the two East Coast treaties to President Carter. Regarding
the boundary pact, the President was informed that since
. 1970 officials of the United States and Canada have
sought to establish by agreement the maritime boundary in
the Gulf of Maine area. Prior to the establishment of 200
nautical mile fisheries jurisdiction by both countries,
these negotiations addressed the continental shelf boundary.
More recently, the negotiations have addressed the maritime
boundary which would divide the continental shelf and fish-
9 ̂eries zones of the United States and Canada." Warren 
Christopher, Acting Secretary, Department of State, told 
the President that despite " . . .  imagination, good will 
and intense effort, the Special Negotiators could not iden­
tify a maritime boundary acceptable to both Governments. 
Accordingly, they recommended that the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area be submitted 
to binding third-party dispute settlement."^*
The Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty contains 
four articles and two annexes. Article I stipulates that
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a special agreement detailing the Gulf of Maine boundary 
dispute should be submitted to . . a  Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice. . . . Article II indi­
cates that if the Chamber of the ICJ has not been consti­
tuted ". . . by the end of the sixth full calendar month 
after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, either 
Party may at any time prior to the constitution of the 
Chamber, terminate the Special Agreement, . . where­
upon the dispute would be given to a Court of Arbitration 
. . composed of five persons mutually agreed upon by the 
Parties, one of whom shall be designated by the Parties to 
be President. Article IV specifies that the boundary 
treaty " . . .  shall be ratified in accordance with the 
domestic requirements of the Parties and shall enter into 
force on the date instruments of ratification of this Treaty 
and of the Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada on East Coast
98Fishery Resources are exchanged. . . . "
The Special Agreement annexed to the Boundary Treaty 
suggests that the ICJ Chamber considering the dispute
. shall be composed of five persons, three of whom shall 
be elected by and from the Members of the Court, after con­
sultation with the Parties, and two of whom shall be judges
ad hoc, who shall not be nationals of either Party, chosen
99by the Parties." The question the Chamber will be re­
quested to decide in the Gulf of Maine is accurately noted. 
"What is the course of the single maritime boundary that
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divides the continental shelf and fisheries zones of the 
United States of America and Canada from a point in latitude 
44®11'12" N, longitude 67®16'46" W to a point to be deter­
mined by the Chamber within an area bounded by straight lines 
connecting the following sets of geographic coordinates; 
latitude 40°W, longitude 67®W; latitude 40°N, longitude 65®W; 
latitude 42°N; longitude
To aid in making the boundary decision, Canada and 
the United States can ask the ICJ Chamber . .to appoint 
a technical expert nominated jointly by the Parties to assist 
it in respect of technical matters and, in particular, in 
preparing the description of the maritime boundary. . . . 
Lastly, the Canadian and American Governments have agreed to
"accept as final and binding upon them the decision of the
102Chamber rendered pursuant to this Article." The State
Department's Warren Christopher summarizes his treaty remarks 
to President Carter by stressing the connection between the 
maritime boundary treaty and the East Coast fisheries agree­
ment. "There is a close linkage between the two treaties.
If for any reason the Special Agreement is terminated and 
the Arbitration Agreement enters into force, but the arbi­
tration does not go forward within certain time limits, either 
Party may terminate the fisheries treaty upon six months 
notice.
The East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement is without 
question the more complicated of the two related pacts. The
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State Department admits that the "Agreement is lengthy and 
c o m p l e x " P r e s i d e n t  Carter's treaty transmittal note to 
the U.S. Senate on May 3, 1979, contains a concise overview 
of the document. "The fisheries treaty contains provisions 
for the conservation, management and utilization of fish 
stocks of mutual interest off the east coast of both countries. 
Detailed entitlement shares for various fish stocks are set 
forth in the agreement, with the shares subject to review 
every ten years. A joint fisheries commission will be estab­
lished to implement the agreement, and dispute settlement 
mechanisms will be included as part of the institutional 
framework to resolve differences that might arise in the 
interpretation or implementation of the agreement.
The Fishery Resources Agreement now being considered 
by the U.S. Senate and new Canadian Government has four main 
parts [introduction and chapters], four annexes, and over 
eighty pages of detailed text.^®^ The two purposes of the 
agreement are ". . . t o  provide for the conservation and 
management of east coast fishery resources which are of mutual 
concern to the Parties and . . .  to provide for the terms and 
conditions under which all fishing by nationals and vessels 
of either Party off the east coast of the other Party shall 
be c o n d u c t e d . O n l y  the Agreement's main provisions and 
a sampling of the entitlements of the designated fish stocks 
will be recounted here. Chapter I of the Agreement details 
the fishery management apparatus and decision-making
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procedures, chapter 2 establishes " . . .  the arbitral
108mechanism which is the corner stone of the Agreement,"
and chapter 3 contains a number of miscellaneous articles,
and notes that the " . . .  Annexes attached hereto form an
109integral part of this Agreement."
The East Coast Fishery Resources Agreement (ECFRA) 
vests management powers in four levels of authority: the
east Coast Fisheries Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
the Commission), the Commission Co-Chairman, the Arbitrator, 
and the national governments (Canada and the United States). 
The Commission is an intriguing joint management body which 
carries on the tradition of such Canadian-American ventures 
as the International Pacific Halibut Commission. The Commis­
sion is to be composed of seven members from each nation, 
with the members serving at the pleasure of the appointing 
party. The two nations will also jointly appoint two Co- 
Chairmen, and it is made clear that the " . . .  Co-Chairmen 
of the Commission shall not be nationals of the same Party, 
and shall not form part of the national section of either 
P a r t y . C o - C h a i r m e n  are to serve five year terms and 
may be chosen for additional terms, if the two Parties so 
desire.
An important key to the functioning of the Commission
is an "impartial" arbitrator, " . . .  appointed jointly by 
the Parties"^^^ for as many five year terms as the two 
nations continue to support his arbitral actions. "The
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Arbitrator's decision on matters referred to arbitration 
shall be final and binding upon the Parties except that 
either Party may request a re^'iew of a decision if it dis­
covers the existence of a new factor of decisive importance 
which was unknown to that Party when the decision was ren­
dered, provided that such lack of knowledge was not due to 
112negligence." If the two nations cannot agree in their
choice of a permanent Arbitrator, they must request the
President of the International Court of Justice to appoint
the Arbitrator. "In each case where the President of the
International Court of Justice appoints an Arbitrator, he
shall select, following consultations with the Parties, a
person who is not a national or permanent resident of Canada
113or the United States of America."
The fourth level of authority that is detailed in 
the agreement pertains to actions of the national governments. 
The national governments must approve Commission management 
decisions, and if the Commission cannot reach a decision, 
the " . . .  Parties shall then consider the matter in consul­
tation with each other and with their resepctive national 
s e c t i o n s . M o r e o v e r ,certain decisions, such as the renego­
tiation of fish stock entitlements, are handled directly by 
the two governments. During the ninth year following 
" . . .  entry into force of their Agreement, and . . . the 
ninth year of each successive ten year period, the Parties 
shall, if either Party so requests, review their respective
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entitlements to any or all of the stocks listed in the 
Annexes.
Just what are the principles and functions of the 
proposed East Coast fishery management system, and how are 
the four levels or centers of authority involved in the 
decision-making process? The Commission is to . . meet 
at least once each calendar year in order to consider mat­
ters relating to the management of each of the fisheries 
covered by this agreement. . . . Each year the Commission 
shall consider and seek to reach agreement on the manage­
ment measures to be applied to each stock listed in Annex 
A or B during the subsequent fishing year, taking into 
account the governing principles set forth in Article 
The governing principles include management meas, os designed 
to achieve the optimum yield from each fish stock, taking 
into account stock interrelationships and other relevant 
ecological factors; the use of the best scientific informa­
tion available; the need for efficient administration and 
enforcement of decisions; and the right of both parties to
harvest their entitlements in an open, nondiscriminatory 
117manner.
The types of decisions to be rendered by the Commis­
sion center on the determination of "the annual total allow- 
118able catch," which includes determination of the permis­
sible commercial catch and where appropriate, the recreational 
catch. The Commission can also prescribe such management
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measures as the designation of zones and periods in which
fishing shall be limited or prohibited; limitations on the
fish catch— based upon such factors as size, number, weight,
sex, incidental catch, and total biomass of fish; and the
requirements and conditions regarding the use of specified
types of fishing gear, fishing vessels, or equipment for 
119such vessels. The Commission will eventually determine
the fishing year or season for the marine life listed in 
Annexes A and B, too.
The fisheries management decision-making procedures 
are dependent upon the types of fish stocks involved. The 
marine species included in Annex A of the Agreement require 
the joint management of the two parties. Thus, the Commis­
sion initiates management decisions in designated zones for 
Annex A stocks of mackerel, pollock, cusk, and until the 
Gulf of Maine boundary dispute is settled, northern lobster. 
Each national section (seven American members and seven 
Canadian members) of the Commission " . . .  shall have one 
vote, which shall be cast by the member of that national 
section designated for the purpose of voting by the appoint­
ing party. A decision of the Commission shall require an
120affirmative vote by each national section."
If the Commission cannot reach a decision, the gov­
ernments themselves attempt to resolve the management mea­
sure (s) to be adopted. However, the Commission can be 
reconvened if direct government to government deliberations
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fail. If the reconvened Commission fails again to reach
a management decision, " . . .  the Co-Chairmen shall attempt
121to resolve the question in dispute. . . . "  Finally, if
the " . . .  Co-Chairmen are unable to reach agreement within
fifteen days after the dispute comes before them, the Arbi-
122trator shall decide the matter. . . . "  The Arbitrator
". . . shall provide an opportunity for each Party to present
evidence and arguments both in writing and, if requested by
123either of the Parties, in oral hearing." In any arbitra­
tion, " . . .  each Party shall have the right to call its own
witnesses, to present documentary evidence, and to cross-
124examine the witnesses of the other Party." Ultimately,
as noted earlier, the Arbitrator's decisions are 'final and
125binding' upon the Parties and " . . .  shall be made public."
The decision-making procedures for Annex B stocks of
Atlantic herring, sea scallops,Atlantic cod in certain areas,
haddock in certain areas, silver hake, red hake, white hake,
Atlantic argentine, and illex squid are somewhat different
from Annex A processes. A Party (Canada or the United States)
having primary management responsibility as designated in
Annex B . . shall present proposed management measures to
the Commission and to the other Party not later than one
hundred twenty days prior to the beginning of the fishing year
126for the stock." If the Commission does not agree with the
management proposal, the matter is taken to the two Co- 
Chairmen. If the two Co-Chairmen cannot resolve the dispute, 
the matter is decided by the Arbitrator.
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There is a third category of stocks, detailed in 
Annex C. The Annex C stocks of Atlantic cod and haddock 
in certain areas, Atlantic redfish, northern lobster after 
the boundary dispute is resolved, loligo squid, and other 
Atlantic groundfish species not dealt with in the Agreement 
are designated as marine life species which will be the 
exclusive management responsibility of either Canada or the 
United States. While one nation in Annex C has exclusive 
management power over a specific stock, the other country 
may be granted limited access and an entitlement to that 
stock if so indicated in the Annex. Finally, with " . . .  
respect to each stock listed in Annex C, the Commission shall 
serve as a forum for consultation on annual management mea­
sures, or amendments thereto, proposed by the Party having
127management responsibility."
In order to provide a clearer understanding of the 
fish stock provisions cited in Annexes A, B, and C, three 
examples might be noted. Annex A indicates that pollock 
(Pollachius virens) located in Divisions 4V, 4W and 4X and 
in Subarea 5 shall be jointly managed by the two Parties.
In terms of access to the stock, Canadian vessels may fish 
in Divisions 4V, 4W, 4X, Subdivision 5Ze and that portion 
of Division 5Y which is in the maritime area in which Canada 
exercises exclusive fisheries jurisidction; U.S. vessels may 
fish only in Subarea 5 and Division 4X.^^® Regarding en­
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catch 74,4 percent of the annual permissible commercial
catch set for this stock under this Agreement, and vessels
of the United States 25.6 percent of the annual permissible
129commercial catch."
As an important example of an Annex B stock, sea 
scallops (Placopecten magellanicus) located in Subdivision 
SZe (the Georges Bank) have one of the most debated entitle­
ments in the Agreement. While the vessels of Canada and the 
United States may harvest scallops throughout Subdivision 5Ze, 
Canada is entitled to 73.35 percent of the annual catch while 
the United States obtains 26.65 percent of the scallops. 
Moreover, Canada is designated as the Party of primary inter­
est " . . .  with respect to that portion of this stock located 
east of 68*30' west longitude and the United States shall be
the Party of primary interest with respect to that portion
1 onof this stock located west of 68*30' west longitude." As 
the Party of primary interest in their specified area, each 
nation will present annual proposed management measures to 
the Commission.
Loligo squid (Loligo pealei) might be mentioned as 
an interesting example of an Annex C stock. While the ves­
sels of both Parties may fish throughout Division 5Z and Sub- 
area 6 for loligo squid, the United States is given exclusive 
management authority over the squid for a ten-year period.
The U.S. is entitled to catch 91 percent of the stock, Canada 
the remaining 9 percent. As a special provision in Annex C
323
regarding the loligo squid, to . . the extent reasonably 
necessary to assure levels of incidental catch of other 
species which are consistent with United States management 
goals and to avoid conflict between different types of fish­
ing vessels and gear, the management measures applicable to
the vessels of Canada may be more restrictive than measures
131applicable to vessels of the United States;
Before turning to the reaction to the East Coast
Fishery Agreement in the United States and Canada, several
final provisions found in the pact should be mentioned. The
two countries are expected to enforce designated management
132measures regarding their own flag vessels.^ Moreover, each
", . . Party shall have the right to place observers on the
vessels of the other Party fishing within the maritime area
in which the former Party exercises exclusive fisheries 
133jurisdiction." Also, each " . . .  Party shall allow access 
to its customs ports on the east coast for nationals and ves­
sels of the other Party fishing pursuant to this Agreement,
for the purposes of purchasing bait, supplies, outfits, fuel,
134and effecting repairs." Lastly, it is made clear that
the " . . .  Parties may, at any time, amend any provision
135of the Annexes by agreement."
The remarkably detailed East Coast Fishery Agreement, 
as well as the Maritime Boundary Settlement Treaty, are now 
pending before the U.S. Senate. The Canadian Government 
needs no further ratification of the documents, although the 
new Cabinet of Prime Minister Joe Clark undoubtedly will give
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serious attention to the implications of the accords for 
Canada's future fisheries policies and continuing West Coast 
salmon and boundary negotiations with the United States.
While most national public officials have been guarded in 
their responses to the East Coast agreements, pending their 
outcome in the U.S. Senate ratification struggle, local gov­
ernmental officials and members of the fishing communities 
in both Canada and the United States have been quite vociferous 
in their reactions to the tentative settlements— especially 
the Atlantic fisheries pact.
Since reactions to the recently released East Coast 
treaties are only beginning to surface, the comments that 
follow represent the tip of an iceberg of attitudes floating 
amid the North Atlantic fishing communities. Looking at 
Canadian responses first, it would have to be noted that 
they appear to reflect the nature of the Canadian polity and 
political culture. Most initial comments from local provin­
cial officials and fishing industry representatives appear 
to be supportive of federal government actions. Even 
Canadian critics of the two agreements realize that there 
is little they can do to block or change the content of the 
treaties; therefore, most Canadians are expressing the hope 
that with the implementation of the treaties there will be 
not only more cooperation between the United States and 
Canadian Governments but also more linkage between provin­
cial fishing attitudes/demands and Ottawa-based decision 
makers' responses.
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The East Coast fishery treaty has garnered the 
expected applause of Trudeau's outgoing Fisheries Minister, 
Romeo LeBlanc. LeBlanc believes that the most important as­
pect of the pact is that Canada and the United States will 
now have " . . .  the framework within which to co-operate in
ensuring that the fish stocks of mutual interest are properly
136managed to the benefit of the fishermen of both countries."
LeBlanc denies suggestions that Canada was "outnegotiated" by
indicating that while Canada did not get all it wanted,
neither did the Americans. "But then again I am sure that if
you asked the American fishermen this question, they would
give the same answer. . . .  It is obvious from the very fact
that it took 18 months to achieve this agreement that both
sides negotiated very hard with the interests of their fish-
137ing communities foremost in mind."
In a February 15 comment. Conservative fisheries
critic, Lloyd Crouse, a member of parliament from the Atlantic
South Shore, suggests that retention of the greater share of
scallops on the Georges Bank will be very beneficial to
Eastern Canadian fishermen; however, reactions to some of
the ground fish allocations will have to be determined". . .
138after we hear from the Canadian fishermen." Nova Scotia's 
Fisheries Minister Donald Cameron feels Nova Scotians should 
be ". . . 'awfully happy' to have the agreement because with­
out it stocks would be destroyed and a large part of the
139province's fishery would be gone." Cameron concludes
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that someone " . . .  interested in cod or haddock might say
we have got too little. . . . You've got to give to get in
140negotiations. . . . "
James Morrow, Vice-President of National Sea Products,
an important Nova Scotia fish processor, suggests that the
agreement appears to be what both countries need. "The
important thing is whether the agreement will stay in place
when the boundary dispute is settled. . . .  If both sides
honor the agreement and police the area to insure each
country stays within its allotted percentages, we will all
see greater quantities of fish."^*^ Still, John Coulten,
former Executive Director of the Nova Scotia Fishermen's
Association, and a member of the Canadian advisory group on
maritime boundary issues, is ". . . not impressed with the
agreement. Either party can back out with six months
n o t i c e . S u c h  would be the case if the boundary dispute
is not referred to arbitration within two years after the
fishing agreement's implementation. Coulton concludes:
"The tactics were wrong from the start. Canada is known
as a country which puts all its cards on the table at once
and leaves no room to horse trade. You can't negotiate
143internationally on that basis."
Representing the attitudes of food processors, Roger 
Stirling, manager of the Nova Scotia Fish Packers Associa­
tion, notes: "We didn't get what we wanted and neither did
the Americans. Both sides are probably unhappy. . . . But
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it [the Agreement] could provide a stability and certainly
that is n e e d e d . S t i r l i n g ,  a member of the Canadian
Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee and East Coast
boundary advisory group, feels a key clause in the fishery
pact is the one linking it to the boundary arbitration.
"If it means what it appears to mean, the implication is
that all we might have is a two-year agreement, and we would
145be unhappy about that." Thus, the permanency of the 
fisheries agreement is one of the biggest concerns Canadians 
have expressed so far.
Since the fisheries agreement's formal signing in 
Washington, B.C., at the end of March 1979, Canadian officials 
have tried to present a positive front. H. Douglas Johnston, 
Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Oceans and Fish­
eries, argues: "It was the best agreement we could have come
up with. . . . It's not everything we would have liked, but 
it was the best we could have done."^^^ Nova Scotia's Fish­
eries Minister Donald Cameron thinks Special Negotiator 
Marcel Cadieux should be praised for his diplomatic efforts. 
"Mr. Cadieux kept us very well informed during the negotia­
tions. He phoned me himself several times to let me know
147what was happening." Moreover, Cameron has indicated 
that the provincial governments had direct representation 
in some of the diplomatic meetings.
The May 1979 issue of a respected Canadian periodical, 
Atlantic Insight, sums up the initial Canadian responses to
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the fisheries accord. "The treaty got a mixed reception
on both sides. Although accepted as necessary for the
preservation of fish, there have been inevitable complaints
that the other side got too much. Canada got 73% of the
lucrative scallop take, but some argue that the average
catch over the past few decades, which was the basis for
the deal, was closer to 85%. Also, Canadians have griped
149 .over their low groundfish quotas." Still, Canadian
journalist Ralph Surette believes that an
. . . encouraging aspect of the Georges Bank con­
flict has been the reduction in bombast as the 
diplomats seemed to stumble across the realities 
only by degrees. At first. External Affairs had 
the jaunty view that the usual Canada-U.S. bon­
homie would solve matters within weeks. Since 
Canada-U.S. bonhomie is usually the prelude to a 
Canadian sellout. Nova Scotia fishermen started 
putting on pressure. Meanwhile American fisher­
men, traditionally more neglected by their govern­
ment than the Canadians, also got increasingly 
militant. The diplomats finally got the message.
From the American perspective, the diplomats evi­
dently did not get the entire message. Since the release 
of the East Coast treaties, America's Atlantic fishing com­
munity has begun to organize a major pressuring effort 
against Senate ratification of the pacts. Beginning on May 
15, 1979, a new coalition, the American Fisheries Defense 
Committee, has spearheaded the drive ", . . to defeat Senate 
ratification of a proposed fishing agreement with Canada.
. . . Jacob Dykstra, of the Point Judith [Rhode Island] 
Fishermen's Cooperative Association is acting as chairman of 
the executive council of the Defense Committee. Dykstra
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points out that the " . . .  new Committee is composed of
a major segment of the American fishing industry who are
banding together to defeat ratification of the proposed
152East Coast Fisheries Agreement with Canada." A detailed 
membership roster clearly demonstrates that the American 
Fisheries Defense Committee represents sea food producers 
and boat owners, unions, trade groups, processors, and 
dealers from Maine to Florida. Its supporters account for 
more than two-thirds of the value of the total fish catch 
on the East Coast of the United States in 1978.
Before detailing some of the arguments of the Amer­
ican Fisheries Defense Committee against the East Coast 
Fishery Agreement, it is important to note that not all 
East Coast fishermen and processors are against the pact.
Lee Weddig of the National Fisheries Institute (NFI), the 
largest fisheries trade association in the United States, 
indicates that since the " . . .  National Fisheries Insti­
tute has members in all factions of the industry . . . [it] 
makes a policy determination somewhat difficult. In this 
case, for example, we have among our members the ocean perch 
and ground fishing operations and users who are basically 
satisfied with the proposed treaty in the North Atlantic,
but also scallop and mid-Atlantic groups which are quite
153unhappy with the proposal."
Having held a special session on the proposed East 
Coast treaties at the National Fisheries Institute Convention
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in Atlanta on May 16, 1979, the NFI has been able to 
formalize its treaty recommendations.Weddig states 
that " . . .  the NFI position is about the only realistic 
one I believe that is possible, and one which we are recom­
mending to the Congress as well. It calls for approval of 
the treaty but with reservations which would provide that 
the allocations would be renegotiated after a boundary line 
is arbitrated or after January 1, 1984, whichever comes 
first. A second reservation would allow reallocations in
any amount and not be limited to the ten percentage points
155presently called for in the treaty." Weddig concludes: 
"Whether these reservations will be accepted by the Canadian 
government remains to be seen. However, our Institute's 
Government Relations Committee and the Board of Directors 
wanted to give the treaty a change.
The American Fisheries Defense Committee does not 
want the fisheries treaty to get that chance. The members 
of the Committee argue that ". . . the basic structure of 
the joint fisheries management regime contained in the treaty 
and the negotiated allocations of access, entitlements and 
management authority is so complex that it is difficult to 
imagine what minimal reservations might be adopted to elimi­
nate the most onerous effects of the proposed agreement on 
the domestic industry. The best approach would be to settle 
the seabed boundary first and then, on the basis of an 
established boundary, negotiate an appropriate regime for 
joint management of transboundary stocks.
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While it is true that the Fisheries Defense 
Committee is heavily financed and supported by Massachusetts 
fishermen, processors, and labor unions, especially in the 
New Bedford area, the Committee has lined up support for 
its anti-treaty position among lobstermen (Maine Offshore 
Lobstermen's Association and the Rhode Island-based Atlantic 
Offshore Fish and Lobster Association). It also has gained 
the active support of the well organized Point Judith Fish­
ermen's Cooperative Association in Rhode Island, the Long 
Island Fishermen's Association of New York, and Maryland 
Watermen's Association. From New York to North Carolina 
in the coastal areas, the Committee lists the support of 
seven New Jersey fish processors and co-ops, ten Virginia 
fish companies, and eleven North Carolina sea food firms; 
the Committee represents an additional forty fishing vessels 
from Mid-Atlantic states. The Committee indicates it also 
has the backing of some fisheries and labor organizations 
such as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the 
American Swordfish Association, the Bender Shipyard of 
Mobile, Alabama, and Scallop-Shrimp King, Incorporated, of 
Corpus Christi, Texas.
It is apparent that the membership of the American 
Fisheries Defense Committee (AFDC) is composed primarily of 
scallop fishermen, lobstermen, Mid-Atlantic fishermen and 
related fish processors; the Committee lacks the support of 
Maine and other New England ground fishermen who hope to
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resume fishing operations in Canadian waters. The important 
New England Fisheries Steering Committee, headed by Howard 
Nickerson, has not sponsored the AFDC either. Nickerson 
notes that while the AFDC is doing a good job, " . . .  all 
members of the [New England] Steering Committee are not in 
agreement with their efforts. It is not a Steering Committee 
effort although many of our members are supporting it gen­
erously, both financially and physically on the Washington,
I C OD.C.,, scene. " In a very graphic manner, the American
Fisheries Defense Committee demonstrates how fractionated 
the U.S. fishing community can be. The American fishing 
industry is not just geographically divided into East, West, 
and Gulf Coast segments, or into distant water versus coastal 
fishing interests. It is also divided into a number of 
species/stock fishing groups with separate interests and 
problems. Perhaps what is remarkable is that two-thirds 
(in catch value) of the Atlantic fishing community has been 
able to form a coalition to defeat the East Coast Fisheries 
Agreement.
What are the specific arguments that the American 
Fisheries Defense Committee (AFDC) has against the proposed 
fisheries agreement? The AFDC suggests that the United 
States has not obtained reciprocal rights of fisheries 
access and management in the Canadian zone comparable to 
those ceded to Canada in the U.S. 200-mile fishing zone.
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As a result of Canada's massive subsidization of 
its fishing industry since the 1960's, the Canadian 
Atlantic fleet consists of larger vessels capable 
of travelling farther to exploit fisheries than the 
bulk of the American East Coast fleet. Thus, 
Canadian fishermen could take full advantage of the 
access given them to fish for such valuable stocks 
as cod, haddock, scallops and herring in the U.S. 
zone. On the other hand, U.S. fishing vessels 
generally do not have the capability to harvest 
fisheries resources in areas of the Canadian zone 
which lie at great distances from U.S. ports. 
Moreover, the theoretical rights of access granted 
American fishermen in Canadian waters are made even 
less meaningful as a result of the comparatively 
more severe weather conditions in these regions, 
which shortens the fishing s e a s o n . 159
One of the biggest complaints of the AFDC relates 
to the scallop entitlements. The Committee claims that the 
treaty, if ratified, " . . .  would reduce the burgeoning 
U.S. scallop industry's share of the total Georges Bank 
catch from about 31 percent in 1978 to 26.65 percent for 
at least ten y e a r s . T h e  U.S. State Department argues 
that during the . . six years (1971-1976) preceding 
establishment of the 200-mile fisheries zones, U.S. fisher­
men did not harvest more than about 15 percent of the major 
scallop stock in the Georges Bank fishery. Their 13-year 
average on the Bank (1964-1976) was only 22.7 percent, and 
the annual U.S. percentage steadily declined during that 
period. The 26.65 percent thus represents a substantial 
increase over the 1971-1976 average which Canada originally 
insisted was the appropriate U.S. share of the fishery.
The AFDC counters by noting that the " . . .  U.S. industry's 
historical share of the Georges Bank scallop landings from
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1950 to the present has been over 50 percent, and that 
share declined steeply (only) when Canada began subsidiz­
ing, its industry around 1960. In recent years, however, 
the American scallop effort has been growing at rapid 
rates. . . .
The AFDC points out that the U.S. fishing community 
on the Atlantic Coast has invested 25 to 30 million dollars 
in new and converted scallop fishing vessels. This invest­
ment has been based on the assumption that the American 
scallop fishermen would be free to compete with their 
Canadian counterparts for an increasing share of the total 
scallop catch on the Georges Bank. "Under the proposed 
treaty, U.S. fishermen would be forced to decrease their
scallop effort and would be unable to utilize the new
1G3investments made expressly for this purpose."
The Defense Committee does not agree with the new 
Canadian entitlement for loligo squid. "Instead of encourag­
ing U.S. expansion into the loligo squid fishery, the pro­
posed treaty would permit Canadian vessels to enter this 
fishery for the first time. Since the bulk of the squid 
caught off the United States coast is consumed abroad,
Canada would be able to compete with American industry for a 
foot hold in overseas markets over a period of ten years.
The U.S. State Department offers a rebuttal to this line of 
reasoning. The squid arrangement with Canada " . . .  permits 
full scope for developing this potential, since the U.S. may
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still permit its own fishermen or third countries to catch 
up to 91 percent of the loligo. In these circumstances, the 
limited share of the loligo resource provided Canada seems 
reasonable in return for the reciprocal access of our fish­
ermen to the valuable redfish [ocean perch] fishery within 
the Canadian Zone."^^^ Not to be outdone, Jacob Dykstra, 
speaking on behalf of the AFDC, points out that Americans 
can fish for redfish in the Canadian zone for only a non­
renewable ten year period. The United States would be re­
quired to guarantee " . . .  Canada the right to develop a 
brand-new fishery for. loligo squid all along the East Coast 
of the United States in exchange for preserving the histori­
cal catch of redfish, or ocean perch, in waters off Nova 
Scotia. Ironically, the perch fishery was originally developed 
through United States efforts.
Other AFDC arguments are centered on the "impracti­
cal management bureaucracy" that would be established in a 
joint Canadian-American East Coast Fisheries Commission, 
and the assertion that the fisheries treaty would undermine 
the authority of America's new Regional Fishery Management 
Councils. "The East Coast Fisheries Agreement would sub­
ordinate the New England and Mid-Atlantic Councils to a pro­
cess that gives Canada dominant influence with respect to 
important fisheries in the region. To subject their deci­
sions to Canadian review, negotiation, and challenge is to 
abort the Councils' function and to undermine the entire
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T 67system of regional involvement.” The U.S. State
Department's reply to that claim is twofold. The position 
of the United States members on the joint Canadian-American 
Fisheries Commission " . . .  regarding the stocks of great­
est interest to the U.S. fishing industry will be based upon 
fishery management plans developed by the [Regional] Council 
concerned, with full public p a r t i c i p a t i o n . M o r e o v e r ,  
out of seven American members [national panel] on the joint 
Commission " . . .  three of the U.S. members would be selected 
by the New England Management Council from among its number 
and two would be selected by the Middle Atlantic Management 
Council from among its number. The U.S. vote in the Commis­
sion would be cast on the basis of a majority vote of the 
U.S. members, so that the Regional Management Councils will 
have effective control over the U.S. vote."^®^
In sum, the American Fisheries Defense Committee 
believes a continuation of the status quo would be preferable 
to the East Coast Fisheries Treaty. The U.S. would continue 
to exercise exclusive management jurisdiction over all of 
the fisheries in its 200-mile conservation zone, the Regional 
Management Councils would remain unscathed, Canadian vessels 
would be kept from fishing in the U.S. zone, and both ". . . 
countries would presumably continue to fish in the disputed 
area on a freely competitive basis, so the American scallop 
fishermen could maintain their recent growth record in the 
Georges Bank r e g i o n . T h e  AFDC concludes that, ". . . to 
the extent that there was concern about the status of stocks
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which migrated across seabed boundaries, the two governments
could informally coordinate fishery management plans in
171order to avoid depletion of resources."
There is a practical bilateral bargaining notion
not detailed by the AFDC which has been suggested by Howard
Nickerson of the New England Fisheries Steering Committee.
"We have missed the boat perhaps in not stressing economics.
The Canadians should be deprived of the U.S. market if they
are not willing to give on stocks or boundary area. Canadians
have said to other nations, 'You can fish off our shores but
you must also buy from our processors and give us entry to
172your markets.'" Nickerson concludes that regarding the
United States, Canadians " . . .  want to sell us all of their 
harvest, regardless if it is caught in their waters or ours.
. . . Most of the product, particualrly scallops, caught in 
the Canadian eastern Maritime is exported to the United 
States. There are many days that there is twice as much 
Canadian fish in Boston and Gloucester as local product. I 
was chastised for mentioning economics and sale of U.S. pro­
duct in east coast ports in a closed U.S. [treaty] pre-
173negotiating session." The most feasible reason for 
Nickerson's chastisement is probably to be found in the 
State Department's public comment that the United States 
and Canada " . . .  are each other's largest trading partners.
An effort to negotiate a reduction of Canadian fish exports 
to the U.S. as part of the boundary/fishery treaty package
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would not have been feasible without raising questions 
concerning many other difficult issues relating to U.S./
Canada trade relationships in energy, automobiles, and other
«174 maoor items.”
The overall U.S. State Department's reply to anti­
treaty sentiment is concisely summarized when it stipulates 
that nothing " . . .  can change the fact that the United States 
and Canada share a common boundary, that there is a boundary 
dispute between them, or that many important fish stocks
move back and forth throughout the boundary region and can
175be effectively managed only on a unitary basis." A con­
tinuation of ". . . the status quo is neither in the national 
interest nor in the interest of the fishing communities of 
either nation. . . . It is time for both sides to heed Aesop's
fable about the dog who dropped the large bone in his mouth
T 76to snatch at its even larger reflection in the water."
That sentiment is reflected in the thinking of Sena­
tor Edmund Muskie, who became the first New England Senator 
to endorse ratification of the East Coast agreements. Muskie 
believes that on ". . . balance, the Agreements are fair to 
Maine and New England fishermen. The package is far from 
perfect. But it is an acceptable compromise which holds the
promise for sound management of fish stocks in which both
177countries have a stake." A pragmatic politician, Muskie 
admits: "I am pleased that our fishermen will again have
traditional access to Canadian waters. . . . This is
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especially important to our groundfish and redfish fleets 
in Rockland and Portland. . . .  I am under no illusion that 
the Joint Management Commission is going to win any popular­
ity contests with the U.S. and Canadian fishermen. Nonethe­
less, I am optimistic that joint management will work and 
that it will be fair. We simply cannot expect to wisely
manage fish stocks of mutual interest without close 
178cooperation." While other powerful East Coast Senators,
such as Edward Kennedy, have not yet made their treaty posi­
tions known, Muskie's early support, and position on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, must be viewed as a 
positive omen for ratification of the East Coast Treaties.
In comparison to all of the public controversy that 
has occurred regarding the East Coast accords. West Coast 
negotiations and policy initiatives appear to have garnered 
little national attention in either country. After John 
Negroponte, chief U.S. fisheries negotiator on the West Coast, 
indicated that some tentative agreements on Pacific halibut 
and groundfish had been reached in mid-February, 1979, Asso­
ciate Deputy Minister Donald Tansley spoke to the Fisheries 
Association of British Columbia on February 27, 1979. His 
comments, based upon notes from a speech by Fisheries Min­
ister Romeo LeBlanc, are some of the most informative to 
date. Tansley stipulated that the ”. . . tentative agree­
ment with the United States on fisheries other than salmon
179. . . "  has been finalized. "in 1977, when both countries
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extended jurisdiction, we found ourselves fishing in each
other's zone, to neither side's satisfaction. Now, in
1979, the proposed resolution would mean mainly this; after
a two-year phase-out, we no longer fish halibut off Alaska
and they no longer fish groundfish, or shrimp and the like,
180off British Columbia." Tansley continues: "By the pro­
posal terms, the U.S. would immediately stop their halibut 
fishery in our zone, which formerly took a half million 
pounds. They would be allowed to fish 3,250 tonnes of
groundfish off the B.C. coast for each of the next two years.
181That represents less than half their previous normal catch."
What would Canadians gain from the West Coast fish­
eries arrangements?
First, two years of fishing Alaska halibut: in 1979,
two million pounds, some 50 per cent of last year's 
level, and in 1980, one million pounds, for a total 
of three million pounds. Besides, we gain the hali­
but that Americans no longer fish off B.C. Second,
we keep for two years and possibly longer the Inter­
national Pacific Halibut Commission, set up by the 
1923 treaty. . . . Third, we gain time to relocate 
the halibut fleet into other B.C. fisheries in a 
planned, orderly manner— and that could include some 
form of relocation assistance.182
In candor, Tansley concludes: "We do not like giving up
the Alaskan halibut fishery. While other countries have lost
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of fish from our zone,
this is the one time the movement to 200-mile zones has
handed us any kind of loss. Although in overall terms we
lose nothing, still halibut fishermen will have to relocate.
But a zone is a zone; we cannot close ours and expect to
fish freely in the other guy's.
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American Harold Lokken, Director of the Pacific
Fisheries Foundation, indicates that as of July 1979 little
184has been written about the West Coast accords. Both
sides appear to be observing the East Coast debates and 
awaiting the outcome of Pacific salmon and boundary nego­
tiations. Lokken, an important industry spokesman involved 
in the West Coast deliberations, clearly states: "I favor
approval of the West Coast agreement on halibut and ground­
fish. Ratification of the halibut agreement is necessary 
to continue the work of the International Pacific Halibut 
Commission which has been in existence since 1924. . . .  As 
for an overall policy, I believe that whenever a fishing 
resource exists on both sides of an international boundary 
. . . the resource should be managed by an international 
agency consisting of the two countries involved. I don't 
believe that separate management of a transboundary resource
will work even though there is some degree of consultation
185between the two countries."
Jim Branson, Executive Director of America's North 
Pacific Fishery Management Council, appears to agree with 
Lokken. "While the west coast portion of the U.S.-Canadian 
Fishery Agreements is not entirely satisfactory [most Alaskans 
would have preferred a complete phase out of Canadian hali­
but fishing as of this year] it is satisfactory from both a 
resource standpoint and an economic standpoint. It saved 
the International Pacific Halibut Commission as a research
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and data gathering body and the Council considers that most 
important if we are to continue to manage the stocks as 
a unit.”^®^
187The U.S. State Department has recently released
the official text of an exchange of notes between Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance and Canadian Ambassador Peter Towe
related to the West Coast fisheries negotiations. Vance's
note to Ambassador Towe indicated his response to ". . . the
discussions between representatives of our two Governments
in Juneau and Ottawa concerning amendment of the Convention
between the United States of America and Canada for the
Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific
Ocean and Bering Sea and concerning fishing off the west
188coast of Canada." Encouraged by the signing in Washington, 
D.C. of an agreement amending the Halibut Convention, Secre­
tary Vance proposed that pending entry into force of the new 
Protocol, " . . .  the halibut fishery and sport fishing in
the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea shall be conducted
189on the basis of the terms of that Protocol."
It would be helpful at this point to set forth the 
exact terms of the Halibut Protocol signed on March 29,
1979. First, nationals and " . . .  fishing vessels of, and 
fishing vessels licensed by, Canada or the United States 
may fish for halibut in Convention waters only in accordance 
with this Convention, including its Annex, and as provided 
by the International Pacific Halibut Commission in
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regulations . . . designed to develop the stock of halibut
in the Convention waters to those levels which will permit
the optimum yield from the fishery and to maintain the
190stocks at those levels." Moreover, it is clear that the
term 'convention waters' refers to . . the waters off
the west coasts of Canada and the United States, including
the southern as well as the western coasts of Alaska, within
the respective maritime areas in which either Party exer-
191cises exclusive fisheries jurisdiction."
Article II of the amended Halibut Convention stip­
ulates that each Party shall have the right to enforce the
Convention and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto;
(a) in all Convention waters, against its own 
nationals and fishing vessels;
(b) in that portion of the Convention waters in 
which it exercises exclusive fisheries juris­
diction, against nationals or fishing vessels 
of either Party or of third parties.192
It is also noted that each " . . .  Party shall take appro­
priate measures to ensure that its nationals and fishing 
vessels allow and assist boardings and inspections of such 
vessels . . .  by duly authorized officials of the other 
Party.
Significantly, Canada and the United States " . . .
agree to continue under this Convention the Commission
known as the International Fisheries Commission established
by the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut 
194Fishery. . . . "  The six-member Commission, three experts 
appointed by each Party, will continue to investigate the
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life history of the halibut. Additionally, the Commission, 
with the approval of the Parties, may divide the Convention 
waters into areas, establish one or more open or closed sea­
sons as to each area, limit the size and quantity of the 
catch taken from each area, fix the size and character of 
halibut fishing appliances to be used in any area, make 
regulations for the licensing of vessels and for the collec­
tion of statistics on the catch of halibut, and finally,
close any area or portion of an area that the Commission
195finds to be populated by small, immature halibut.
The 1979 Halibut Protocol points out that the 
" . . .  Annex to this Convention shall constitute an integral 
part of the Convention, and all references to the Convention 
shall be considered to refer to the Annex as well."^^^ The 
most important aspects of the Annex relate to stock quotas 
established for the period beginning April 1., 1979, and end­
ing March 31, 1981. In ". . . the maritime area outside the 
Bering Sea in which the United States exercises exclusive 
fisheries jurisdiction, beyond three miles from the baseline 
from which the territorial sea of the United States is mea­
sured, nationals and fishing vessels of Canada issued regis­
tration permits by the United States may catch three million
197pounds of halibut . . . "  subject to the following limits;
(1) from April 1, 1979 to March 31, 1980, they 
may catch two million pounds of halibut;
(2) from April 1, 1980 to March 31, 1981, they 
may catch one million pounds of halibut.
Other Canadian and American percentages of the annual
total allowable catch of halibut in various portion/areas
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of Convention waters are detailed in the Annex. It is
indicated that by . . January 1, 1981, and thereafter
as it considers appropriate, the Commission shall, on the
basis of a review of pertinent information, recommend for
the approval of the Parties any appropriate changes in the
division of the annual total allowable catch set forth 
198. . . "  in Convention waters. Lastly, pending delimita­
tion of maritime boundaries between Canada and the United 
States in ". . . the Convention area, the following principles 
shall be applied as interim measures in the boundary regions:
(a) as between the Parties, enforcement of the 
Convention shall be carried out by the flag 
state;
(b) neither Party shall authorize fishing for 
halibut by vessels of third parties;
(c) either Party may enforce the Convention with 
respect to fishing for halibut, or related 
activities, by vessels of third parties.199
Since the ratification of the Halibut Protocol is 
currently being considered by the United States Senate, 
Secretary Vance suggested that, as an interim measure, the 
two governments conduct the halibut fishery on the terms of 
that March 29, 1979, agreement. Moreover, Vance's Note to 
Ambassador Towe contained a second proposal. "Nationals 
and fishing vessels of the United States shall not fish for 
groundfish in the maritime area off the west coast of Can­
ada in which Canada exercises exclusive fisheries jurisdic­
tion, except as provided . . in the Secretary's Note
and related Annex. Specifically, Vance proposed that na­
tionals and fishing vessels of the United States be allowed
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to *'. . . catch 6,500 metric tons of groundfish during the
period beginning April 1, 1979, and ending March 31, 1981 
201. . . "  in Canada's West Coast waters. It was further 
stipulated that half of the allotted groundfish (3,250 met­
ric tons) should be taken during each of the twelve month 
periods beginning on April 1, 1979. The Annex attached to 
Vance's Note provided further details as to the types and
amounts of groundfish that might be taken from designated
202marine areas off Canada's West Coast.
Vance's message to Ambassador Towe also contained 
the suggestion that the two governments should " . . .  estab­
lish an ad hoc group to consult on the implementation of 
the provisions of the [Halibut] Convention and of this agree­
ment and on other matters of mutual interest, including 
regulatory measures affecting fishing by nationals and ves­
sels of the United States in the maritime area off the west
coast of Canada in which Canada exercises exclusive fisheries 
203jurisdiction." Finally, Secretary of State Vance indi­
cated that prior to March 31, 1981, Canada and the United 
States should ". . . consult with a view to future fisheries 
cooperation off the west coasts of the United States and 
Canada within the respective maritime areas in which either 
exercises exclusive fisheries jurisdiction.
In categorical terms. Secretary Vance was attempting 
to formalize an executive agreement that would keep the 
International Pacific Halibut Commission in operation and
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establish the terms under which United States fishermen
could take designated amounts of groundfish from Canada's
Pacific maritime areas. "If the foregoing proposals are
acceptable to the Government of Canada, I have the honor to
propose that this Note and its Annex, together, with your
Excellency's reply shall constitute an agreement between the
United States and Canada which shall enterinto force on the
205date of your reply."
Upon receipt of the Secretary of State's Note, 
Ambassador Towe drafted the following reply to Vance: "I
have the honour to inform you that the foregoing proposals 
are acceptable to the Government of Canada and to confirm 
that your Note and this reply which is equally authentic in 
English and in French shall constitute an agreement between 
our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date 
of this reply." Thus, on March 29, 1979, the United States
and Canada exchanged Notes constituting a two year agreement 
on valuable stocks of Pacific halibut and certain species of 
Canadian groundfish.
As this study concludes its analysis of contemporary 
American-Canadian fisheries negotiations, the halibut and 
groundfish provisions of the Vance-Towe Agreement are in 
force; moreover, the Protocol amending the Convention be­
tween Canada and the United States of America for the Pre­
servation of the Halibut Fishery of the North Pacific Ocean 
and Bering Sea is pending ratification in the United States
348
207Senate. Still, while evidence exists that some progress
has been made regarding the sharing of Pacific halibut and 
groundfish, other problems persist. The joint management or 
sharing of highly migratory species of fish such as salmon 
and tuna as well as the resolution of West Coast maritime 
boundary disputes remain deadlocked dreams in the hands of 
the American and Canadian negotiators.
Observations
While the next chapter of this study will contain the 
conclusions and prognostications on the outcome of the East 
and West Coast treaty efforts, this chapter would not be com­
plete without several summary comments. The negotiating 
efforts from 1977 to 1979 have been intense and difficult. 
Ifhile all the deliberations have not yet been culminated, 
it is obvious that both sides have been willing to compro­
mise to reach tentative agreements. East Coast efforts, which 
to date, are the most comprehensive, are also very contro­
versial. This is to be expected since both Governments have 
been willing to finalize some specific long-range Atlantic 
fisheries enactments. One important American fish broker 
and industry advisor to the State Department reflects: "I
believe that the [East Coast] treaty now before the U.S.
Senate regarding U.S.-Canadian relationships is the best 
that could be worked out at this time. The fact that the 
Canadian fishing groups and the U.S. fishermen are both 
dissatisfied as to what they received, indicates that as
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negotiations go, this was the best compromise that could be
208worked out at this time."
The Marine Law Institute of the University of Maine 
School of Law and the staff of the Maine Commercial Fish­
eries have jointly written some interesting comments on the 
East Coast Fisheries Agreement. They note that since 1950, 
the U.S. and Canada have concluded 232 agreements between 
them, but " . . .  none of these has been permanent. One side 
or the other could always withdraw. This agreement is unlike 
anything on record as both countries have to agree to termi­
nate it. In short, the U.S. may only withdraw from this
agreement if Canada allows us to. This represents a first
209in U.S. foreign policy." Those who favor the East Coast 
fisheries treaty note, however, that since ". . . joint man­
agement is inevitable, the treaty flexible, and the basic 
provisions fair, the fear of the treaty's permanence is with- 
out real merit."
Still, fears persist within the fishing communities 
of both countries, especially regarding a West Coast 
"sellout." Donald Tansley of Canada's Department of Fish­
eries and Oceans argues: "Actual negotiations on a spe­
cific subject have to remain secret; otherwise, every ploy 
or position by either side would be dragged through a public 
debate and we could look forward to a settlement in the 
year 3000. But our general approach is open and obvious; 
get the best deal on salmon, get the best deal on other
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fish, get the best deal on boundaries— for each coast.
211There's no secret deal or sellout anywhere.”
Before leaving office, Romeo LeBlanc, Canada's 
Minister of Fisheries gave perhaps the most realistic 
assessment of the 1977-1979 Canadian-American fisheries
negotiations. "Compromise is defined as finding a solution
212where both sides are equally unhappy." In that regard,
the negotiators appear to have succeeded.
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CHAPTER VII
SHARING THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA:
CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSTICATIONS
A depleted sea----
Diplomatic maneuvers amid 
harbor cries;
Storms on shore to match 
the ocean's gales.
Bonhomie----
Share the living resources 
of the sea;
Waters will calm and the 
fish still leap.
Abundantly---
This study began with the notion that while "fish 
still leap," world fisheries are experiencing great changes 
as fishermen expand their efforts to use the living resources 
of the sea. Canada and the United States are important par­
ticipants in those changing international fisheries rela­
tionships. The goals of this final chapter will be to 
(1) provide some schematic conclusions drawn from the FiNS 
framework employed in the dissertation, (2) reflect on the 
successes and continuing dilemmas for contemporary American-
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Canadian fisheries negotiations, and (3) set forth some 
comments on the future of the reciprocal fisheries relations 
between these two North American countries.
Schematic Conclusions
From a practical standpoint, the Fisheries Negotiations 
Schema for Open Polities (FiNS) has provided an organizational 
framework for a vast amount of material. The levels of anal­
ysis perspective has enabled the author to look separately 
at the international (first level) actors involved in the 
shaping of North American fisheries policies. Moreover, 
important national attributes (second level) as well as 
domestic policy influencers and decision makers (third level) 
have been individually examined with the schema.
It should be concluded that the first or international 
level of analysis, in addition to the obvious significance of 
the bilateral interactions/negotiations between Canada and 
the United States, has been important to Canadian-American 
fisheries relations in several regards. All of the efforts 
at the United Nations Third Law of the Sea Conference 
(UNCLOS III) discussed in chapter 3 have encouraged the 
creation of 200-mile special economic/fishing zones. Since 
so many Conference nations have become involved in the 
development of that zonal concept, it encourages and legiti­
mizes the efforts of individual nations to expand their 
fisheries/resource boundaries. During the most recent 
session of UNCLOS III, from March 19 to April 27, 1979, the
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159 delegations have taken no additional actions regarding 
the living resources of the sea, but then few, if any, are 
needed. The exclusive economic zone and resource-related 
articles contained in UNCLOS Ill's Informal Composite Nego­
tiating Text have gained so much acceptance that most nations 
consider them as "customary international law."
The first level of analysis also helps to show how 
regional fisheries commissions, the International Commission 
for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) and its replacement 
on the Atlantic Coast— the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization (NAFO), as well as the International Commission 
for North Pacific Fisheries on the West Coast can still play 
some limited management, research, and data gathering func­
tions for North American oceanic fisheries. Clearly their 
efforts have become even more restricted since Canada and 
the United States implemented their 200-mile fishing zones.
The United States is still outside the NAFO officially,
" . . .  although in spirit and perhaps financially I would 
question whether our U.S. participation ever really ended. 
Regarding the multinational corporations (especially those 
based in Japan) and the distant water fishing nations, the 
200-mile American and Canadian fishing zones have dramatically 
curtailed their access to the rich Atlantic and Pacific 
fisheries.
The second level of analysis of Canada and the United 
States helps convey to the reader important similarities 
and differences between the two societies. In terms of
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national attributes relevant to fisheries policy making, 
both nations have a wealth of marine resources off their 
coasts and domestic fishing industries eager to expand their 
harvesting operations in the new 200-mile North American 
fishing zones. The two open polities are dissimilar, how­
ever, in several important respects. Since Confederation 
in 1867, the federal government of Canada has maintained 
exclusive legislative authority over its oceanic fisheries. 
This has led to the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus in 
Ottawa which has tight management authority over the country's 
fisheries. Given such jurisdictional strength, the federal 
government has established a separate Department of Fisheries 
headed by a minister with cabinet rank. The United States, 
on the other hand, grants legal authority to its coastal 
states to regulate fisheries within the territorial sea; 
thus, until the implementation of the 1976 U.S. Fishery Con­
servation and Management Act, the federal government has had 
a comparatively smaller role in the management of the coun­
try's living marine resources. The United States, it must 
be emphasized, has never had a separate federal fisheries 
department, secretary of fisheries, or unified fisheries 
decision-making process.
Differences in Canadian and American fisheries policy 
making cannot be attributed only to jurisdictional (federal- 
provincial/state) distinctions. Demographically, Canadian 
fishermen make up a much larger percentage of the total
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population than do their American counterparts. Economically, 
the Canadian fishing industry, when compared with its Ameri­
can equivalent, contributes a greater proportionate share 
of revenue to the country's gross national product. Struc­
turally, it should be recalled, the Canadian fishing industry 
is coastal in nature while the American fishing industry is 
more highly fragmented into coastal versus distant water 
fleets. Moreover, the United States fishing community is 
also divided into a greater number of species/stock fishing 
groups with separate interests and problems.
In sum, as a result of all these political, social, 
and economic attributes, Canada has developed a federal 
fisheries apparatus which oversees a coastal fishing industry 
that is unified in its call for protectionist national fish­
ing policies and willing to work closely and cooperatively 
with Ottawa. In contrast, the United States is attempting 
to coordinate more complex federal and state fisheries mech­
anisms designed to manage a fragmented fishing industry 
which is divided in its fisheries goals and frustrated by 
the fact that it feels relegated to the periphery of America's 
economic and political priorities.
The third level of analysis of the Canadian and 
American polities has enabled the author to demonstrate 
that,while the values in both nations' political cultures 
have encouraged pluralistic responses from interest groups, 
political parties, and the mass public, the decision­
makers and the bureaucratic policy influencers wield the
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greatest amount of control over the direction of American 
and Canadian fisheries policies. The bureaucratic influ­
encers in both nations, especially individuals in Canada's 
Department of External Affairs and Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans as well as the U.S.'s Department of State and 
Department of Commerce,are currently articulating ideas 
which usually become the major policy alternatives considered 
by diplomats involved in the bilateral American-Canadian 
fisheries negotiations.
Moreover, a third level assessment of policy influ­
encers provides some understanding of who is really influenc­
ing whom. In the case of Canada, the highly centralized 
Ottawa decision-making apparatus still seems to be formulat­
ing all of the significant domestic and international fish­
ery decisions. Canadian economist, Parzival Copes, while 
admitting that the federal government's absolute power over 
fisheries has been somewhat diminished by judicial decisions 
and by delegation of some functions to provincial govern­
ments, contends that " . . .  the Minister in charge of Fish­
eries in Ottawa does all of the planning and implementing 
of regulations. The four Atlantic provinces have fisheries 
departments, but those handle fisheries development and sub- 
sidies rather than management." The maritime interest 
groups of Canada, especially the fishermen and fish pro­
cessors, occasionally cry out for help and grumble about 
directives from Ottawa. Still, it should be concluded that 
most of Canada's interest, partisan, and mass policy
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influencers are not articulating distinctive policy 
alternatives but rather supporting fisheries policies 
already made by a cohesive group of Ottawa-based decision 
makers.
In the United States, there appears to be more of a 
fisheries policy-making debate between decision makers and 
the domestic policy influencers. Since the passage of 
the 1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act, greater 
inputs into the fisheries decision-making process have been 
provided. "The power struggles this has resulted in are 
familiar to fishermen of the Northeast by now. Industry 
has struggled to learn how to participate effectively in the 
Council process, which is designed to take and use public 
and industry suggestions. States have struggled to avoid 
pre-emption by the Council or National Marine Fisheries 
Service. The Councils have struggled to assert themselves 
as the primary decision-making body. . . . ”
Robin Peters, General Manager of Maine Commercial 
Fisheries is fearful that just as the U.S. Regional Fishery 
Management Councils are beginning to work, they might find 
their range of actions limited by the new joint American- 
Canadian East Coast Fisheries Commission. Peters, who is 
also a commercial fisheries specialist for the University 
of Maine Sea Grant Marine Advisory Service, notes that the 
”. . .  Council system established by the (1976) FCMA is 
cumbersome, frustrating, and decidedly imperfect. However 
an attempt has been made through that law to get
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constructive participation from a broad group of users of 
the resources."* The Maine fisheries expert believes that 
if . . this cumbersome structure is put in an interna­
tional context it becomes very difficult for it to survive 
because of the tendency of the federal government to feel 
that they need tremendous centralized power in order to
5function internationally."
Paradoxically, it must be concluded that while Amer­
ica’s domestic fisheries policies are now being based upon 
a broader range of articulated private interests, America's 
regional fisheries enactments with Canada bear the heavy 
imprint of bureaucratic influencers based in Washington,
D.C. The American Fisheries Defense Committee, a sizable, 
well-organized interest group designed to fight against Senate 
ratification of the East Coast Fishery Agreement is evidence 
of the fact that many American fishermen and fish processors 
feel their views and best interests are not being taken into 
account in regional/international fisheries negotiations.
Once again, they argue, cultivation of friendly Canadian- 
American relations has been given a higher governmental 
priority than fulfillment of the needs/aspirations of many 
domestic American fishermen. As third-level policy influ­
encers, such fishermen and processors feel stultified in 
their pressuring efforts.
One final conclusion to be derived from the usage 
of the Fisheries Negotiations Schema for Open Polities
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relates to William Coplin's traditional "international 
politics framework" and "world policy process framework."®
It should be recalled that Coplin's world policy process 
assumes that for certain "issue areas" such as international 
fisheries relations "... there are no organized patterns 
of influence and authority among various actors. Instead, 
lines link all actors— subnational, national, and transna­
tional— to the formation of world p o l i c y . I n  such a 
framework, the nation-state is only one type of actor that 
might be the critical factor in the international 
negotiations.
Dissertation chapters 3 through 6 have documented 
the fact that for open polities such as Canada and the 
United States, the world policy process framework is not 
appropriate in assessing regional/international fisheries 
relations. Coplin's more traditional "international politics 
framework," which has been incorporated into the Fisheries 
Negotiations Schema, is clearly more useful and accurate.
The nation-state is still the prime focal point for American- 
Canadian fisheries relations. There are organized patterns 
of influence and authority among the various actors. Parti­
san, mass, interest, and bureaucratic policy influencers 
in the U.S. and Canada direct their fisheries pressuring 
efforts through the nation-state, while intergovernmental, 
nongovernmental, and multinational organizations openly link 
their fisheries actions/concerns to those of the Canadian
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and American polities. Moreover, distant-water fishing 
nations such as the Soviet Union and Japan have been forced 
to deal directly with the two North American governments, 
in hopes of continuing some fishing operations in the new 
200-mile American and Canadian fishing zones.
In sum, American and Canadian fisheries relation­
ships today parallel the patterns of influence and authority 
suggested in Coplin's "international politics framework."
While it is possible to suggest that the proposed Joint 
East Coast Fisheries Commission demonstrates a new pattern 
of fisheries management authority between the United States 
and Canada, the usage of the "world policy process framework" 
to explain overall international fisheries policy making 
seems, at best, a futuristic dream.
American-Canadian Fisheries Accomplishments 
and Continuing Negotiations Dilemmas
Two years ago, Francis Christy, Jr., a noted fisheries 
researcher, wrote that " . . .  the changes occurring in the 
Law of the Sea will dramatically affect the patterns of 
exploitation of fisheries and the distribution of their 
benefits. It is not clear, however, that the effects, in
pthe short run, will be beneficial." In order to avoid 
severe depletion of fish stocks in the regions where stocks 
are widely shared, " . . .  the regional institutions will 
have to acquire a high degree of authority. Whether or not 
they will do so will depend upon how the states balance off
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their perceptions of the needs for authoritative bodies 
against their reluctance to relinquish any of their
9sovereignty."
It would appear that the United States and Canada 
are on the verge of heeding Christy's advice. The Joint 
East Coast Fisheries Commission that is a central part of 
the Atlantic fisheries agreement is an interesting apparatus. 
While the Commission's decision-making processes seem to 
be quite cumbersome, a genuine effort is being made to coop­
eratively manage a wide range of Atlantic fisheries. Even 
though the two national governments have significant inputs 
into the establishment of fishery entitlements and the annual 
total allowable catch for each enumerated stock, ultimate 
locus of authority rests with an Arbitrator who is not to 
be a national of either country. In addition to the joint 
East Coast Commission, Canada and the United States are 
planning to continue to utilize the International Pacific 
Halibut Commission, at least for a few more years. It should 
not be forgotten that the fifty-five year old Halibut Com­
mission can be cited as the first international effort to 
jointly manage a high seas fishery.
Comparing the Halibut and East Coast Commissions, 
one is struck by the more ambitious nature of the yet to 
be implemented East Coast regional mechanism. While both 
Commissions are joint efforts, the Pacific body has never 
placed its ultimate authority in the hands of an arbitrator,
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and usually makes management recommendations which can be 
ignored by the member governments. In recent years, the 
greatest value of the Halibut Commission has been its 
ability to act as a scientific research and data gathering 
body. The Halibut Commission is obviously a less complex 
organization since it is concentrating on one transboundary 
stock of fish. All of these factors have contributed to 
the Commission's successes and longevity. If the East Coast 
Fisheries Commission becomes a functioning reality, it will 
likely take months if not years before its capabilities are 
effectively utilized. Considering the variety of stocks of 
Atlantic living resources the Commission is charged with 
conserving and managing, the different levels of authority 
(national governments. Commission panels. Commission Co- 
Chairmen, and Arbitrator) potentially involved in the decision­
making process, and the vociferous efforts of various Atlantic 
fishing groups to challenge its actions, the East Coast Fish­
eries Commission faces some troubled waters.
The movement to 200-mile fishing zones has definitely 
complicated the American-Canadian fisheries relationship.
In addition to all the maritime boundary disputes yet to 
be settled or arbitrated, the two nations must resolve the 
sharing of Pacific salmon and other migratory species of 
fish. The salmon issue has been a difficult one for decades, 
and both sides continue to demand their fair share of the 
anadromous bounty. Romeo LeBlanc notes that; "Intelligent
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men having argued twenty years over this subject, obviously 
I can make no promise that they'll settle it tomorrow.
Still, Trudeau's former Minister of Fisheries gives 
some hope for the sharing of Pacific salmon. "But times 
are changing. Both Canada and the U.S. are gaining confidence 
in their ability to produce more salmon. With stocks of the 
two countries intermingling, only through cooperation can 
we produce the most salmon for fishermen on both sides.
Since 1977, LeBlanc concludes, more emphasis is being placed 
on conservation schemes with "fairer formulae for future 
sharing." "In this approach, where runs are intermingled, 
both countries would cooperate to increase production in 
parallel, with each country taking an amount of fish equiva­
lent to its own contribution, whether those fish originated
1'2in its rivers or not." It seems certain that while the 
regional management of Pacific salmon stocks is needed, the 
settlement of that bilateral impasse will be as controver­
sial and difficult as the implementation of the East Coast 
fisheries accord.
Will the East Coast treaties and West Coast hali­
but pact be ratified by the U.S. Senate? While it is danger­
ous to predict a Senate response before the Washington, D.C. 
hearings and debates have occurred, it seems likely that the 
treaties will be approved. When Senators such as Edmund 
Muskie^^ attempt to persuade their colleagues that manage­
ment concerns and the reestablishment of reciprocal fishing
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rights between Canada and the United States outweigh specific 
entitlement and Commission problems in the East Coast fish­
eries agreement, they will likely be supported in their pro­
treaty position. The pressuring efforts of the American 
Fisheries Defense Committee are well financed and quite 
impressive, but the most that the AFDC might hope for are 
some treaty reservations along the lines suggested by the 
potent National Fisheries Institute (as cited in chapter 6).
As for Prime Minister Joe Clark's response to the 
treaties, and his willingness to consider East Coast treaty 
reservations regarding the renegotiation of stock alloca­
tions, several thoughts might be set forth. The victory of 
the Progressive Conservatives in Canada's May 1979 federal 
elections has placed the new Prime Minister on a political 
and economic tightrope. "Mr. Clark will govern with 136 
seats in the new house of 282 seats. With the support of 
the six Social Credit members from Quebec he would have the 
barest possible m a j o r i t y . T r u d e a u ’s Liberals have 
" . . .  slumped to 114 seats— although they led ir. the 
popular vote because of their overwhelming strength in 
Quebec— and the New Democratic party [has] . . .  26 seats. 
Both of these parties will be willing to give Joe Clark all 
the political opposition he can handle. Moreover, it is 
argued that Clark's " . . .  minority Progressive Conservative 
government, which fell seven seats short of a majority in 
Parliament, must tread slowly on the dramatic economic
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stimulus that Clark promised the voters. The penalties 
for moving too fast will be steeper inflation and deeper 
deficits in the federal budget and in the balance of 
payments.
Balanced on his own political tightrope. Prime 
Minister Clark must demonstrate his leadership capabilities 
in both foreign and domestic affairs. It seems certain that 
he will want to keep the East and West Coast maritime pacts 
as they are, devoid of reservations which might ultimately 
provide Canadian fishermen with less favorable stock allo­
cations. It is also likely that Prime Minister Clark will 
strongly support Canadian fishermen with federal subsidies, 
update current federal fisheries policies, and encourage 
the finalization of Canadian-American fisheries and mari­
time boundary disputes.
While the new Canadian Prime Minister is faced with 
difficult economic and political problems, so, too, is his 
American counterpart. President Carter, facing re-election 
in 1980 amid rivalries within his own party, will want to 
maintain strong economic ties with Canada. Surely that is 
why Carter accepted an invitation from Clark to meet in 
Canada during the fall of 1979^^ to discuss important 
mutual interests: creation of a North American energy
common market, improvement of trade relations, and resolu­
tion of outstanding maritime problems. Carter can demon­
strate his foreign policy prowess by rekindling
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American-Canadian good will through the development of 
acceptable energy, fisheries, and boundary arrangements.
Just as Nixon and Ford before him. Carter has taken
his oceanic foreign policy role seriously. By encouraging
the establishment of internationally agreed upon fisheries/
maritime laws of the sea at UNCLOS III, signing protocols
18for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean and 
Pacific salmon, and transmitting to the United States Senate 
the new East and West Coast maritime pacts. Carter demon­
strates a desire to find international and regional solu­
tions to the equitable sharing of the living resources of 
the sea.
While Carter and his predecessors have often been 
at odds with Congress over maritime policies during the 
1970s, this is to be expected. The President as "chief 
diplomat" has taken a comprehensive, internationalist stand 
on many oceanic problems, while Congress has listened more 
intently to the domestic policy influencers who have been 
demanding an immediate unilateral creation of a 200-mile 
fishery zone. In the end, both President and Congress have 
accepted the fact that the 200-mile zone is an idea whose 
time has arrived. Today, the American President and Congress 
are not far apart in the realization that in order to make 
the 200-mile fishing zone work, reciprocal fisheries rela­
tions with Canada must be resumed as soon as possible.
380
Future Fisheries Relations
In an effort to make a few prognostications related 
to American-Canadian fisheries relations, several thoughts 
might be safely expressed. At first glance, it might seem 
strange that both Canada and the United States have been 
able to sign a great many fisheries agreements with other 
nations since 1976, but not with each other. The ease with 
which both nations created their 200-mile fishing zones 
should not really be surprising, however. Most coastal 
states, influenced by international forums such as UNCLOS 
III, have been on the verge of taking similar actions through­
out the 1970s; thus, Canada and the United States unilaterally 
acted at an appropriate moment in maritime history. Distant 
water fishing nations, especially those who had been members 
of the International Commission of Northwest Atlantic Fish­
eries, anticipated the North American moves, and eagerly 
sought new bilateral accords that would give them some 
future access to the waters off Canada and the United States.
Now that Canada and the United States control most 
of the fisheries resources 200 miles off their coasts, new 
dilemmas have developed. Where should the maritime boundary 
lines be drawn between the two North American neighbors?
How should the transboundary stocks of fish that swim freely 
in the two nations' waters be shared? How can the historic 
fishing rights of American and Canadian fishermen be pro­
tected in the other country* s zone? These questions have
381
led to protracted disputes, a fisheries impasse, and after 
two years of negotiations, some proposed settlements. The 
resumption of Atlantic fishing in each other's zones, and 
the continuance of Pacific fishing for groundfish and hali­
but on a reciprocal basis for two years can still occur in 
1980, if the U.S. Senate does not become mired in other 
pressing concerns— energy, inflation, SALT II treaties, and 
re-election. It also seems probable that the three West 
Coast maritime boundary disputes, like the Gulf of Maine 
area, will not be resolved soon, and eventually will be de­
cided by third-party arbitration.
There are definite signs that both Governments are 
looking optimistically toward the future. In Canada, Prime 
Minister Clark has selected James McGrath as the country's 
new Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. McGrath, a Progres­
sive Conservative member of Parliament from the Atlantic 
coast (St. John's East), is expected to be an open, deter­
mined spokesman for Canada's fishing industry. It will be 
up to McGrath to implement the Progressive Conservative 
Party's pledges:
— to establish and maintain good relationships 
between the federal and Provincial Departments 
of Fisheries in order that Provincial viewpoints 
are taken into account in the drafting and 
implementing of any federal fishery policy;
— to establish fishery advisory councils on the 
east and west coasts . . . composed of local 
fishermen and representatives of the processing 
industry who would review all aspects of exist­
ing regulations and policies so as to recommend 
changes and improvements as warranted;
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— to prepare now for the time when fish stocks 
become more plentiful by assisting in financing 
the construction of needed fishing vessels;
— to re-examine all shellfish and groundfish 
fishery regulations.19
In the United States, Congress is already designing
new implementing legislation for the U.S./Canada East Coast
Agreement. A Northeast Fisheries Act of 1979 is under active
20consideration by both the House and Senate. The U.S. 
Commerce Department is continuing its efforts to make cer­
tain that fish are harvested responsibly in accordance with 
regionally developed plans. Moreover, Allen Peterson, Jr., 
Northeast Regional Director for the Commerce Department's 
National Marine Fisheries Service, suggests that " . . .  since 
the United States enjoys within its 200-raile zone much of 
the available fisheries resources of the western hemisphere,
I believe we could and should become a major exporter and
turn around the present circumstances in which more than
2160 percent of our fishery products are imported."
While domestic fisheries hopes and expectations 
remain high in both Canada and the United States, maritime 
relations between the two nations must be given more con­
stant attention, devoid of the incrementalism that could 
lead from one fisheries impasse to another. The author of 
this dissertation believes that fisheries problems between 
the two countries are far from over, but. at least there is 
renewed hope that the opening of zonal waters to each others' 
fishermen will usher in a new era of positive fisheries 
relations between the United States and Canada.
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Once the fisheries agreements are implemented, the 
painstaking efforts on the East Coast to make the joint 
Fisheries Commission a workable mechanism will begin. In 
the short run, as Francis Christy, Jr., has noted, the 
benefits to both sides might not be readily apparent. Given 
time, however, as all effective management and conservation 
measures do, Canada and the United States should be embarked 
upon an equitable sharing of the living resources of the sea. 
Their successful joint fisheries management efforts could 
act as an effective model for other coastal states to 
follow.
It might be recalled that the second chapter of the 
dissertation attempted to document the long fisheries rela­
tionship between the United States and Canada through five 
diplomatic periods. It seems appropriate to suggest that 
two more diplomatic eras should be added to that chronology. 
From 1960 to 1978, the United States and Canada have both 
been involved in a "Period of Unilateral Maritime and Zonal 
Extensions." In 1979, it is too early to tell if a new 
fishery period is about to begin. One can only hope that 
some day a writer will look back upon the post 1979 years 
and determine that they were a time of cooperation— a 
"Period of Joint Efforts to Conserve and Share the Living 
Resources of the Sea."
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APPENDIX A
Regulations for Exclusive Economic Zone as provided in the 
UNCLOS III Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Article 62, 
par. 4(a) through (k).
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive 
economic zone shall comply with the conservation measures 
and with the other terms and conditions established in the 
regulations of the coastal State. These regulations shall 
be consistent with the present Convention and may relate, 
inter alia, to the following:
(a) Licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and 
equipment, including payment of fees and other forms 
of remuneration, which in the case of developing 
coastal States, may consist of adequate compensation 
in the field of financing, equipment and technology 
relating to the fishing industry;
(b) Determining the species which may be caught, and 
fixing quotas of catch, whether in relation to par­
ticular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per 
vessel over a period of time or to the catch by 
nationals of any State during a specified period;
(c) Regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the 
types, sizes and amount of gear, and the numbers, 
sizes and types of fishing vessels that may be 
used;
(d) Fixing the age and size of fish and other species 
that may be caught;
(e) Specifying information required of fishing ves­
sels, including catch and effort statistics and 
vessel position reports;
(f) Requiring, under the authorization and control 
of the coastal State, the conduct of specified fish­
eries research programmes and regulating the con­
duct of such research, including the sampling of




(g) The placing of observers or trainees on board 
such vessels in the ports of the coastal State;
(h) The landing of all or any part of the catch 
by such vessels in the ports of the coastal State;
(i) Terms and conditions relating to joint ven­
tures or other co-operative arrangements;
(j) Requirements for training personnel and transfer 
of fisheries technology, including enhancement of 




U.S. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
Title III— National Fishery Management Program
Sec. 301. National Standards for Fishery Conservation and 
Management
(a) In General.— Any fishery management plan pre­
pared, and any regulation promulgated to imple­
ment any such plan, pursuant to this title shall 
be consistent with the following national stan­
dards for fishery conservation and management;
(1) Conservation and management measures shall 
prevent overfishing while achieving, on a con­
tinuing basis, the optimum yield from each 
fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures 
shall be based upon the best scientific infor­
mation available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual 
stock of fish shall be managed as a unit through­
out its range, and interrelated stocks of fish 
shall be managed as a unit or in close coordina­
tion.
(4) Conservation and management measures 
shall not discriminate between residents of dif­
ferent States. If it becomes necessary to allo­
cate or assign fishing privileges among various 
United States fishermen, such allocation shall 
be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; 
(B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; 
and (C) carried out in such manner that no par­
ticular individual, corporation, or other entity 
acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures 
shall, where practicable, promote efficiency in 
the utilization of fishery resources; except 
that no such measure shall have economic allo­
cation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures 
shall take into account and allow for variations 




(7) Conservation and management measures 
shall where practicable minimize costs and 
avoid unnecessary duplication.
(b) Guidelines.— The Secretary (of Commerce) shall
establish guidelines, based on the national 
standards, to assist in the development of 
fishery management plans.
